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INTRODUCTION
The Kiowa, Comanche and Kiowa Apache (KCA) are best 
known for their part in the culture history of the Great 
Plains in the period prior to their confinement on a reserva­
tion in Southwestern Oklahoma. Their tribal names correctly 
conjure images of their free life as mounted nomadic hunters 
and gatherers who subsisted primarily on bison, as far- 
ranging horse raiders/horse traders, and as superior horse­
men and skilled warriors who frequently eluded the U.S. 
Cavalry.
Their cultural origins and reservation confinement 
period are less well known. The Kiowa and Kiowa Apache, 
though of different linguistic stocks, were apparently long 
term affiliates. Prior to the arrival of the horse on the 
Plains, both tribes were pedestrian hunters and gatherers 
and made use of the bison. The Comanche were also originally 
pedestrian hunters and gatherers. Their movement onto the 
Southern Plains from the Great Basin was relatively recent
1
2and roughly coincides with their adoption of the horse- 
bison complex.
Following the Medicine Lodge Treaty of 1867, the 
Kiowa, Comanche and Kiowa Apache were restricted to a single 
large reservation in Southwestern Oklahoma. Since that time 
U.S. Government agencies have made repeated efforts to re­
mold these tribes in the image of "civilized" self-sufficient 
farmers. These efforts have taken a variety of forms from 
encouraging to cajoling and bribing to nagging to threaten­
ing and punishing to training and teaching to equipping and 
assisting in the fields. It is common knowledge that these 
efforts were largely unsuccessful. Today there are but a 
handful of Kiowa, Comanche or Kiowa Apache farmers.
When the question is asked. Why is this so?, one 
immediately apparent and glib answer comes to mind; The 
Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache were buffalo hunters who 
looked down upon neighboring farming tribes and were cul­
turally and temperamentally resistant to becoming farmers. 
This cultural bias is certainly authentic and is present 
today, though its potency as a shaper of culture history and 
its universality among tribal members during the past cen­
tury is just as certainly questionable.
3Getting past the most superficial consideration of 
the problem, we are required to deal with three perplexing 
facts: (1) Throughout their culture history, the Plains
tribes, including the KCA, certainly showed an ability to 
adapt. (2) The Wichita, a "peripheral Plains" village 
farming group, were located in the same area at the same 
time and are in the same situation today vis-a-vis success 
in farming. (3) There have been at various times since 
1867 significant numbers of Kiowa, Comanche, Kiowa Apache, 
and Wichita (KCA/W) farmers.
It would seem, then, that the above mentioned answer, 
that a cultural bias prohibited the Kiowa, Comanche, and 
Kiowa Apache from becoming successful farmers, is inadequate 
and that the question remains unanswered. From even a cur­
sory consideration of the problem, it becomes apparent that 
any single factor answers, simple determinist hypotheses or 
limited time foci would be found wanting. All this is but a 
way of making a claim for the need to examine the historical 
complexity surrounding the problem.
As an indication of the welter of historically vary­
ing factors directly affecting the adoption and success of 
farming among the Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache, the 
following partial list is offered:
41. Periodically fluctuating federal policy with 
respect to treaty responsibilities and the legal status of 
American Indians and their property.
2. Treaty violations and hostile responses on both
sides.
3. The frequency of turnover in local Indian agency 
administration and continuity between administrations.
4. Tkie attitude and honesty of the local agents.
5. Inconsistent agent efforts to encourage farming
(cajole/threaten; withhold rations/furnish rations).
6. The growth of agency paternalism and individual 
Indian dependence on the agent.
7. Varying soil conditions and rainfall in South­
western Oklahoma.
8. The location of grain elevators, mills, and gins.
9. Fluctuations in local market prices for various
commodity crops.
10. Commodity market fluctuations in the national 
economy.
11. The changes in the Department of Agriculture 
policy and application of crop reduction programs.
12. The relationship between farming technology and 
minimum acreage.
513. The variety of sources of Indian subsistence 
(bison/rations/gardens "grass money"/"lease money"/etc.).
14. Opportunities to lease or sell Indian land.
15. The size and suitability of Indian allotments 
for subsistence farming.
16. Indian land inheritance practices and the frac­
tionation of original allotments.
17. The availability of capital to Indians to begin 
farming.
18. The availability of farming implements, seed, 
and agricultural training.
19. The effect of efforts to "civilize" the Indians 
upon the social organization of the Indian population.
20. Inter-tribal competition and intra-tribal fac­
tionalism.
21. Traditional Indian attitudes toward farming.
An answer as to why the KCA/W didn't become success­
ful farmers is not to be found, however, in a list of vari­
ables. This list is only offered as a sample of the complex 
series of historically occurring factors at work.
The proposed explanation will be phrased in terms of 
an analysis from three directions. First, the application 
of government policy and resulting local farming programs
6will be examined. Second, attention will be given to the 
sequential variance in the favored Indian adaptations and 
their fit in the developing local agro-economy. Third, the 
import of the development and maintenance of hindering 
paternalistic relations between the government and the KCA/W 
will be assessed as it can be seen to affect Indian farming.
An historical examination of administrative policy 
(federal government, military. Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(BIA), the local agency policy) is seen as crucial in that 
there lies the motive force behind the early push toward 
Indian farming and the source of many of the economically 
significant conditions with which the KCA/W had to deal. In 
treating the sources of administrative policy, the events, 
assumptions, and politics behind the historical development 
of policy will be evaluated. The greatest attention, how­
ever, will be given to policy application and sanctions at 
the local level where the effect of administrative dis­
continuities, internal inconsistencies, restrictions, and 
policy violations can be fully appreciated. In the phrasing 
and application of administrative policy, numerous unrealis­
tic expectations in the government's view of the problem of 
Indian self-sufficiency can be identified and subsequent 
frustrations and policy reversals better understood. In no
7way, however, is the effect of government policy applica­
tions seen as determining, though it can certainly be 
sighted as greatly contributing to the defeat of the farming 
option.
The Indian's varying alternative economic adap­
tations will be treated in the context of historically 
developing environmental, technological, and economic con­
ditions affecting farming in the KCA/W reservation and 
allotment area. The methodological frame of reference taken 
here is broadly ecological. Adaptation is used as a general 
term descriptive of the process whereby the KCA/W (and all 
populations) are seen to adjust or cope with varying con­
ditions in their environment. The intent here is to em­
phasize the conditions surrounding Indian farming (and more 
broadly, survival) as they unfold and to provide the kinds 
of ethnohistorical information that will aid us in better 
understanding the KCA/W adaptations and present economic 
conditions. It will be seen that the stereotype of Indians 
having squandered a golden opportunity for economic success 
through farming is a grim joke indeed. Finally, a brief 
discussion and comparison of KCA/W patterns of adaptation 
over an extended period from pre-horse hunting to the present 
will be offered.
8Also worthy of close examination is the historical 
development of paternalism, seen here as a reciprocal rela­
tionship which in this case served to perpetuate a critical 
dependence on the part of the Indians and helped defeat any 
design for Indian self-sufficiency. Paternalism, to be 
sure, is not all one way— neither completely a blessing nor 
totally a curse. On the reservation, the agency gave some 
real assistance to the KCA/W though the price was steep in 
terms of regulatory restrictions and eroded initiative.
Even in post-allotment times, as the BIA sought to protect 
the financial and landowning interests of the Indians, much 
power of self-determination was lost. The bureaucracy that 
the KCA/W came to depend upon in so many ways was a great 
hindrance in its lack of sensitivity to their problems and 
its crippling over-protection.
The form of presentation used here can best be called 
ethnohistorical/ecological. The first chapter presents the 
general pre-reservation cultural ecological picture for the 
Southern Plains and emphasizes the adaptability of the Plains 
tribes in their precontact situation. The second chapter 
offers a brief ethnographic description of the KCA/W and a 
resume of their culture history and contact experience prior 
to the Medicine Lodge Treaty of 1867. These chapters serve
9as a baseline against which succeeding economic adaptation 
may be appraised. The following three chapters cover his­
torical periods and offer material on administrative policy, 
KCA/W economic adaptation (especially farming), and pater­
nalism. Each chapter concludes with an analysis of the 
condition of Indian farming in that period. The general 
conclusions chapter follows in which a summary analysis and 
answer to the Indian farming question is offered.
The sources used include such documentary evidence as 
the Annual Report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
(ARCIA) and archival material from the Oklahoma Historical 
Society including KCA/W agency files and letter pressbooks. 
The viewpoint and recollections of the KCA/W are represented 
in the Doris Duke Oral History Project material and the score 
of interviews taken in Southwestern Oklahoma between January, 
1973, and August, 1977. A half dozen key informants provided 
detailed life history accounts which proved to be invaluable. 
Standard ethnographic and historical sources involving the 
KCA/W and Southwestern Oklahoma are also used as are a 
variety of economic and agricultural references. The primary 
and unpublished secondary sources used will be evaluated in 
the chapter where they are first cited.
FARMING AMONG THE KIOWA, COMANCHE,
KIOWA APACHE, AND WICHITA
CHAPTER I
CULTURAL ECOLOGY ON THE SOUTHERN PLAINS
The Great Plains Environment 
The Great Plains are constituted by that vast and 
unbroken grassland extending from the central Canadian 
provinces to the Rio Grande border of Texas. The western 
margin is fairly distinct and is established by the foot­
hills of the Rocky Mountains. The eastern margin is some­
what less distinct and is located on the Mississippi-Missoui#: 
River Valley or roughly congruent to the 97th meridian in the 
north and the 98th meridian in the south. The area contains 
the states of Kansas, Nebraska, and South Dakota and parts 
of Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Colorado, Missouri, Wyoming, 
Iowa, Montana, North Dakota, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and 
Alberta.
10
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This great outwash plain from the Rocky Mountains 
which has been modified somewhat by erosion is characterized 
by a basically flat surface which is relatively treeless and 
is subhumid to semiarid. Though there is considerable local 
variation, these generalizations hold for the area as a whole. 
The generally uniform elevation is broken by the Black Hills 
of South Dakota, the Red River Valley of the North, and the 
Wichita Mountains of Oklahoma. There is a general elevation 
decline and subsequent drainage from west to east, just as 
there is an overall reduction in annual rainfall and foliage 
density from east to west. The local river valleys and 
creeks provide an important if variable water source and sup­
port the limited stands of trees in the area.
Wedel gives a succinct description of the climatic 
picture on the Great Plains:
Considering the region as a whole, its out­
standing climatic features are the low precipita­
tion, especially limited in winter; the irregular 
and uncertain distribution of moisture received 
over long and short periods; the pronounced daily 
and seasonal temperature ranges; the low relative 
humidity, high rate of evaporation, and frequent 
droughts; the abundant sunshine; and the per­
sistent winds of relatively high velocity. In 
general, these characteristics become increasingly 
marked from east to west, and are especially typi­
cal of the High Plains (1961:30).
To amplify Wedel's statement somewhat, it should be 
noted that the pattern of moisture distribution and amount
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are uncertain seasonally and annually. The spring and early 
summer storms are of short duration accompanied by damaging 
high winds and result in local flooding and quick run-off. 
With an average hourly wind velocity above 10 mph. for the 
area and above 12 mph. for Western Oklahoma and Kansas (Webb 
1931:23), the little moisture acquired by the soil is quickly 
evaporated, keeping the area quite dry. As a result, even 
the low annual rainfall figures are misleading in their real 
effect on soil moisture. These factors combine to restrict 
the possibility of agriculture to the limited stream valley 
areas prior to the advent of modern agro-technology.
The temperature ranges from a summer high in excess 
of 110° F. from Texas to Alberta to a winter low of -16° F. 
in the south and -55° F. in the north (Wedel 1961:34). The 
Southern and Central Plains experience an annual growing 
season of 140-200 days while the Northern Plains have less 
than a 100 day growing season.
As noted earlier, trees are usually only found along 
a watercourse. For the rest of the area, a variety of 
grasses prevails. The 100th meridian, roughly congruent with 
the 20 in. annual rainfall line, serves as a transition area 
for the two major grassland ecozones on the Plains. The tall 
grasses with their permanently moist subsoil are found to the
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east of this line while the short grasses with their per­
manently dry subsoil are found to the west (Wedel 1961:36). 
This line also serves as the rough divider between the 
Prairie and the High Plains and parallels the division be­
tween the area of prehistoric village Indians and nomadic 
bison hunting Indians.
Other than grasses, the area contains a locally vary­
ing supply of tubers, berries, fruits and nuts. However, due 
to the grassland environment, it is the herbivores which are 
the most important and prominent food source for man before 
the arrival of the plow. Unquestionably the most populous 
and important of the herbivores was the bison, though the 
pronghorn antelope and mule deer also thrived in great num­
bers. Other significant Plains fauna include the wolf, coy­
ote, kit fox, jack rabbit, prairie dog, opposum, prairie 
chicken, grouse, wild turkey, turtles and fish. In the woods 
to the east and along major watercourses, white tail deer, 
elk, black bear, cougar, wildcat, beaver, otter, and raccoon 
were found (Wedel 1961:36-45).
The Great Plains environment described here is that 
which existed prior to European arrival but subsequent to the 
close of the Altithermal period some 4,500 years ago.
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Prehistory on the Great Plains 
The Great Plains have witnessed a variety of human 
adaptations over many thousands of years. Sometime before 
11,000 years ago until about 7,000 years ago. Pleistocene 
era Big Game hunters roamed the Plains and left archaeologi­
cal evidence of their occupation--from the Clovis mammoth 
hunters to the Folsom men to the Plainview ancient bison 
hunters of the Southern Plains. From 7,000 to 4,500 years 
ago the Plains experienced a dramatic environmental change 
characterized by a rise in temperature and a decline in 
moisture. For this Altithermal period there is at present 
only limited and somewhat ambiguous evidence of human habi­
tation. The extent and conditions of human occupation of 
the Plains during this time remain a matter of some contro­
versy though new evidence continues to come to light.
The next evidence of human occupation on the Plains 
is in the subsequent Medithermal period during which scat­
tered groups roamed the Western Plains. Archaeological 
evidence indicates that these men subsisted chiefly on small 
game and relatively few bison by comparison with their 
Pleistocene predecessors. A further difference from the 
Big Game hunting culture is obvious from the presence of 
grinding stones which shows that gathering had become more
15
important in their subsistence though the technology re­
mained lithic and lacked pottery (Wedel 1961:283).
At some yet undetermined time prior to 2,000 years 
ago, Woodland culture with its pottery made its first in­
roads onto the Eastern Plains from the Dakotas to Oklahoma. 
The Woodland variants include Hopewellian village sites, 
dating from about 200-300 A.D., with evidence of agriculture 
based on corn and beans and evidence of deer and bison hunt­
ing. Other Woodland hunters and gatherers were present along 
creek bottoms and their sites, dating from 1900 B.C. to 
700 A.D., have yielded little evidence of agriculture. The 
.WpcidJ-SBd era is still little known though of obvious impor­
tance, for here is found the first pottery and agriculture 
in the area, indicating the shift from food gathering to food 
production. Found principally in the tall grass Plains, the 
Woodland culture combines river valley agriculture with the 
hunting of woods game, chiefly deer, and grassland game, 
mainly bison (Wedel 1961:285).
The Woodland adaptation served as the basis for the 
rise of the succeeding Plains Village Indians beginning in 
about 800-900 A.D. and lasting for the next thousand years. 
The Plains Village Indians were more sophisticated than their 
Woodland predecessors. They occupied fortified villages with
16
substantial multifamily dwellings. Technologically su­
perior, they had abundant and varied pottery, a great 
diversity of stone, bone, horn and shell tools, and a well 
developed fishing technology, as well as the bison shoulder 
blade hoe distinctive of the Woodland peoples. In the period 
prior to European contact, small villages are found on the 
Central and Southern Plains with square or rectangular houses 
and plain or cord marked pottery. From the Niobrara south, 
villages are characteristically found on lesser water courses.
The picture in general, from the Dakotas to 
Texas seems to be one of innumerable small, widely 
scattered communities, probably not often exceed­
ing a few score inhabitants, the women tilling the 
gardens in the nearby creek bottoms and the men 
hunting along the valley margins and on the ad­
jacent uplands. Many of the basic elements of the 
culture of these smalltown peoples, such as their 
pottery, their agriculture, and their community 
life, were rooted ultimately in the east; but the 
way of life had a much stronger Plains flavor than 
did that of the earlier Woodland groups. North of 
the Niobrara, the ancestral Mandans may have been 
among the people represented; farther south, the 
Pawnees and other Caddoan groups were possibly 
among these early-day farmers in the Plains (Wedel 
1961:286).
After the mid-1500s and European contact, there is 
an apparent change in population distribution and community 
pattern among the Plains Village Indians. The small earth- 
lodge settlements on the westerly streams were abandoned 
(possibly the result of a shuffle to gain access to European
17
traders arriving in the East along the major rivers). During 
this period, the villages are fewer and larger and are lo­
cated along major streams. The house patterns are circular 
and the pottery is stamped, incised or plain with no cord 
marking.
These characteristics persisted into the 
historic period among the sedentary tribes of the 
Middle Missouri, notably the Mandans, Arikaras, 
and Hidatsas, and among the Eastern Plains tribes 
farther south, such as the Pawnees, Omahas, Otos, 
and Kansas. On the Middle Arkansas and south­
ward, the grasshouse villages of the Wichitas and 
other Caddoan-speaking groups had superseded the 
earlier settlements of wattle-and-daub and earth- 
lodge habitations. Some of these historic tribes 
were very likely lineal descendants of the early 
farmers of the prehistoric smalltown communities ; 
others seem to have been later arrivals who 
adopted the way of life of the people they found 
residing in the region (Wedel 1961:287).
At about the same time, other peoples from the east 
were pushing out onto the prairie. In the eastern Dakotas 
and southern Manitoba, possibly such people as the ancestral 
Assiniboine were arriving from the Minnesota lakes area.
Other groups possibly arriving at this time include the fore­
runners of the historical period Western Plains Algonkians, 
like the Blackfeet. To the south in the Central Eastern 
Plains, several Oneota sites seem to give evidence of an 
early influx of Siouan-speaking peoples. These sites, show­
ing a subsistence pattern based partly on agriculture and
18
partly on bison and deer hunting, are attributed to the 
early Iowa and Missouri and possibly Kansas as well. The 
Osage coming from the Ozark Plateau seem to have been clearly 
influenced by these Oneota peoples (Wedel 1961:288).
Relatively little is known of the more recent pre­
history of the Western Plains border along the Rocky Moun­
tains. We know that some Shoshoneans once commanded parts 
of the area but later retired to the periphery to become 
foragers making periodic seasonal incursions onto the High 
Plains for bison. The identity of the Plains Apache and the 
significance of the Dismal River material is still disputed, 
though it appears that some Apachean groups were on the 
Southern Plains after 1500 A.D.
The early Plains dwellers form the bases for what in 
historic times were two somewhat competing adaptations to 
the Plains: the Plains Village Indians occupying the eastern
tall grass Plains and the Plains Nomadic Indians inhabiting 
the western short grass or High Plains. With their mixed 
horticultural/hunting subsistence pattern, relatively popu­
lous sedentary villages and early access to European trade 
goods and guns, the Plains Village Indians enjoyed a more 
secure, and for a time truly affluent, existence than did 
the nomads to the west. In terms of material abundance the
19
Plains Village Indians reached their climax from 1500-1700 
on the Southern and Central Plains and from 1600-1750 in the 
Middle Missouri area. However, following the development of 
the horse/bison complex among the nomadic peoples and the 
arrival of European diseases in truly epidemic proportions 
among the village peoples, the positions were reversed. The 
period from 1750-1850 marks the ascendance and climax of the 
equestrian nomadic adaptation on the Plains. Though of 
shorter duration, it was no less successful than that of the 
Plains Village Indians and was terminated only by the virtual 
extinction of the bison and the overwhelming flood of immi­
grants from the east.
The Bison, the Horse, Trade and Warfare on 
the Plains in Historic Times
No cultural ecological treatment of the Plains would 
be complete without a discussion of the parts played by the 
bison and the horse and the patterns of trade and warfare 
that flow from the attempts to appropriate these two animals. 
Oliver (1962) has made a lengthy and perceptive analysis of 
the impact of the requirements of bison hunting via the horse 
on the cultures of historic Plains Indians and the resulting 
cultural convergence of formerly pedestrian hunting and 
gathering and agricultural peoples. He demonstrates how, in
20
the realm of social organization, original agriculturalists 
became more flexible and original hunters and gatherers be­
came more complex. Before continuing, a note of caution 
should be sounded here that environment does not determine 
but affords possibilities of exploitation and fit and that 
cultures adapt to environments while having pre-existing 
social structures, current external political relations and 
economic linkages that must be reconciled.
Oliver's painstaking analysis of bison natural his­
tory and human ecology on the Plains yields the following 
results :
That the bison was the most important single source 
of food and raw materials for the Plains Indians of historic 
times hardly needs stating and an exhaustive delineation of 
its uses would serve little purpose here. What is of concern 
is the habits and distribution of the bison and the effect 
these had on the hunting peoples. The bison was found over 
the entire Great Plains area and in fact well beyond, though 
not in the incredible numbers common to the Plains. Though 
individual bison ranged with the seasons from 100-400 miles 
north and south, bison were present on the Plains year round. 
In winter bison were found in herds of 20-100, seeking shel­
ter from the freezing wind and pawing through the snow for
21
food. During this time individual small herds tended to move 
slightly south within their usual range, while in the summer 
heat they were found farther north. In exceptionally hot and 
dry years parts of the extreme Southern Plains were tempo­
rarily abandoned by the bison. With the plentiful spring 
grass, bison began congregating in somewhat larger herds un­
til in the running season of August and September they formed 
the combined herds that truly blackened the Plains for miles 
on end. At this time the surrounding countryside would ex­
perience the temporary lack of bison except for a few old 
bulls.
These seasonal differences in the habits of the bison 
required a certain technical versatility on the part of the 
hunters. The situation is complicated by the additional fact 
that the location of bison season to season and year to year 
was unpredictable even to the Indian hunters so familiar with 
the animal. Scouts sent out in summer to locate the herds 
frequently were gone for many days before returning. It is 
apparent, then, that hunting bison was no simple matter of 
interception along seasonal game trails but required that the 
hunters literally "follow the herds around.” It is sometimes 
assumed that the Indians engaged in immediate and wholesale 
slaughter once a bison herd was located. Ewers assures us.
22
however, that the maximum number of bison killed in a single 
chase by any one mounted hunter was 4 or 5 animals (1955: 
325).
To best exploit the bison, most typical Plains 
groups made the following adjustments. First, a fluid social 
organization was needed since tribes dispersed into rela­
tively small bands in the winter and established tribal camps 
in the summer to take advantage of the habits and varying 
supply of bison and fit the requirements of available horse 
forage. To best accomplish this when separate, bands com­
posed of related families functioned under informal, pres­
tigious, and charismatic leadership. During tribal encamp­
ment and group hunts a more formalized authority prevailed 
and was executed impartially by the military societies desig­
nated as police. Military society memberships cross-cut 
kinship lines. Second, group mobility became a prime ne­
cessity in order to hunt the shifting and unpredictable 
bison, to gain horses by raid, and to avoid easy location 
and attack by enemies. Third, due to the competition between 
tribes for bison and horses, military skills became an im­
portant feature of daily life and group organization as well 
as the basis for leadership. Fourth, resulting from their 
importance to subsistence and tribal power, horses became
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not just a medium of exchange but the basis of wealth and 
status in Plains Indian society (Oliver 1962:15-18).
Ewers (1955) carefully traces the source of horses 
for the Plains Indians to the early 17th century Spanish 
stock raising settlements near Santa Fe. Horses were first 
acquired by Indians through friendly trade contacts from the 
ample supply of the Spanish who furnished examples of the 
advantages, use, and care of horses. Ewers agrees with 
Wissler (1914:2) that the Ute, Apache, Kiowa, and Caddo first 
got horses from the Spanish sometime in the 1630s through the 
1650s, and the Shoshone and Comanche gained horses shortly 
thereafter (Ewers 1955:3). More specifically, ethnohistoric 
evidence indicates that the Ute had horses by 1640. Apache 
were raiding Spanish settlements for horses in the 1660s and 
the Kiowa and Kiowa Apache were reportedly trading horses to 
the Wichita or Pawnee in 1682. In 1705, the Comanche were 
also making raids on the Spanish for horses. By the early 
1800s, the Kiowa, Comanche, Kiowa Apache, Cheyenne, and 
Arapaho had established themselves as middlemen in a vast 
and lucrative system of horse trading. Ewers (1955:8-9) 
cites the report of Antoine Tabeau, a French trader from St. 
Louis, who travelled among the Arikara in 1803-1804. Tabeau 
was told by the Arikara that they had formerly taken tobacco.
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maize and European trade goods to the Black Hills to trade 
for horses from the Kiowa, Comanche, Kiowa Apache, Cheyenne, 
and Arapaho. The Arikara had been told at the time that the 
horses came from the Spanish at San Antonio and Santa Fe and 
that they were bought or stolen at will. It should be noted 
that while the Cheyenne and Arapaho were important middlemen 
in the horse trade, they neither were among the very first 
to get horses nor among those with the easiest access to 
Spanish horses.
In general, the system of horse trade followed along 
the lines of long standing trade relations. Where the no­
madic hunters had traded meat and hides for vegetables and 
trade goods from the sedentary villagers, Spanish horses 
subsequently were traded for French and British guns in the 
1700s. The arrival of horses and guns on the Plains had far 
reaching effects, resulting in the reshuffling of tribal 
territories and the rise or fall in power of virtually every 
Plains tribe.
Initially, the spread of horses proceeded by trade, 
but raiding rapidly became the chief means of gaining horses. 
The Comanche, Kiowa, and Kiowa Apache occupied the most ad­
vantageous position for horse raiding. From the Southern 
Plains they raided New Mexico and Texas with ease. Later 
they made incredibly large scale horse raids into Mexico.
25
Horses were individually owned as private property, 
and there was a wide range in the numbers owned not only 
from one tribe to the next but from individual to individual 
within the same tribe. As noted by Mishkin (1940), 
Richardson (1940), and Ewers (1955), this condition of dif­
ferential horse wealth gave rise to the formation of class 
structure within formerly classless societies. The upper 
class included the horse rich, privileged but responsible 
leadership of the tribe. The middle class maintained a 
jealous independence and possessed relatively few horses.
The lower class was comprised of the underprivileged and 
dependent members of the tribe who attached themselves to 
the upper class families as followers (Ewers 1955:338-339).
War raids on the Plains were conducted throughout 
most of the year, though large revenge raids were limited to 
the summer. Typically, raiding parties were comprised of 
quick moving groups of 5-30 male volunteers under temporary 
charismatic leadership. These aggressive raids culminated 
in a surprise attack during which each man operated in­
dependently and the raiders quickly withdrew. Military ac­
complishment was as important to social position as horse 
wealth, and war deeds were graded and honored accordingly. 
Horse raids were conducted on foot by small groups whose
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chief aim was the stealthy theft of horses. Confrontation 
was to be avoided if possible since the raiders were out­
numbered. The Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache differ 
slightly from this pattern in that they left for horse raids 
mounted (Mishkin 1940:59) and not infrequently raided Mexico 
for horses in parties numbering above a hundred. Revenge 
raids were conducted on horseback by somewhat larger groups 
whose purpose was the taking of enemy scalps to avenge the 
loss of comrades fallen on previous raids. A great deal of 
formal ritual accompanied the return of a successful revenge 
raid party.
From the foregoing material, a series of summary 
observations upon Plains cultural ecology is in order.
1. The general Plains environment offered a bounti­
ful supply of bison and limited agricultural possibilities 
to the vicinity of watercourses in pre-reservation times.
2. Plains prehistory represents a succession of sub­
sistence adaptations culminating in struggling pedestrian 
nomadic bison hunters in the west and reasonably secure 
sedentary village agriculturalists in the east. The rela­
tively more bountiful subsistence of these peoples was due
to the combined exploitation of agricultural possibilities 
and seasonal bison hunting opportunities.
27
3. The introduction of the horse allowed greater 
efficiency in bison hunting, stimulated heavy intertribal 
trade, and with the gun resulted in the rise and fall of 
various groups on the Plains. The attraction of this adap­
tation can be seen in the virtual abandonment of agriculture 
and the adoption of a thoroughly nomadic life way by the 
Cheyenne, Arapaho, Crow, Gros Ventre, and Teton Dakota.
4. The habits of the bison and the requirements of 
horses resulted in the cultural convergence of former hunters 
and gatherers and former agriculturalists and the emergence 
of dynamically flexible social organization among the "True 
Plains" tribes.
5. There was a concomitant rise in the importance of
i
military capability due to increasing intertribal competition 
for bison and horses that was further augmented by the gun 
trade.
6. These conditions ultimately resulted in the 
nomadic equestrian bison hunters becoming dominant on the 
Plains from the mid-1700s until the mid-1800s with the de­
cline in the bison herds and increasing American military 
presence. Sometime prior to 1800 the former advantageous 
position of the Plains Village Indians residing in their 
horticultural trade centers began to erode. The
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commencement of a series of smallpox and cholera epidemics, 
frequent raids by the nomadic groups, the decline in the fur 
trade, and pressure from an unending stream of immigrants 
from the east combined to work against them in a deadly way. 
The passing of the Plains Village way of life did not occur 
overnight, but the equestrian nomads were still functioning 
without real hindrance while the villages held but a shadow 
of their former position of power and security.
CHAPTER 2
THE KIOWA, COMANCHE, KIOWA APACHE, AND WICHITA AND 
THEIR CULTURE HISTORY PRIOR TO THE 
MEDICINE LODGE TREATY OF 1867
The Kiowa
On the basis of ethnohistorical material, the Kiowa 
cannot be traced outside the Plains, so their origins remain 
somewhat of a mystery. Linguistically, the Kiowa are identi­
fied as speakers of a Tanoan related language and some 
scholars have speculated on the possibility of an ultimately 
Southwestern origin for the group (Harrington 1910:1; Lowie 
1954:217; Trager & Trager 1959:335-350).
The lack of any agricultural traditions for them 
makes it most likely that the Kiowa were nomadic hunters 
long before the spread of the horse complex. Both Mooney 
(1898:153) and Mishkin (1940:24) promote the idea of the 
northern origin of the Kiowa sometime prior to 1700 in the 
mountains of western Montana. Upon their descent onto the
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Northern Plains, they became allies of the Crow from whom 
they received horses and knowledge of the Sun Dance. If the 
Kiowa are in fact La Salle’s "Manhroat,” then their associa­
tion with the Crow would have predated 1682. They subse­
quently moved farther south into the vicinity of the Black 
Hills and maintained a position to the east of the Crow 
where they were forced to contest the area with the Cheyenne 
and Dakota. At this time the Kiowa were engaged in trade 
with the Arikara and Mandan villages to the east where they 
traded horses gained on raids to the Southwest.
Losing ground to the Cheyenne and Dakota, the Kiowa 
moved still farther south into the area adjacent to the 
Wichita Mountains and came into conflict with the Comanche. 
Kiowa-Comanche relations continued to be hostile until about 
the last decade of the 1700s at which time an enduring alli­
ance was forged between the Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa 
Apache. The Southern Plains held great attraction for the 
Kiowa since this position offered easier access to supplies 
of horses at Santa Fe and San Antonio and to southern trade 
routes.
The Kiowa remained on generally friendly terms with 
the Mescalero Apache and the pueblos, with whom they exchanged 
captive slaves for horses. They were also engaged in amicable
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trade relations with the Wichita and affiliates who served 
as middlemen in a lucrative horse trade with the French. In 
1776, for example, they traded thousands of horses and mules 
through the Wichita to the French in the east (Mishkin 
1940:6).
The longterm enemies of the Kiowa include the Caddo, 
Tonkawa, Osage, Navajo, Ute, and Jicarilla Apache. The 
Osage made a singularly devastating attack in 1833 and killed 
many Kiowa. The Cheyenne and Arapaho were also on an inter­
mittently hostile footing with the Kiowa until 1840. The 
Kiowa, as well as the Comanche, Kiowa Apache and Wichita, 
suffered severely from smallpox epidemics in 1801 and 1816. 
Despite numerous enemies, the Kiowa experience on the South­
ern Plains was marked by increasing military power and horse 
wealth.
Estimates of pre-reservation Kiowa population run to 
about 1600 people.
The yearly round for the Kiowa is the same pattern 
familiar to most True Plains tribes. In the winter, the 
tribe was split into some 10-15 bands located in scattered 
stationary camps affording members shelter and protection.
At this time there was relatively little economic activity.
In spring the bands began to reassemble and hunt. By
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mid-summer the tribe had congregated for the Sun Dance, 
group hunts and large scale raids. In Autumn, after the 
running season of the bison, the large tribal camp began 
to dwindle as bands once more went their separate ways.
The band (topadoga) was composed of a central 
patrilocal extended family and its friends and followers.
This group had a stable nucleus and a relatively fluid body. 
The maximum winter membership of any single band is esti­
mated at 400 people (Richardson 1940:8), with considerable 
range in size from one band to the next. Leadership was 
provided by an informally acknowledged band headman 
(topadoki) noted for his wisdom and generosity. The band 
headman was primarily responsible for maintaining law and 
order within the group, initiating camp movements, and or­
ganizing band defense. Voluntary cooperation was the prin­
ciple upon which the group functioned. Band size was largely 
a reflection of the headman's prestige. Superior band size 
held a payoff in terms of economic benefits and adequacy of 
defense. Less wealthy followers were sought and even com­
peted for as an advantageous labor source (Richardson 1940:6).
As Mishkin (1940:27) notes, each band was "a self- 
contained unit, economically, socially, politically and even 
religiously." The ten tribal medicine bundles or "Ten
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Grandmothers" were distributed among the bands. Each bundle 
was equal in power and, in concert with the others, served 
as the supernatural source of tribal welfare. Custody of 
the bundles was inherited through ten family lines from 
father to eldest son. The bundle holders settled disputes 
by offering terms of reparation and a medicine pipe which 
had to be accepted by the disputants. They also maintained 
bundle sanctuaries in tipis where tribal members came to 
pray, entreat, or make vows to the bundles.
For 1-2 months during the summer, the entire tribe 
formed a camp circle with each band occupying its established 
position. At this time, the group hunt and Sun Dance (Kado) 
were held and the camp harmony rule prevailed. The keeper of 
the Sun Dance medicine (taime) organized the ceremonial pro­
- a m ,  and one of the military societies served to maintain 
law and order. Richardson (1940:9) lists five military 
societies: Koisenko, Daimbega, Tonkongya, Tsetamma, and
Adltoyui. These societies, which cross-cut band divisions, 
each had two leaders and two whip bearers and functioned 
only during the tribal encampment. One of the military 
societies was also designated to police the summer hunt(s) 
and restrain young and ambitious hunters from starting ahead 
of time and disturbing the bison.
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Raiding activities of the Kiowa conformed to the 
general pattern described in the last chapter. Horse raid­
ing parties of 6-10 men and revenge raiding parties of 
100-200 were launched under charismatic leadership. Re­
cruitment for revenge raids was formalized with a pipe and 
a scalp dance was held and war deeds recounted on the group's 
successful return. Though there were many small horse raids 
during the year, the large revenge raid was possible only 
immediately after the Sun Dance.
The horse complex and accompanying horse wealth 
complex were of great importance in Kiowa society. A man 
had to have a good horse to join revenge or horse raiding 
parties and thereby gain prestige and acquire more horses. 
Despite the generosity of the rich, wealth accumulated in 
successful families and resulted in the class divisions 
noted by Mishkin (1940) and Richardson (1940). The Onde or 
first rank contained the bundle owners, great warriors, im­
portant band headmen, and the wealthy distinguished members 
of the tribe. The Ondegupa or second rank held the small 
band headmen and the moderately wealthy and distinguished.
The Kwwn or commoners were "poor but honest" and much sought 
after as followers. Finally, the Dapom (also an epithet) 
were the non-productive and non-ambitious few (Richardson
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1940:15). The sons of a wealthy family could afford to go 
to war and distinguish themselves while augmenting the 
family horse herd. The sons of commoners could seldom af­
ford to go on raids and certainly could never lead one.
While wealth was important, war honors were of the most con­
sequence in status validation. Raid leaders and individual 
warriors gained prestige and formal recognition for specific 
deeds which made them eligible for membership in the ranked 
military societies.
The Comanche
The Comanche speak a Shoshonean dialect which is part 
of the larger Uto-Aztecan language family. Formerly Great 
Basin hunters and gatherers, it is likely that in prehorse 
times they made limited pedestrian bison hunting excursions 
onto the Plains. Their relatively recent arrival onto the 
Plains appears to have originated from the southwestern 
Montana/northwestern Wyoming area (Jones 1968:13). By about 
1700, the Comanche had made their descent onto the Plains 
from the Colorado Rockies in full possession of the horse/ 
bison technology (Wallace and Hoebel 1961:117). Lowie 
(1954:216) notes that in 1701 they were found at the head­
waters of the Arkansas in Colorado and by 1705 were engaged 
in horse raids into New Mexico. In the period from 1705
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until about 1720, the Comanche and Ute collaborated in raids 
on the Spanish Southwest. During this time, the Comanche 
(lacking a supply of guns) were feeling pressure from the 
north due to the southern movement of the Blackfeet and the 
western shift of the Crow (Wallace and Hoebel 1961:10-11). 
Beginning in 1726, they were engaged in hostilities with 
their old allies, the Ute, in the competition for horses. 
Subsequently, the Comanche elected to move south for better 
access to Spanish supplies of horses.
The mid-1700s saw heavy raiding by the Comanche in 
New Mexico. The Spanish repeatedly sought amicable means of 
relieving the Comanche threat since the Comanche served as a 
buffer to the expanding influence of the French and English 
in the east (Jones 1968:16). The Comanche were simultan­
eously seeking treaties with northern tribes in order to 
secure markets for their horse trade and acquire French guns. 
It was Spanish policy not to trade guns to the Indians.
In the late 1700s, the Spanish decided to move 
against the Comanche in southeastern Colorado with the assist­
ance of the Ute. Peace was not concluded between the Spanish 
and the Comanche until 1786 (Wallace and Hoebel 1961:286). 
Shortly thereafter, renewed hostilities broke out between the 
Ute and Jicarilla Apache and the Comanche.
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It was in about 1790 that the northern Comanche bands 
formed an alliance with the Kiowa and Kiowa Apache. This 
alliance greatly strengthened the positions of all three 
tribes in the face of their numerous common enemies.
The threat of the Osage, with their ample sources of 
guns and powder, was first really felt by the Comanche in 
1802, Intermittent war raged between the two groups until 
they were restricted to their separate reservations.
After the Cheyenne and Arapaho had moved south to 
the Arkansas River, the Comanche, Kiowa, and Kiowa Apache 
intensified their hostile activities against them. Appar­
ently the Cheyenne and Arapaho had been attempting to cut 
themselves in as additional middlemen in the lucrative horse 
trade with the northern Plains villages.
In 1820, Major Long met the Comanche, among others, 
on the upper great bend of the Arkansas River,
In their heyday, the Comanche were the largest and 
most powerful nomadic group on the Southern Plains, Ranging 
from the Platte to the Red River to the Rio Grande, their 
horse wealth, gained from far flung raids, was truly in­
credible, One band was reported to have had as many as 
15,000 horses and several hundred mules (Oliver 1962:23),
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Changes in Comanche culture from their early Great 
Basin foraging pattern to their later equestrian bison hunt­
ing adaptation have been noted by Jones (1968:21). Power 
shifted from the hands of the old peace chiefs to the younger 
war chiefs with the increased emphasis on raiding. The bands 
became larger and more independent and captives began to be 
taken and assimilated into the group. Bison subsistence re­
placed gathering and rabbit hunting and the adoption of the 
horse resulted in greater mobility, increased the size of 
their range and allowed the amassing of great wealth.
It should be noted, however, that the Comanche had 
their cultural differences from the bulk of the "True Plains" 
tribes. The Comanche lacked the characteristic pattern of 
summer tribal camps and winter dispersal. The Comanche 
never united in one place as a tribe but lived in scattered 
mobile bands of varying sizes. Not infrequently bands were 
temporarily joined by other bands and band membership was 
flexible.
The Comanche had at least five large bands (Oliver 
1962:72; Jones 1968:26-27). The Penateka were the southern­
most band and were early associates of the Caddo and the 
Wichita. The Nokoni occupied a position north of the 
Penateka, while the Kotsoteka lived on the Canadian River.
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The Kwahada of the Staked Plains were the most warlike and 
were the last to surrender to the U.S. Army. Finally, the 
Yamparika maintained the latest contact with their Shosho­
nean traditions and were the northernmost band.
The Comanche had no tribal chief but headmen of 
family encampments, one of which served as a band chief or 
headman. Positions of authority were filled on the basis of 
charismatic leadership. The band peace chief decided when 
and where to move camp, while the war chief was responsible 
for organizing raids and establishing truces (Oliver 1962:23). 
Within the band, an informal council of influential men func­
tioned in an advisory capacity. Decisions affecting the band 
apparently were arrived at on a consensual basis. Status 
commonly was established on the basis of war honors and horse 
wealth.
Though there were no age grade or military societies, 
the Comanche did have small loosely organized medicine socie­
ties. By comparison with other Plains tribes, their re­
ligious patterns were simple and lacked the characteristic 
ceremonialism and ritual (Jones 1968:22). The Comanche had 
no Sun Dance prior to reservation times.
There has been much speculation as to why the Coman­
che had no hunt police. Wallace and Hoebel (1961) look to
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the Shoshonean origins of the Comanche and a characteristic 
"Shoshonean atomism." Colson (1954) states that they were 
in the "best buffalo country" and therefore didn't place as 
much emphasis on the summer hunt as other Plains tribes did 
and didn't feel the need for hunt police. It should be 
noted, however, that in hot and dry years it was not un­
common for bison to abandon completely large portions of the 
Southern Plains.
Oliver (1962:73-75) directs our attention to a set 
of characteristics of the Comanche and offers a plausible ex­
planation for their lack of hunt police. First, the bands 
were widely scattered across Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, 
Kansas and Oklahoma and many bands "were not seriously in­
volved with the buffalo." It should be remembered that it 
is probable that the various bands left the eastern peri­
phery of the Basin at different times and adapted to differ­
ent conditions on the Plains. Second, some of the bands were 
more deeply involved with horses than any other Plains group. 
A case could be made for some bands even subsisting on horse 
raid/horse trade. We know that horses were traded for food 
in the eastern villages. And just as the summer was optimal 
for group hunts, it was also optimal for raiding and trading 
horses. In times of food shortage, the horse was even eaten
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by the Comanche. Certainly, it was the horse more than the 
bison that made the Comanche prominent. Third, the ecologi­
cal situation of the bands was varied and encouraged local 
adaptations. The effect of summer heat on the bison in the 
Southern Plains already has been noted. As the Comanche 
moved south to gain easier access to horses, they occasion­
ally lost access to large bison herds. If their gains in 
horses had not outweighed their losses in bison, one would 
not expect them to have continued their move south. Finally, 
the Comanche show every indication of having been quite able 
to hunt cooperatively and effectively without hunt police. 
Since the tribe never came together, the number of hunters 
engaged in a group hunt was much smaller than for other 
tribes and therefore the group hunt was easier to coordinate. 
Hunt discipline was maintained by the hunt leader and by peer 
group.
The Kiowa Apache 
Despite Mooney's (1898:246-247) early conviction of 
a Northern Plains origin for the Kiowa Apache, subsequent 
linguistic and cultural analysis has made a Southwestern 
origin more probable (see Opler 1936; Hoijer 1938; Brant 
1951; Jordan 1965; Beals 1967; Bittle 1971; Bittle n.d.). 
Ultimately the Kiowa Apache derive from the Western
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Sub-Arctic Athabaskan stock and left the area on a move 
south at about 900 A.D. Apparently associated with the 
Lipan and Jicarilla, they arrived in the Southwest at about 
1400 A.D. and later moved independently out onto the High 
Plains. Their earlier affinity with the Lipan and Jicarilla 
can be seen in terms of linguistics, social organization, 
and culture hero myths (Brant 1951:83-89).
The Kiowa Apache are most likely descended from those 
pedestrian bison hunting Apache found on the Plains by the 
first explorers (Coronado and others) and, along with the 
Kiowa, have probably maintained the longest Plains residence 
to be found among later "True Plains" tribes (Jordan 1965 : 
1-2). If in fact La Salle's "Gattacka" and "Manhroat" are 
the Kiowa Apache and Kiowa, then these two tribes were 
mounted and trading horses from the Spanish Southwest to the 
Pawnee by 1682. From Lewis and Clark in 1805 we leam that 
the "Cataka" (Kiowa Apache?) were in the vicinity of the 
Black Hills associated with the Kiowa and trading horses for 
guns with the Arikara and Mandan villagers on the upper 
Missouri River. Mooney (1898:248) has the Kiowa Apache with 
the Kiowa in 1780 and already moving south. We know that 
after their move south trade with the northern villages 
tapered off and was replaced by trade with the Cheyenne and
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Arapaho (Jordan 1965:2). Brant offers the following re­
construction of this early period:
Quite possibly the known Comanche movement south­
ward in the early eighteenth century cut the Kiowa 
Apache off from other Apaches living marginal to 
the Plains, while it forced the Jicarilla Apache to 
retreat to the northern New Mexican highlands and 
the Lipan Apache to move southward toward the Texas 
gulf area.
If it be granted that the Kiowa Apache movement to 
the Plains took place in these general circumstances, 
we can assume that their subsequent history, judging 
from documentary sources, consisted of joining the 
Kiowa, moving about the Plains a great deal in the 
18th century, and then, in the late 18th century and 
19th, moving southward to the area they have occupied 
since (Brant 1951:133).
Sometime after 1805, then, the Kiowa Apache moved 
south of the Platte River, relinquishing their active trade 
with the northern villages, and traded at Bent's Fort on the 
Arkansas River for guns and trade goods. They also made 
trading trips to western New Mexico settlements and were 
visited by itinerant Mexican traders. Prior to the 1830s 
the Kiowa Apache inhabited an area centering in southwestern 
Oklahoma though they continued to range far and wide on raids 
(McAllister 1955:99; Lowie 1954:217). In the 1830s hos­
tilities between the Kiowa and Cheyenne, the Kiowa Apache 
maintained a careful neutrality. Together with the Arapaho, 
they are credited for helping arrange peace between the two 
warring tribes in 1840 (Jordan 1965:4). After the truce.
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relations were generally friendly between the Kiowa,
Comanche, Kiowa Apache, Cheyenne and Arapaho. Old enmities 
continued with the Ute, Navajo, Pawnee, and Osage.
It has been suggested by Wedel that the Kiowa Apache 
were at one time agriculturalists and are to be associated 
with the Dismal River material from Nebraska and Kansas. 
According to Wedel (1961:115), the Kiowa Apache joined a 
group of pueblo people seeking refuge after the Pueblo Re­
volt of 1680 and together hunted, farmed, and made pottery 
in sedentary villages. The Dismal River people are thought 
to have been displaced and scattered by the mounted Comanche. 
This account conflicts with our interpretation of La Salle's 
information that the Kiowa Apache were near the Black Hills 
trading horses to the Pawnee by this time. Further, it seems 
highly unlikely that the Kiowa Apache would lose all trace of 
pottery and agriculture by historical times. Morris Opler's 
detailed analysis (1971) of the evidence strongly supports 
the conclusion that no Apachean peoples are represented in 
the Dismal River material.
As with his treatment of Kiowa Apache origins,
Mooney comes to some hasty and erroneous conclusions as to 
their cultural position. He states: "As the Apache are
practically a part of the Kiowa in everything but language.
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they need no extended separate notice" (1898:248).
McAllister (1955), Brant (1951), Jordan (1965), Opler and 
Bittle (1961), Bittle (1971), and Bittle (N.D.) refute this 
claim.
Though the Kiowa Apache frequently participated in 
Kiowa summer encampments and large raids, their actual close­
ness has been exaggerated. Except for those summers when the 
two tribes camped together, they remained separate and dis­
tinct. McAllister notes that the Kiowa Apache were never 
subservient to or dependent upon the Kiowa but maintained a 
relationship of "social symbiosis" (1955:100-101). Their 
limited numbers, never exceeding 350 people, made summer 
affiliation with a larger tribe a virtual necessity during 
those years when enemies were many and raids were frequent. 
During the 19th century they camped variously with the 
Kiowa, Comanche, Cheyenne, Arapaho or, in peaceful years, 
alone (Jordan 1965:4).
Kiowa Apache subsistence activities follow the pat­
tern common to nomadic equestrian tribes with the exception 
that when camped alone their bison hunting endeavors were 
necessarily on a much smaller scale. Bison were taken by 
stalking, ambush or chase without any particular hunt leader 
while the surround was used when participating in group
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hunts with the Kiowa. Secondarily, antelope and deer were 
hunted. The Kiowa Apache made use of a wide range of plants 
for food including plums, prairie turnips, mesquite beans, 
and other berries, fruits, nuts, and tubers. A variety of 
other plants were also used for their medicinal properties 
(Jordan 1965). Corn and squash were gained in trade with 
farming villages to the east since the Kiowa Apache knew 
nothing of agriculture.
The Kiowa Apache are described as having been "like 
one large, endogamous band, with a keen feeling of unity" 
(McAllister 1955:99). During much of the year the tribe 
broke down into smaller camps though they routinely stayed 
close to one another. Bilateral descent and initial matri- 
local residence was the rule and the extended family was the 
basic unit of individual allegiance. Bittle (n.d.) notes 
that "the family seems to have been the sole functional unit 
of organization and it had enormous independence of decision 
and movement."
The Kiowa Apache had no single head chief and their 
political structure appears to have been quite loosely or­
ganized and based on informal leadership.
There were four dancing societies: the Rabbit
Society, the Blackfeet Society, the Horse Society and an old
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women's society. All children were members of the Rabbit 
Society (Dasowe) whose dances conferred health and long life 
on participants and gave lessons in discipline and obedience. 
The principle tribal medicine bundle holder organized and 
supervised the dances and disciplined reluctant or inactive 
dancers (Bittle n.d.).
The Blackfeet Society (Manatidie) was the principle 
men's military society. Since membership conferred not only 
honor but burdensome duties and increased personal danger, 
it was sometimes avoided. Members formed close relation­
ships with "special partners" and lived as almost insepar­
able twins. The society held an annual Spring dance but
could have dances at any time of the year before a raid. At
these dances especially brave men served as the four staff 
bearers and the whip. The Blackfeet Society was also re­
sponsible for policing camp movements and, on those occa­
sions when the Kiowa Apache participated in the Kiowa summer
hunt, they served as hunt police (McAllister 1955:153).
The Horse Society (Klintidie) was composed of 10-16 
of the tribe's oldest and bravest members and functioned as 
a "contrary" society.
Twenty of the oldest women and one old man, serving 
as drummer, formed the Izuwe or old women's secret
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organization. This society prayed for sick tribal members 
and actively participated in scalp dances (McAllister 
1955:156).
As with other nomadic Plains tribes, the most re­
spected men in the tribe were those who could combine out­
standing war records with sizeable horse herds gained from 
raiding.
Personal "power" was acquired most frequently by 
simple vision encounters with animal, plant or natural 
force "power" sources. The vision quest was not often 
attempted. "Power" was considered dangerous and was some­
times shunned by those who had had an encounter vision.
Those who accepted and developed their "power" served as 
shamans for the tribe (Brant 1951:39).
The maintenance of four tribal medicine bundles gave 
health and long life and protected the supernatural in­
terests of the tribe. The bundles, like the Blackfeet 
Society staffs, were inherited through the male line. The 
bundles conferred particular blessings on those who came and 
entreated their assistance. As with the Kiowa, bundle 
owners had the power to forcefully settle disputes between 
tribal members (Jordan 1965:8). Though the Kiowa Apache 
frequently joined the Kiowa during their Sun Dance and
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thought their presence was beneficial to the tribe, their 
own medicine bundles were considered of much greater im­
portance to their tribe's welfare.
The Wichita
The term "Wichita" refers to a group of related 
village dwelling agricultural peoples. The Wichita proper, 
Waco, and Tawakoni share the closest linguistic affiliation, 
while the Kichai are more remotely associated. These four 
groups, together with the Caddo, Pawnee, and Arikara, are 
members of the Caddoan branch of the Hokan Siouan language 
family. Though in close association with the Wichita 
proper, the Waco and Tawakoni seem always to have ranged 
somewhat to the south. The Kichai were a separate tribe but 
in the 1700s became affiliated with the Wichita speaking 
groups and ultimately merged completely with them.
The origins of the Wichita as well as those of the 
other members of the large Caddoan group were treated in the 
last chapter. Suffice to say, the Wichita were early Plains 
dwellers whose origins can be traced to the southeast peri­
phery of the Plains.
The Wichita first were contacted in 1541 by the 
Coronado expedition to Quivira. At that time they were 
found living in villages of grass-covered houses practicing
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agriculture and hunting bison. They were located within 
the great bend of the Arkansas River in south central 
Kansas (Newcomb and Field 1967:243). The same conditions 
prevailed in 1601 when the Onate expedition located the 
Wichita in the same general area.
By the mid 1600s the Wichita were engaged in trade 
with the French. Sometime in the last half of the century 
they acquired horses, though farming continued to remain 
important to subsistence. It was in 1718 and La Harpe's 
expedition into Oklahoma that the Wichita were first ob­
served raising horses. La Harpe was impressed by their 
thriving villages. By this time, the Wichita were in con­
flict with the Lipan and Comanche (Newcomb and Field 1967: 
249).
A year later, DuTisne, venturing out from the 
Illinois country, encountered two Wichita villages and ob­
served that they had both guns and horses. The Wichita 
apparently were being forced south at this time by the 
Osage.
Between 1747 and 1749, the Wichita and Comanche 
formed an alliance which gave the Comanche access to guns 
from the Wichita, furnished a supply of horses to the 
Wichita which augmented their position as prosperous
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middlemen, and allowed the French to reach the Spanish
settlements in New Mexico. Newcomb and Field (1967:241)
make the following observations on the relationship between
the Wichita and the Comanche:
The Wichita-Comanche relationship extending through 
many years was an intimate and complex one, and al­
though we have not yet pursued all of its ramifica­
tions, it is clear that in the earlier period the 
two peoples were hostile and the Wichitas dominant.
The Wichitas continued their dominant role after 
the alliance was concluded in the 1740's, but the 
Comanches were in the ascendancy. By the nineteenth 
century their positions were reversed.
In 1757, the Spanish established the San Saba Mission 
for the Lipan to the southwest of the Wichitas. The follow­
ing year, a war party of Wichita, Comanche, and Tonkawa 
attacked and destroyed the mission. The next year (1759) 
Parrilla launched a punitive campaign and was soundly de­
feated when he attacked the fortified Wichita villages on 
the Red River. Supplied by horses from the Comanche and 
with plenty of guns and powder from their heavy trade with 
the French, the Wichita easily routed the Spanish (Newcomb 
and Field 1967:261). The Wichita realized, however, that 
war with the Spanish could be costly and sent word to Cala- 
hora that they wanted peace. Calahora made visits to the 
southern Wichita on the Sabine River in 1760, 1761, and 
1762. He brought gifts and assurance that the Spanish were
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also desirous of an amicable relationship. To show their 
good faith the Wichita returned their Spanish captives.
While the southern Wichita villages remained friendly to 
Calahora, the Wichita on the Red River continued to exchange 
attacks and counterattacks with the Lipan at San Saba.
In 1762 Louisiana was transferred to the Spanish, 
though the Wichita and the French continued to trade vigor­
ously— hides, captives, and horses for guns and trade goods. 
Later, in 1769-1771, the Spanish licensed the French traders 
in their territory and forbade them to trade for horses or 
slaves and restricted the trade in guns. Consequently, the 
Wichita power position based on the horse and gun trade be­
gan to decline from this point on.
In 1771, Mezieres, a Frenchman in the Spanish service, 
gained peace with all of the Wichita for the Spanish. It was 
an uneasy peace, though, which gradually deteriorated. In 
1784 the Wichita and Comanche raided San Antonio for horses. 
The period from 1785 to 1787 saw the Osage attacking the 
Wichita and the Wichita again attacking the Lipan and raid­
ing San Antonio for horses. In their effort to maintain 
peace with the Wichita, the Spanish launched no punitive 
campaigns after the horse raids (Newcomb and Field 1967: 
272-282).
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During the last two decades of the 1700s, the Wichita 
lost the powerful position that they had gained as middlemen 
between the Southern Plains nomadic tribes and the French.
The new basis of trade with the Spanish was unsatisfactory. 
One can hardly > iame the Spanish for being less than en­
thusiastic to buy back horses stolen from their own settle­
ments at the price of equipping the raiders with guns.
In this period, the Wichita grew poor in the trade 
goods upon which they had come to depend. Their shortage 
of guns made them increasingly vulnerable to the Osage.
Severe blows were also dealt them by the epidemics of 1801 
and 1816. By the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, the power 
position of the Wichita was a thing of the past, though they 
continued to effectively subsist by farming and bison hunt­
ing. In 1808, the Wichita were found on the Brazos and Red 
Rivers drawn together for defense against the Osage. They 
suffered severe casualties in an attack by the Osage in 
1833.
The following description of the Wichita is taken 
from Schmitt and Schmitt (1952), Newcomb (1961), and Newcomb 
and Field (1967).
The Wichita occupied sedentary villages of grass 
houses adjacent to the fields where they grew corn, beans.
54
squash, and melons. After the harvest, the produce was 
dried and stored in cache pits. The women tended the gar­
dens while the men hunted near the villages. During the 
fall or winter bison hunts, the village grass houses were 
abandoned for a more mobile existence in tipis. There was 
some gathering of wild fruits and vegetables, and garden 
produce was traded for meat from the Comanche and Kiowa.
The Wichita warfare pattern generally parallels the 
larger Plains Indian tradition. Overall, however, the 
Wichita bear a strong cultural similarity to other Plains 
village dwellers, especially to the Pawnee.
Among the Waco, Tawakoni, Wichita proper, and Kichai 
there were only minor cultural differences, and even those 
disappeared as the constituent groups merged in identity 
during reservation times.
Each village was independent and had its own village 
chief, sub-chief, and lesser officials to handle its ex­
ternal affairs. The chiefs were elected by an informal 
council of warriors.
The primary social and economic unit was the matri- 
lineal matrilocal extended family. The oldest woman served 
as the household head and managed internal affairs. This
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matrilineal emphasis was significantly eroded by the in­
fluence of European contact.
The Wichita had nc actual vision quest, though 
"power” was encountered in dreams and visions. There were 
semi-secret religious dance societies and a ceremonial deer 
dance was held for the tribal welfare by medicine men three 
or four times during the year.
The Kiowa, Comanche, Kiowa Apache, 
and Wichita, 1834-1867
The following reconstruction of this period in 
Southern Plains Culture History is based upon Schmitt and 
Schmitt (1952), Brant (1951), Levy (1961), Oliver (1962), 
Jordan (1965), Newcomb and Field (1967), and Bittle (1971).
The first probable U.S. contact with the Southern 
Plains tribes was made during the Dragoon Expedition to the 
Wichita village at Devil's Canyon in 1834. As a result of 
this expedition, the Wichita, Kiowa, Comanche, and probably 
the Kiowa Apache, were invited to a council at Fort Gibson 
in early September of that year. At this time some of the 
Waco, Tawakoni, and Kichai were still in Texas. The council 
served as prelude to a meeting a year later (August, 1835) 
which resulted in the Camp Holmes Treaty. The treaty es­
tablished peace between the KCA/W and the U.S. and between
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the KCA/W and the Osage, who had been recently engaged in a 
military contest over access to bison hunting grounds.
Though formally stipulated in the treaty, peace between the 
warring tribes was short lived.
The summers of 1835 and 1836 found the Kiowa and 
Kiowa Apache raiding for horses among the Mexican settle­
ments in Texas. These two tribes were attacked by the 
Cheyenne in 1836 and there followed a long series of hos­
tilities.
In May, 1837, the Kiowa, Kiowa Apache, and Tawakoni 
met with General Stokes and Colonel Chouteau at Fort Gibson. 
Peace with the Osage and Creek was again agreed to and 
peaceful relations were reaffirmed with the U.S., Texas, and 
Mexico. This agreement, however, did not stop the raids for 
horses and captives into Texas and Mexico.
The southern Comanche endured a hungry summer in 
1838, since the bison temporarily had abandoned their ex­
treme southern range. During the same summer, hostilities 
ran high between the Cheyenne and the Kiowa. A lasting 
peace was established between these tribes in 1840, and 
attention again was turned to summer raids in Mexico. The 
preceding winter was marked by a severe smallpox epidemic 
on the Southern Plains.
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The period of 1840-1848 found the KCA/W engaged in 
uninterrupted raids into Texas and Mexico though raids 
lessened on the Santa Fe Trail. In deciding upon military 
retaliation or renewed peace efforts, the U.S. agencies in­
volved were much confused as to which groups of which tribes 
were raiding when and where, either singly or in combination.
In October, 1848, Thomas Fitzpatrick concluded an 
amicable and successful meeting with the Cheyenne, Arapaho, 
Kiowa, Kiowa Apache and a few Sioux. The tribes were warned 
against making further raids in Mexico. Nevertheless, the 
following year the Wichita, Comanche, and Lipan made raids 
along the Mexican border. Meanwhile, a cholera epidemic 
had a truly disastrous effect on the combined Kiowa and 
Kiowa Apache summer encampment causing them to disperse.
Later in the year, Fitzpatrick again met with the tribes, 
but little was accomplished. The evident lack of coordina­
tion between the Department of Indian Affairs and the mili­
tary did nothing but cause suspicion among the Kiowa and 
Kiowa Apache.
In 1851, Fitzpatrick set up a meeting with Southern 
Plains tribes for September at Fort Sumner, Kansas to ar­
range a new treaty. The Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache, 
however, initially refused to venture so far out of their
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own territory. The following year (1852), while camped near 
Fort Atkinson (formerly Fort Sumner) the Cheyenne, Arapaho, 
Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache decided to move against 
the Pawnee but subsequently were routed. By this time, the 
Wichita proper and Waco had established villages near Rush 
Springs, Oklahoma, while the Tawakoni and part of the Waco 
remained in Texas.
The second Fort Atkinson Treaty was agreed to in 
July, 1853. The government, recognizing the effect of in­
creased white travel through Indian hunting grounds, agreed 
to provide annuities of food and clothing for ten years to 
the Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache. In return, the 
tribes were to release all captives, cease intertribal war, 
stop raids to Mexico and Texas, and allow the government to 
put roads and military posts on their land. The terms were 
accepted, though the treaty had little real effect. The 
annuities were chronically short or late, and the Kiowa 
immediately resumed their raids. The Kiowa Apache began 
associating with the Cheyenne and Arapaho.
During the summer of 1854, the Kiowa, Comanche, and 
Kiowa Apache met at the Pawnee Fork with some Cheyenne, 
Arapaho, and Osage for a group campaign aginst the Sauk,
Fox, and Pottowatomie. The attackers were soundly defeated
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and the Kiowa and Comanche returned to Fort Atkinson to 
pick up their annuities. By the same time, part of the 
Wichita, along with the Caddo, Penateka Comanche, and 
Tonkawa, had accepted lands on the Brazos Reserve in Texas. 
In 1855, they were reported to have had 600 acres under 
cultivation, making good crops, raising cattle, and attract­
ing other Wichita to the reserve. They were met with hos­
tility, however, from the surrounding Texans. The result 
was an ambush in 1858 and the abandonment of the reserve in 
the following year. Those Wichita who had remained in 
Oklahoma took up residence near Fort Arbuckle in the summer 
of 1855.
The Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache suffered a 
dry, hungry summer in 1855. The next year they resumed 
their attacks on the Santa Fe Trail. The summer of 1857 
was again a hot, dry, and hungry one marked by a Kiowa raid 
against the Navajo and another raid into Mexico. Though the 
Kiowa and Comanche travelled to Fort Atkinson for annuities, 
the Kiowa Apache again remained separate and received no 
annuities. A similar situation presented itself the follow­
ing year (1858): annuities were distributed regardless of
the tribes’ recent raiding activities, the Kiowa raided in 
Mexico, and the Kiowa Apache camped with the Cheyenne and
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Arapaho. In October, the Rush Creek Massacre took place. 
Major Van Dorn's cavalry attacked a Wichita village while 
it was being visited by some Comanche on their way to Fort 
Arbuckle for a peace talk. Knowing that the Comanche sus­
pected them of collusion and fearing for their safety, the 
Wichita removed themselves to the near vicinity of Fort 
Arbuckle.
The years 1859 and 1860 were quiet ones, though the 
Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache were forced to move to 
the north for their summer hunts due to drought conditions 
in the south. The Wichita in southwestern Oklahoma suffered 
cruelly during this time due to crop failure. The Civil War 
period (1861-1865) found the Wichita removed to what is now 
Wichita, Kansas, where they shared an agency with the Caddo, 
Shawnee, Delaware, Creek, and Cherokee. Their condition re­
mained poor and a flood in 1863 wiped out their hopes for 
what had otherwise promised to be a good crop.
In 1862, the Kiowa Apache were informally adopted 
by the Arapaho and joined them on a reserve shared with the 
Cheyenne in southeastern Colorado. They continued to camp 
separately, however. In the winter and spring, another 
smallpox epidemic hit the Southern Plains tribes which 
already were suffering from lack of food. The tribes once
61
more resorted to raids on the Santa Fe Trail and to stealing 
cattle. After a hard winter, the Kiowa Apache temporarily 
rejoined the Kiowa for the summer camp in 1863.
Following the Sand Creek Massacre of Cheyenne and 
Arapaho in 1864, a general Indian War ensued. At Fort 
Larned, the Kiowa stole horses and engaged the cavalry in 
a skirmish. The government issued an order prohibiting the 
fall bison hunt. After the Sun Dance that year, the Kiowa, 
Comanche, and Kiowa Apache were attacked and put to flight 
by troops led by Kit Carson in the Texas panhandle.
In October, 1865, the Treaty of the Little Arkansas 
was concluded. The Cheyenne, Arapaho, and Kiowa Apache 
actually signed the treaty and made assurances that their 
captives would be returned. The Kiowa and Comanche, com­
plaining of former annuity irregularities, abstained. At 
this time the Kiowa Apache formally affiliated with the 
Cheyenne and Arapaho. As it turned out, agent neglect 
caused the annuities again to be irregular in the following 
years.
The summer of 1866 found the Southern Plains tribes 
on good terms with each other though their relationship with 
the government continued to be tense due to some small raids 
by unknown parties. Some politicians at this time
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considered the advisability of a war of extinction. On 
October 21, 1867, the government entered into its last 
major peaceful effort to settle with the Cheyenne, Arapaho, 
Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache. The result was the 
Treaty of Medicine Lodge. At this point, the Kiowa Apache 
once more rejoined the Kiowa and Comanche.
From the 1830s on, the decline of the bison was 
notable. The Kiowa, Comanche, Kiowa Apache, and Wichita 
were forced to compete for the dwindling herds on the 
Southern Plains with the hostile eastern tribes as well as 
with white hunters. In addition. Levy (1961:23) notes that 
a major dry cycle in the Southern Plains climate began in 
1846 and lasted through 1874. The individual effect of 
many of those dry years has already been noted. The 
southern tribes were forced to range northward out of their 
home territory for bison and the same conditions brought 
crop failure to the already economically reduced Wichita 
villages.
In the major epidemics of 1801, 1816, 1839-1840, 
1849-1850, and 1861-1862, it is estimated that the nomadic 
tribes lost as much as one quarter of their population in 
a single bout, while the sedentary villages lost as much as 
one-half of their population. It is evident that by 1867,
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the Kiowa, Comanche, Kiowa Apache, and Wichita were in a 
stressful ecological position. When the reduction of the 
bison and the frequent epidemics are coupled with the de­
cline of the horse and gun trade and the increasing U.S. 
military presence in their territory, their situation ap­
pears even more grim. Though they were increasingly 
threatened by these conditions, as long as they had horses 
and bison, some hope remained.
The government failed to gain control of the situa­
tion, partly through the remoteness of its agents, partly 
through the lack of realism in the treaties it made, and 
partly due to the fact that a supply of bison, though re­
duced, was at hand to the tribes. Through the treaties, 
both the government and the Indians learned a lesson in 
mutual unreliability that was continued from that point on. 
As the game diminished and treaties were made prohibiting 
raids, the government, in effect, encouraged Indian re­
liance on undependable annuities. Indian frustration with 
their condition and governmental attempts to find alterna­
tives to bison or rations are dealt with in the following 
chapter.
CHAPTER 3 
THE RESERVATION PERIOD, 1867-1901
Developments in Federal Indian Policy 
The development of federal Indian policy through 
1901 can be organized into three succeeding stages:
(a) antecedent British Crown policy; (b) the push for 
tribal pacification and concentration upon isolated reser­
vations; (c) the move toward individual allotment and 
tribal dispersal and atomization, i.e. the breakup of 
reservations and forced assimilation of Indian populations. 
In the latter two stages Indian self-sufficiency through 
agriculture was a consistent goal of federal policy makers.
As Officer (1971:10-11) notes, British Crown policy 
recognized that the Indians had "a compensable interest in 
the lands they occupied and used" and required certain 
protection by the government. The British colonies and 
later the U.S. government "acknowledged certain rights of 
sovereignty and entered into treaties" which included the
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regulation of Indian trade and land sale. It was after the 
War of 1812, however, that U.S. Indian policy took the 
familiar form of territorial acquisition and Indian isola­
tion and removal (Officer 1971:13).
In 1849, Congress created the Department of Interior 
and transferred responsibility for Indian affairs from the 
War department to the Secretary of the Interior, where the 
source of federal Indian policy remains to this day. This 
move was not without controversy. There was significant 
pressure to return authority over the Indians to the mili­
tary for thirty years following the transfer to the Depart­
ment of Interior (Officer 1971:26; Priest 1942:15-27). The 
military did retain authority over off-reservation hostile 
groups until pacification was accomplished. This appar­
ently practical division of authority proved to be a source 
of problems in the late 1860s and early 1870s in dealing 
with the KCA/W. It disallowed any well coordinated, effec­
tive means of dealing with Indian problems (see below the 
problems encountered by agents Tatum and Haworth of the 
KCA).
Also in 1849, Superintendent Mitchell (cited in 
Bittle 1971:8-9), made some interesting observations con­
cerning the Southern Plains tribes nearly 20 years prior to
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their reservation confinement. He noted that the bison 
soon would be eliminated, that the agricultural prospects 
for the area were not good, and that cattle herding appeared 
a much more likely subsistence pursuit for the Indians in 
the future. Later, many KCA agents would come to the same 
conclusion, though the goal would never be realized.
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Manypenny called for 
the policy of Indian removal to be abandoned in 1853 in 
favor of the establishment of permanent reservations which 
would allow the Indians to settle in security and develop 
agricultural self-sufficiency. He also envisioned the 
beginning of a voluntary allotment program. Consistent with 
this vision, the Omaha Treaty of 1854 included just such an 
allotment clause (Officer 1971:26), though the Dawes Act, 
calling for general allotment, was not passed for another 
33 years.
Twelve years prior to the Medicine Lodge Treaty 
the federal government already had a farm plan in mind for 
the KCA/W (Bittle 1971:17).
The preceding prophetic visions and events were 
much in advance of their eventual general applications and 
are not to be taken as indicative of the ordinary concerns 
of the Department of Interior and the Congress at the time.
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Pacification and reservation confinement were yet to be 
accomplished on the Southern Plains and remained the chief 
immediate goals until 1875. During 1865-1867, a joint com­
mittee was established to investigate the conditions of the 
Indians. The committee reported increasing white trespass 
onto Indian lands, the rapid destruction of the bison, and 
deplorable reservation conditions, but no actions were 
immediately taken to alter the situation (Officer 1971:27).
In 1866, Congress authorized the Indian Peace Com­
mission to make treaties with the Western tribes. Western 
Oklahoma was designated for the Southern Plains tribes' 
reservations. For this purpose, 5,546 square miles were 
ceded to the government by the Chickasaw and Choctaw 
(Wallace and Hoebel 1952:309). The following year, the 
Medicine Lodge Treaty defined reservations for the KCA and 
Cheyenne and Arapaho.
The Board of Indian Commissioners was created as a 
source of recommendations for improvements to the Indian 
Bureau. The Board, composed of nine "philanthropist" ad­
visors, functioned until 1934. For yearly 20 years, the 
Board's potentialities were held in check by bureaucratic 
opposition due to the "joint control clause," dividing 
policy-making authority between the Board and the Department
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of Interior without any clear definition of roles or juris­
dictions (Priest 1942:42), This conflict was continually 
carried to the Congress but was never resolved.
As part of President Grant's Peace Policy, mission­
aries were placed in charge of the reservation agencies in 
1869. This move was largely a response to the problem of 
inept and fraudulent handling of annuities for the Indians 
prior to the Civil War (Officer 1971:29). The Quakers were 
given control of agencies in Indian Territory.
Church nomination of Indian agents continued for 
nearly 10 years. During this time problems arose in intra- 
Church coordination, government support, inter-Church 
rivalry, Church/lndian Bureau resentment, and Church/mili- 
tary antagonism (Priest 1942:28).
Church nomination generally upgraded agent honesty 
and sympathetic concern for the Indians. The honest, con­
cerned, and inexperienced churchmen, however, proved to be 
incompetent administrators (Priest 1942:37). The overall 
failure of these agents helped emphasize the need for 
fundamental reform in the Indian Affairs administration. 
Clearly, honest and concerned agents were not all that the 
situation required.
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The Indian Appropriation Bill of 1871 brought an 
end to the treaty-making era and the fiction of Indian 
tribes as autonomous political powers. It was anticipated 
that the bill would assist in getting better policy and 
policy applications by making the process public. In 
reality, it did little to improve conditions. With the end 
of treaty-making came the end of direct Indian input and 
their requisite acceptance of the policies affecting them 
(Priest 1942:102).
The annuity system was many things to many people.
To Congress, it was an unpopular fiscal drain, though a 
recognizable treaty obligation. To westerners, it was a 
means of pacifying a dangerous neighboring population.
To the Indians, it was something owed them and needed by 
them, despite frequent prodigal usage and, just as frequent, 
late delivery of useless goods. To annuity contractors, it
was big business and a chance to cash in on governmental
corruption and mismanagement. The result was that the 
government, taxpayers and Indians were cheated, the annuity 
profiteers became wealthy, and the Indians often either got 
what they didn't need or want or got rotten food and flawed
goods (Priest 1942:106). A further, as yet largely un­
noticed, result was that the Indians were becoming
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increasingly dependent upon the annuity system for sur­
vival.
Annuity reforms commenced in the late 1870s affected 
the types of items furnished and emphasized economic useful­
ness. The period from 1878 to 1889 saw a decrease in 
rations, an increase in domestic, educational and agricul­
tural annuities, and the abandonment of the use of tribal 
leaders as annuity distributors (Priest 1942:110). As Priest 
notes, however, "the Congressional practice of providing as 
little as possible for the conduct of Indian affairs seri­
ously impeded reform" (1942:119).
Levels for the funding of annuities were established 
early, at a time when bison still provided many tribes with 
the bulk of their subsistence. With the demise of the 
bison. Congress continually acted to cut rather than expand 
its already conservative Indian budget, reducing not only 
rations but also agency personnel. The Indian Appropriation 
Bill of 1875 allowed only $6,000 per reservation for all 
agency employees (Priest 1942:119), limiting personnel at the 
initial critical phase in the promotion of Indian self- 
sufficiency through agriculture. Another example can be 
found in 1884 when Congress provided what it thought was a 
generous $25,000 for farm instructors on all reservations--
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enough for one farmer for every three reservations that 
required one (Priest 1942;119). Of course, there were sig­
nificant fluctuations in the level of yearly Indian appro­
priations. Congress, however, consistently sought to cut 
the level of funding and consistently provided less than 
was required to expect reasonable success in achieving the 
goals it had in mind for the Indians, viz. independence, 
self-sufficient farming, and Christian citizenship. As 
Priest notes:
There was no relation between the miracles Congress 
wished the Indians to accomplish and the means it 
provided to help them do so, . . . more employees 
and men of considerably greater ability were 
necessary if annuities were to be reduced, for 
while anyone could distribute rations in one day, 
farming instructors had to exert intelligent effort 
over a long period (Priest 1942:119).
The wisdom of spending more now on instructional personnel
in order to save later on rations was apparently not accepted
by Congress.
The Congressional battles over Indian appropriations 
largely reflected party and sectional differences. The 
Democrats in the House pushed for cutbacks in Indian funding, 
while the Republicans in the Senate from New England and the 
West fought to maintain current levels of spending. The 
result was usually a compromise budget (Priest 1942:117).
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Corruption was widespread in the upper levels of the 
Indian Affairs administration in 1869-1880. In this connec­
tion, Priest notes that "until President-elect Hayes an­
nounced the appointment of Carl Schurz as Secretary of the 
Interior in 1877, no positive action was taken to check the 
spread of crimes against the American Indians" (1942:68). 
Secretary Schurz started housecleaning over significant oppo­
sition and extensive corruption turned up in the wake of the 
investigation. The new commissioner, Hayt, pursued a ruth­
less hatchet job of reform, but was later found corrupt him­
self and was dismissed in January, 1880. Though Hayes and 
Schurz had failed to accomplish the reform they sought, their 
investigations exposed the extent of the corruption in Indian 
Affairs, roused popular support for reform, and directed 
public concern to problems in Indian administration (Priest 
1942:68).
By the 1870s and 1880s, some reformers were regretting 
the reservation isolation of the Indians which prevented 
Indian-white contact which they imagined would have a civiliz­
ing effect on the Indians. In 1877, the Board of Indian 
Commissioners recommended allotment of the Indians. In 1879, 
the first general allotment bill was introduced in Congress. 
Reform-minded Secretary Schurz promoted the severalty bill.
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saying that he thought it was the Indians' wish to have "a 
white man's title to their lands" (Washburn 1975:7). Allot­
ment, however, was not quickly accepted or passed.
By the 1870s, flagrant white encroachment onto 
reservations required constant governmental vigilance to hold 
it more or less in check. The weakness of the government in 
the face of greed is illustrated by the Black Hills gold rush 
war and the forced sale of Sioux reservation land.
In April, 1879, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
alerted President Hayes of a plot by surrounding settlers 
to seize forcibly Indian land in Indian Territory. The plot 
was foiled and its exposure served to retard rather than 
hasten the opening of the reservations (Washburn 1975:6;
Priest 1942:75).
Gradually, however, defenders of the reservation 
system were recognizing the impossibility of maintaining the 
status quo and were concluding that a voluntary allotment 
plan seemed the best alternative (Washburn 1975:6).
Both Washburn (1975:5) and Priest (1942:77) agree that 
the event which started the organized public concern with 
Indian rights was the Ponca removal. In 1876, the government 
decided to remove the Ponca from their original reservation 
in Nebraska to one in Indian Territory. The Ponca sought in
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vain for permission to return to their original reservation. 
Their flight back to the north and ensuing court case in 1879 
did much to highlight not only their plight but also the 
various problems in Indian administration.
By 1880, the tide of public sentiment had turned in 
favor of the Indians' cause. This was brought about by the 
exposure of fraud and corruption in the Commissioner's 
office, white encroachment onto Indian land, and the Ponca 
removal tragedy (Priest 1942:66).
The following organizations, founded at this time, 
were to play major roles in the debate over allotment that 
was brewing, and each in its way attempted to represent the 
best interests of the Indians. The Women's National Indian 
Association was founded in Philadelphia in 1879. It origi­
nally was formed to oppose the opening of Indian Territory. 
Rapidly its scope widened, and by 1886 it had 60 branch 
organizations. The Indian Rights Association also was 
founded in Philadelphia, in 1882. In 1883, the influential 
annual Lake Mohonk Conferences commenced. These conferences 
played an important prelegislative role by providing an 
arena in which different opinions could be aired and compro­
mises worked out. The National Indian Defense Association,
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known for its conservative position favoring Indian isola­
tion, was formed in 1885 in Washington.
In his annual report in 1880, the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs stated that "the demand for title to lands 
in severalty by the reservation Indians is almost universal" 
(quoted in Washburn 1975:8). Was this a lie or just a 
serious error? The authentic wishes of the Indians on this 
issue went unheeded, in any case. By no stretch of the 
imagination was it true that the Indians were in favor of 
allotment.
An interesting example is provided by the Five 
Civilized Tribes who were economically successful agri­
cultural peoples living on reservations in eastern Indian 
Territory. They were well organized enough and prosperous 
enough to send vocal lobbyists to Washington (Washburn 1975: 
8). Though they were able to gain exemption from the ini­
tial allotment act, however, later they were forced to accept 
allotment by the Curtis Act of 1898 and the Burke Act of 
1906. If wealthy Christian agricultural tribes with consti­
tutional governments could not prevail against the push for 
allotment, what tribes could?
Early versions of the allotment bill called for 
gradual allotment, Indian consent, and the guarantee of
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tribal patent. Almost immediately, the idea of gradual 
allotment was swept aside in the haste to make land avail­
able and to assimilate the Indians "for their own good" 
(Priest 1942:124).
At the 1884 Lake Mohonk Conference, it was resolved 
by the participants that tribal organization was a serious 
hindrance to civilizing the Indians, that immediate allot­
ment should be extended to all Indians wishing it, and that 
all other Indians should be alloted "as soon as practicable" 
(Washburn 1975:12). The conference, attended by repre­
sentatives of the government, the reform organizations, and 
various churches and universities, went on to endorse the 
Coke Bill calling for voluntary allotment. As with the 
other general allotment bills introduced in Congress since 
1879, the Coke Bill neither passed nor failed, but was 
shuffled back and forth and debated (Washburn 1975:15).
The debate that raged during the 1885 Lake Mohonk 
Conference dramatized quite well the central issue. General 
S. C. Armstrong and Dr. Lyman Abbott advocated forced allot­
ment and the abrogation of all prior treaty obligations. 
Senator Henry Dawes of Massachusetts and Herbert Welsh of 
the Indian Right Association opposed the forced or hasty 
application of allotment in favor of a voluntary, gradual
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approach (Washburn 1975:17). Both arguments were couched in 
terms of seeking justice and equality for the Indians and the 
best opportunity for their advancement. The rhetoric was a 
thin disguise for the multiplicity of other motives.
The Board of Indian Commissioners canvassed 49 Indian 
agents on the allotment question in November, 1885. All of 
the agents said that their tribes were not ready, and over 
half said that allotment would fail to accomplish its in­
tended goal (Washburn 1975:19).
Senator Dawes, who staunchly opposed forced allot­
ment, either capitulated to what he saw as the inevitable 
forces of land greed or vacillated in his opinion (Washburn 
1975:12, 18, 21). In any case, the bill requiring general 
allotment that was passed in 1887 bears his name. Whether 
or not adherence to his original position would have done 
more than delay forced allotment for a year or two is 
problematic.
The Dawes Bill was passed in the Senate during 
February, 1886. It gave the executive branch the power to 
allot individual Indians tracts of 40-60 acres based on age 
and marital status, and to buy the remainder of the reserva­
tion and open it to white settlement. Ten days prior to 
this, the House passed an amendment requiring the consent of
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the male majority of each tribe to be allotted. A joint 
Congressional committee was called and finally succeeded 
in eliminating the amendment. The bill was passed by the 
House in January, 1887, stood approved by the Senate, and 
was signed into law by the president on February 8, 1887 
(Washburn 1975:24-26).
The Dawes Act became the cornerstone of federal 
Indian policy until 1934. It provided for 160 acres to 
each family head, 80 acres to each single adult, and 40 
acres to each child under 18 years. "Trust" patents were 
to be issued making the land inalienable for 25 years, after 
which time "fee" patents would be issued. Some tribes, in­
cluding the KCA/W, were initially exempted from the Dawes 
Act.
After passage of the Dawes Act, protest by the 
opposing forces was heard only briefly. In general, in­
terest in and concern for the Indians waned greatly, and 
little enthusiasm was found to provide the kind of follow- 
through that would make the goal of the legislation a 
reality. This sudden decline in interest accurately re­
flected the true source of interest in Indian reform at the 
time--self-interest. Within two years of the passage of the 
Dawes Act, regretful soul searching and recognition of its
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failure to achieve its goal was heard at the annual Lake
Mohonk Conference where the bill originally was framed and
approved (Washburn 1975:30). The floodgates, however, were
open, and there was no going back. Avarice and ignorant
righteous concern had won out, and the Indians paid for this
white adventure with their land.
The bill which eventually passed was a skillful 
compromise and blending of the interests of land 
speculators and humanitarians, westerners and 
easterners, frontiersmen and intellectuals. When 
the promise of the legislation proved abortive, 
humanitarians, in the opinion of one historian, 
sought to blame its failure on greedy westerners 
and insensitive administrators rather than their 
own fantastic expectations (Washburn 1975:30).
In 1891, the Dawes Act was amended to limit allot­
ments to 80 acres and provide for the leasing of Indian 
allotments under certain conditions. It was further modi­
fied in 1894 and 1897 with regard to the specifics of the 
leasing provision. This was done despite the objection of 
Dawes and other reformers who correctly assessed the prac­
tice of leasing as a major contributor to continued non­
productivity among the allotted Indians (Washburn 1975:29). 
Supporters of leasing argued that some allotted Indians 
were too young, too old, or too sick to farm their allot­
ments and that their land should not be wasted when it could 
be used to benefit them by leasing (Otis 1973:124). In
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1898, the Sac and Fox agent In Oklahoma defended leasing as 
furnishing a good example in the white "leaseman." One 
agent went so far as to say that the Indians got more out 
of leasing their land to whites than if they had farmed it 
themselves (Otis 1973:125). The result of this travesty on 
the original intent of the allotment program is obvious and 
will be dealt with specifically in the following chapters.
It is sufficient to note here that by allowing what de­
veloped into uncontrolled white leasing of Indian allot­
ments any potential for even limited success of the allot­
ment program was eliminated. Not until the Great Depression 
and the New Deal was an effort made to reverse the failure 
of the allotment program (Washburn 1975:30).
Though the phrase comes from Lyman Abbott who was 
somewhat of an embarrassment to fellow severalty supporters, 
the notion that "barbarism has no rights which civilization 
is bound to respect" (quoted in Washburn 1975:16), is in­
dicative of the general attitude, if not the rhetoric, which 
prevailed in Indian policy once the Indian military threat 
was eradicated and tribal sovereignty became a legal con­
venience. It was Colonel William McMichael of the Board of 
Indian Commissioners who said during the severalty debates
81
that "we must protect the Indian, not against himself, but 
against ourselves" (Washburn 1975:18).
"^ he Farming Frontier in Areas Adjacent 
to the KCA/W Reservation
The area immediately to the southwest of Indian 
Territory was settled late relative to the rest of the 
Plains Frontier. Indian raiding activity posed a barrier 
until their pacification in 1875. The area also offered 
unfavorable climatic conditions for agriculture. Indian 
Territory itself was officially closed to all settlement 
until 1889.
In the 1860s, Indian depredations actually caused 
a loss of population for much of west Texas (Fite 1966: 
195). After 1875, west Texas boomed with the influx of 
pioneers and cattlemen. The cattle empire greatly ex­
panded in the 1870s in the Texas area surrounding south­
western Indian Territory. In the 1880s and 1890s ranching 
was still the dominant use of land in this area (Fite 1966 : 
199).
The farmers initially planted gardens and fodder 
for their livestock. Corn was unquestionably the dominant 
crop in the 1860s through the 1880s. Gradually, winter 
wheat made its entry. Winter wheat offered the dual
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advantages of winter pasturage and suitability to local 
climatic conditions. The development of interest in cotton 
during the 1870s and 1880s was severely hindered by the un­
availability of gins (Fite 1966:197). Small scale agri­
culture required a combination of crops and livestock in a 
pattern of diversified subsistence farming. An additional 
requirement of considerable cost to the settlers was ade­
quate fencing, given the dominance of cattle raising in the 
area.
On the northern border of Indian Territory, squatters 
from Kansas continually made a nuisance of themselves in the 
1870s. The policy prohibiting trespassing on Indian reser­
vations was hard to enforce, even though army troopers re­
peatedly attempted to clear the squatters out (Fite 1966: 
203-204).
Indian Territory finally experienced massive white 
settlement in 1889-1901. In April, 1889, the "unassigned 
lands" in Indian Territory were opened to settlement. The 
area is located in what is now north central Oklahoma ad­
jacent to the former KCA/W and Cheyenne and Arapaho reser­
vations. In opening the area, the "land run" was used for 
the first time (Fite 1966:205).
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In rapid succession former reservation land was 
opened to settlement. The lands of the Sac and Fox, Iowa, 
Shawnee, and Potawatomi were opened in 1891. The Cheyenne 
and Arapaho reservation was opened in 1892. The run for the 
Cherokee Outlet was made in 1893. In 1901, the KCA/W sur­
plus lands were dispersed by lottery. Of the 170,000 people 
registered for the lottery, only 6,500 received land (Fite 
1966:208). Though the anxious settlers soon faced dis­
couragement from the environment and market conditions, 
Oklahoma offered the best land available at the time of the 
opening (Fite 1966:214). It should be noted, however, that 
when land was opened there was routinely much large and 
small scale speculation and that not everyone who staked a 
claim was a homesteader. Frequently, homesteaders arrived 
too late and had to buy claims from speculators at rapidly 
inflating prices. Fite states that "the great majority of 
entries filed on government land after about 1898 were made 
by petty speculators who had no intention of farming" (Fite 
1966:215).
1867-1875, Years of Military Conflict and the 
Beginning of Reservation Life
The advent of the Medicine Lodge Treaty in October, 
1867, found the Southern Plains tribes in varying
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circumstances. The Arapaho were peaceful but short of food. 
Some of the Cheyenne young men were making sporadic raids.
The KCA had returned from a raid against the Navajo (Nye 
1968:106-107).
The white participants of the treaty council, in­
cluding Commissioner Taylor and other prominent officials, 
assembled at Fort Lamed and then proceeded to Medicine 
Lodge Creek in Southern Kansas. While on their way, many 
white men in the party tactlessly engaged in shooting bison 
for sport and succeeded in outraging the Indians (Debo 1970: 
186).
As the council convened, the commissioner made his 
charges against the tribes and sternly warned them to stop 
their raids. Ten Bears of the Comanche, followed by 
Santanta of the Kiowa, was quick to reply. They both justi­
fied their deeds and said that all they wanted was to be left 
alone to continue their free roaming, hunting life. Taylor 
responded that they would have to change before the bison 
were all gone, and he urged them to accept a reservation 
where they would be fed, clothed, housed and educated (Nye 
1968:107-108; Debo 1970:187-188).
The Kiowa and Comanche refused to sign until it was 
agreed that they would be allowed to go off the reservation
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to hunt bison. In the course of a week's time all five 
nomadic Southern Plains tribes signed the treaty in which 
they agreed to accept restriction to Indian Territory, stop 
raiding, allow traffic across their lands, and permit the 
building of railroads and army posts. In return, the 
government promised to safeguard their reservations, provide 
an agency, schools, a blacksmith, a doctor, agricultural 
equipment and instruction, a new suit of clothes at the 
annual census and $30,000 appropriated yearly for thirty 
years "for the judicious purchase of such articles as may 
seem proper to the conditions and necessities of the Indians 
(KCA)" (Mooney 1898:184-185; Brant 1951:138; Nye 1968:109; 
Pennington 1972:507). This appropriation amounted to some­
thing less than $10 per person (KCA) per year. It is un­
clear why the tribes signed the treaty; whether from a desire 
for presents and rations or from the threat posed by the 
council's escort troops. In any event, after signing the 
treaty the KCA moved to the vicinity of Fort Cobb and agent 
Leavenworth established a temporary agency in Eureka Valley. 
The agency was not equipped and no rations arrived for the 
Indians during the winter of 1867-1868 (Nye 1965:111).
The Wichita and affiliated tribes who had been liv­
ing on a crowded reservation in Kansas returned to Indian
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Territory in 1867. The incredible conditions and circum­
stances under which they were removed from Butler County, 
Kansas to a reservation adjacent to the KCA are well des­
cribed in Buntin (1934:1-17). The relatively short trip 
took close to a year, cost much in rations and Indian lives, 
and represents an excellent example of the ineptness with 
which Indian affairs frequently were carried out. Plagued 
by cholera and arriving too late to begin farming, the 
Wichita were demoralized, unsettled, and completely dependent 
upon the government during the winter of 1867-1868 (ARCIA 
1867:323. ARCIA indicates the annual agent's reports to 
the Commissioner published in the Annual Report of the Com­
missioner of Indian Affairs).
Up to the mid-1700s, the Wichita population had 
exceeded 10,000 persons. During the last half of the 
1700s, they experienced a rapid decline in numbers. This 
decline slowed somewhat in the 1800s, though by 1867 only 
758 Wichita remained (Bell 1967:348).
The years from 1867 to 1875 were confusing and 
violent ones for the KCA/W. Drought, scarcity of bison, 
and lateness or shortage of rations posed a subsistence 
problem for all four groups. Raiding parties of uneon- 
trolable young men from the Kiowa and Comanche perpetrated
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acts for which their entire tribes were held responsible 
and; therefore, punishable. The stressful and frustrating 
reservation conditions also led to competition among the 
leaders of the various tribal factions. The army responded 
to raids with punitive actions against raiding and non­
raiding factions alike. These punitive actions, in turn, 
aroused the fear, anger, and hostility of entire tribes.
The cycle of escalation was complete by 1874 and ran its 
course until the tribes were worn to exhaustion and 
straggled in to the agency to surrender in February, 1875. 
During this period, the Wichita and most of the Kiowa Apache 
remained as non-combatants, though they did flee the agency 
at times. The early development of agriculture among the 
KCA/W was retarded by the frequent military campaigns in 
the area.
In the winter and spring of 1868, the frustrated and 
hungry Kiowa and Comanche victimized the Wichita crops and 
stock, raided the Wichita agency for food, and threatened 
their own agent, Leavenworth, who fled (ARCIA 1868:287-288; 
Nye 1968:113). In May, most of the Kiowa and Comanche moved 
north for bison.
During the summer, numerous raids were made into 
Texas and a campaign against the Navajo resulted in attack
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and rout at the hands of the Ute. In mid-July, the KCA and 
Cheyenne and Arapaho converged on Fort Larned for their 
annuities.
As a result of Indian raids in late summer and fall, 
Sheridan's punitive winter campaign was launched, during 
which Custer led the attack against the Cheyenne and Arapaho 
winter camps along the Washita (Nye 1968:127; Debo 1970: 
189-190). After the cavalry's successful attack, the 
Indians fled and later were forced into Fort Cobb to join 
the KCA held there.
In January of 1869, construction was begun on Fort 
Sill and a nearby agency for the KCA was established. After 
their move to the vicinity of their new agency, the KCA re­
mained peacefully on the reservation for a year with the ex­
ception of a few raids into Texas.
Grant's Peace Policy, initiated in the same year, 
gave a big push to the program of reservation localization 
of Indians and their training as agriculturalists. At this 
time the first two farm instructors were hired for the KCA. 
In payment they received $60 per month, a daily ration, and 
10% of the Indian crops (Pennington 1972:11). The Kiowa 
and Kiowa Apache had 55 acres plowed for them and planted 
in c o m  and vegetables. Agent Tatum stated that they showed
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"little interest in their crops" and that they preferred to 
hunt (ARCIA 1869:385). Their horses ruined the crop. The 
corn meal ration given the Indians was bad and caused 
diarrhea, so it was fed to their horses. When the clothing 
annuity arrived, it contained fancy dress clothes which were 
completely unsuited to the Indians' needs. Despite these 
problems, Tatum had confidence in his plan for educating and 
making self-sufficient farmers of the KCA (ARCIA 1869:385). 
Tatum initially was a concerned, energetic, and ambitious 
agent, though he was more than a little unrealistic in ex­
pecting the Indians to act like and take the same responsi­
bilities and outlook as Quaker farmers in the East.
At the Wichita agency, though the Indians expressed 
a desire for implements and seed for the next season, little 
was accomplished other than limited gardening. The Penateka 
Comanche and some Pawnee were included on the Wichita reser­
vation at that time. The Penateka had acquired some farming 
skills on their former reservation in Texas and had 71 acres 
in corn and vegetables (ARCIA 1869:384).
During 1869, the Wichita suffered from short rations 
of poor quality. In his annual report, their agent esti­
mated that the government had paid six times what the
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rations were worth and as a result had run short of funds 
for other necessities (ARCIA 1869:393).
During the spring and summer of 1870, the KCA went 
off reservation to hunt and also engaged in various small, 
sporadic raids in Texas. In order to discourage raiding, 
sale of stock and purchase of guns and ammunition by Indians 
was prohibited. Tatum noted that the peaceful tribes re­
ceived much less than the raiding tribes in the way of 
rations and annuity goods and that this served to encourage 
raiding, since the Indians were also well aware of the cor­
relation (ARCIA 1870:261-262).
General Hazen of Fort Sill assisted Tatum in getting 
land plowed for Indians to farm and gave him $3,000 for im­
plements and seed. Tatum's budget apparently had been cut 
back and such assistance was greatly needed. Despite this 
aid, the Indian farming picture for the year was grim.
The Wichitas prefer their small patches in the 
edge of the woods to a field. The Comanches,
Kiowas, and Apaches had made no effort to raise 
a crop this year (ARCIA 1870:265).
In the past, Indian captives usually had been ran­
somed by the government. Tatum refused to do this and with­
held all rations until the captives were brought in. This 
move was decisive and effective and served to discourage the 
further taking of captives. However, it does herald a trend
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of growing autocratic power concentrated in the hands of 
individual agents. Coupled with increasing Indian depend­
ence on rations, it constituted a basic feature of the 
emerging paternalistic relationship between the Indians and 
their agents.
Raiding among the KCA intensified during 1871. Tatum 
attributed much of it to the presence of traders from Mexico 
and New Mexico who illegally offered Indians guns and ammu­
nition for stolen horses, mules, and cattle (ARCIA 1871:503). 
The series of raids into Texas and Mexico culminated in the 
attack on the Warren Wagon Train in Texas on May 18, 1871, 
in which seven wagoneers were killed. The Kiowa leaders, 
Santanta, Big Tree, and Satank, were arrested at the agency 
for leading the raid. On their way to Texas for trial,
Satank was killed after he attacked a guard. Santanta and 
Big Tree were tried, convicted, and sentenced to life im­
prisonment. Originally, the sentence had been execution, 
but the threat of Indian reprisals caused the sentence to 
be changed. The two leaders were imprisoned at Huntsville 
(ARCIA 1871:502-503; Nye 1968:165-166; Debo 1970:192).
The Quahada Comanche continued their raids, but the 
Kiowa were somewhat restrained by their leader's imprison­
ment. After a meeting at the Wichita agency and a trip to
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Washington, Lone Wolf and other Kiowa leaders were eventually 
able to secure the release of Santanta and Big Tree late in 
1873.
Tatum's attitude had changed toward his charges. He 
felt that the KCA had "forfeited their treaty" and stated 
further that "they are wards and paupers of the United 
States, and should be treated as such, and not as nations" 
(ARCIA 1871:503).
Meanwhile, on the Wichita reservation, drought de­
stroyed much of what had been done in Indian farming during 
the previous winter and spring (ARCIA 1871:477).
Due to continued KCA raids into Texas in 1872, Tatum
once again punished the Indians by withholding rations.
Though he recognized that he was unable to control the
tribes, he objected very strongly to what he saw as buying
further atrocities by paying for temporary peace after raids.
The cycle of raid . . . treaty and payoff . . . governmental
neglect , . . raid . . . treaty and payoff . . . appeared
obvious to Tatum.
The natural ability of the Indian is little, if 
any, inferior to the Anglo-Saxon, and he should 
be held responsible for his actions, especially 
when he receives no provocation for them. The 
leniency of the Government in letting guilty ones 
go unpunished is accepted on their part as 
cowardice or imbecility on the part of the whites 
(ARCIA 1872:248).
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On the Wichita reservation, progress in agriculture
still was painfully slow. The first effort by men working
in the fields was aborted mid-season. The women continued
tending their garden plots. During the year, widespread
sickness resulting in many deaths disrupted even these
modest farming endeavors. The agency physician attributed
the illness to bad flour rations.
I know that the Indian country makes a good mar­
ket for millers and dealers to dispose of an 
article that could find a market nowhere else; 
but it is bad for Indians to have to suffer for 
their benefit (ARCIA 1872:254).
The Wichita reservation was also plagued by the stealthy
operations of whiskey dealers and horse thieves from Texas.
In 1873, the KCA received a new agent. Tatum was 
replaced by agent Haworth, a fellow Quaker with a very 
different style. Haworth was a benign paternalist. He saw 
himself as the KCA/s "new father" and referred to them as 
the Government's "wild red children" (ARCIA 1873:219).
As with Tatum, Haworth was initially quite opti­
mistic about Indian farming and the effects he thought he 
could have on the KCA. In the spring, land was plowed and 
planted for a few Comanche and Kiowa Apache. Some men, but 
mostly women, worked in the fields. The year's drought was
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hard on the crops, though a slight Increase in interest was
shown in wanting to farm the following year.
In his report for the year, Haworth boasts that
following horse raids into Texas,
I did not make any threats of stopping their 
rations, or anything of the kind; simply re­
minded them of their promises, and appealed 
to their better natures with the very satis­
factory result referred to (i.e., the horses 
were returned), (ARCIA 1873:219).
He goes on to state that a few Comanche made raids into Texas 
and Mexico but that the Kiowa and Kiowa Apache remained 
quietly on the reservation. According to Nye (1968:167), 
this report of peaceful conditions is inaccurate. He notes 
that there was increasing agitation among the KCA due to the 
activities of white bison hunters, horse thieves, and whiskey 
traders and due to inadequate rations. The year's drought 
had caused the bison to range farther north than usual dur­
ing the summer, and the KCA faced another bleak winter with­
out sufficient food.
Conditions among the Wichita were not much better. 
Agent Richards reports:
The summer has been a very dry one here and the 
crops have suffered greatly, particularly the 
corn; all of which that was planted early will 
be almost an entire failure (ARCIA 1873:225).
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The Wichita also continued to be plagued by white horse 
thieves and whiskey traders, by the scarcity of bison, and 
by poor and insufficient rations.
Though raids into Mexico and Texas were made by the 
KCA during the spring of 1874, the Southern Plains Indian 
War of 1874-1875 properly began with the attack at Adobe 
Walls in the Texas panhandle on June 27th and 28th. The 
attack was led by the Comanche and was motivated by the 
desire to rid the Southern Plains of white bison hunters.
At Adobe Walls, the white hunters, though outnumbered, were 
able to withstand the Indian attack. Their hunting rifles 
gave them superior fire-power. Later, both non-combatant 
Indians and those directly involved in the attack showed up 
at the Wichita agency for rations. A fight ensued and all 
of the Indians fled (ARCIA 1874:220; Nye 1968:168; Debo 
1970:198).
Following this outbreak General Sheridan was given 
authority to launch a full-scale campaign to subdue the KCA 
once and for all. Sheridan's plan involved enrolling all 
friendly Indians and having them camp together at Fort Sill. 
Those not so camped and enrolled would be assumed hostile 
and subject to attack. By repeated attacks the hostile 
Indians gradually would be worn down and forced to surrender,
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They could then be safely disarmed and dismounted and the 
leaders would be sent to prison (Nye 1968:168).
After a series of encounters in July and August, the 
hostile factions of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Cheyenne took 
refuge in Palo Duro Canyon. The spot was unknown to the 
military. The Indians, however, eventually were tracked 
to the canyon and MacKenzie led a devastating attack on 
September 27. Though some of the Kiowa surrendered at Fort 
Sill, the pressure was maintained by continued attacks on 
those groups still out. The last of the hostile Indians 
surrendered in February, 1875.
As planned, the Indians were disarmed and dismounted, 
and many of their leaders were sent to Fort Marion, Florida. 
Santanta and Big Tree were returned to prison in Texas. 
Santanta committed suicide in prison, but Big Tree and those 
sent to Fort Marion eventually were released (Nye 1968:174- 
177; Debo 1970:198-199).
As can be imagined, little in the way of farming 
was accomplished by the KCA during 1874. Haworth did note, 
however, that he felt that they would make better stock 
men than farmers and he urged his superiors to follow a 
suitable course of action (ARCIA 1874:221). This estima­
tion and suggestion was heard repeatedly in succeeding years 
from nearly every agent.
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Though not involved in the hostilities, the Wichita 
had a bad farm year due to severe drought.
It took the government ten years to pacify the 
Southern Plains tribes, limit them to reservations, and make 
them totally dependent. At the conclusion of the 1874-1875 
outbreak, the hostile Cheyenne, Kiowa, and Comanche were 
sent to Fort Marion, Florida (Mooney 1898:215). Never again 
was there a raid or outbreak among the KCA.
It should be noted that the Indian position during 
the latter 1860s and early 1870s was one of real despera­
tion. White hide-hunters had been slaughtering the bison 
in incredible numbers since the 1830s. The carnage was 
greatest in the 1870s. By 1878-1880, there were few bison 
left on the Southern Plains. As was seen in the preceding 
chapter, the KCA economies depended upon bison hunting and 
horse trading. The bison were being anihilated rapidly by 
white hunters and horse raiding/trading was prohibited by 
treaty and punished by the military. Though there were 
some other game animals, the Plains Indian ecological adap­
tation was based upon bison hunting. The rations provided 
at the agency, even when they arrived and were edible, were 
clearly inadequate to the needs of the Indians.
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From the Indian viewpoint, then, the Southern Plains 
Indian Wars were part of a fundamental struggle for survival. 
It is worth noting that the years of peak raiding activity 
and reservation outbreak (1871, 1873, and 1874) were pre­
cisely those years when drought conditions prevailed on the 
Southern Plains and the already depleted bison herds ranged 
farther north than usual and out of the effective range of 
the KCA camped on the reservation. These desperate condi­
tions were augmented by the uncontrollable and illegal ac­
tivities of white horse thieves and whiskey and gun traders 
(ARCIA 1874:222; ARCIA 1874:238; Nye 1968:151; Debo 1970:198)
If it is clear that the KCA saw the whites in the 
area as a threat to their survival, it is just as clear that 
the whites saw the KCA as murderous outlaws and as a barrier 
to the acquisition of desirable unused lands. The Indian 
threat was managed alternately by capricious military bully­
ing and by periodic "honest" peace-making. When the in­
evitable breaches of treaty occurred, escalating armed con­
flict was resumed until a new peace was established. In the 
course of events any mutual trust or respect became a bad 
joke.
From the vantage point of history, it is easily seen 
that the white treaty-makers were quite unrealistic in
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expecting an armed and mounted, nomadic raiding population 
to accept restriction of their normal subsistence-getting 
activities and a great reduction of their territory while 
the wherewithal to resist was still at hand and no really 
viable alternatives were available. Admittedly, the In­
dians were a difficult population with which to deal. With 
their multidimensional crosscutting political organization 
(tribes, bands and military societies), accountability for 
Indian treaty violations was nearly impossible to establish. 
Only by the destruction of the bison and the death or im­
prisonment of their military leaders were the KCA effectively 
pacified. Once pacified, it was just as unrealistically ex­
pected that with insufficient agricultural equipment and 
inadequate instruction and supervision they could be rapidly 
transformed into self-sufficient farmers.
Agents Tatum and Haworth both were faced with enor­
mous obstacles. The Quaker agents frequently were at odds 
with the military (Buntin 1931:41-42). They were held 
accountable for the misdeeds of licensed traders. They had 
to face the Indian's complaints over the lateness, size or 
quality of rations and annuity goods. Their superiors re­
quired incredible amounts of paperwork which took them out 
of contact with the Indians. And their repeated and urgent
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requests for farm equipment and instructors either were 
ignored or responded to with a meager concession and a 
demand for immediate farming results.
The early Indian farming program strategy involved 
plowing and planting fields for groups of Indians and then 
encouraging them to tend and harvest the resulting crops.
The sod; however, had to first be broken with a special plow 
and extra horses. It was a slow and expensive process.
Even though the initial work was done for them, the KCA 
preferred to hunt and take rations. Their horses destroyed 
many of the fields, and the raiding factions ridiculed any 
fellow tribesmen who farmed (Pennington 1972:29). Prior to 
1875, nearly all of the farming done among the KCA/W was 
done by Wichita or by Penateka Comanche who had previous 
farming experience. In succeeding years, this picture 
gradually changed until significant numbers of KCA were 
actively engaged in farming.
A Brief Estimation of Sources 
The following presentation of the remaining reserva­
tion years is drawn from four major sources : The Annual
Reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (ARCIA); 
"Government Policy and Farming on the Kiowa Reservation: 
1869-1901" by William D. Pennington (1972); "History of the
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Kiowa, Comanche, and Wichita Indian Agency" by Martha L. 
Buntin (1931); Carbine and Lance; The Story of Old Fort 
Sill by Wilbur S. Nye (1969).
The annual reports of the KCA/W agents contained 
within the ARCIA, were of greatest assistance in putting the 
reservation picture together. Usually the agents' reports 
covered the period from September of the preceding year to 
late August or early September of the current year. These 
narrative reports are a valuable presentation of the agent's 
view of the events and circumstances involving the KCA/W 
during the previous year. However, since they also repre­
sent the agent's annual accounting of his stewardship of the 
reservation to his superiors, the reports must be treated 
somewhat skeptically as regards the Indians' progress in 
agriculture. The agency statistics for the year are found 
in the appendix of each report and also must be viewed 
critically. Not only are the agents of varying veracity, 
but discrepancies can be found between the figures quoted 
in the narrative reports and those presented in the 
statistical tables (viz. ARCIA 1882, the tables report 
38,000 bushels of wheat for the KCA/W agency while the agent 
notes that no wheat was grown). Further, it is quite clear 
that the yearly farming statistics are routinely estimates.
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In spite of the need for caution and a critical evaluation 
of the information contained in the agents* reports and the 
statistical tables, a reasonably consistent picture of the 
year-to-year developments on the KCA/W reservation can be 
put together. The long sequence of years and the general 
continuity of agricultural progress lend credibility to the 
overall picture. There were conscientious agents and their 
reports fit in the developmental sequence quite well. Also, 
in the course of frequent controversy between agents and 
commissioners, additional information was presented to help 
corroborate, or at best evaluate, the agents* accounts and 
figures. In the following presentation, specific discrep­
ancies will be noted.
Pennington's work helps in establishing the validity 
of particular reports. His unpublished doctoral disserta­
tion for the Department of History at the University of 
Oklahoma is based largely upon Congressional reports and a 
detailed study of the correspondence between the agency and 
commissioners. He has unearthed much specific information 
regarding agency supplies and crops, but he offers little 
in the way of analyses, generalizations, or conclusions. 
Overall, his presentation is disjointed and frequently more 
confusing than informative.
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Buntin's work is also unpublished and is a master's 
thesis presented to the Department of History at the 
University of Oklahoma. Buntin's reconstruction is largely 
based upon agents' correspondence and concerns itself more 
with agency bureaucratic history and the agents' person­
alities than with the progress of Indian farming. She 
demonstrates little sympathy for or understanding of the 
KCA/W. She evaluates Indian progress in farming as nil and 
portrays it as a history of ample opportunity and monumental 
sloth on the part of the Indians (viz. Buntin 1931:85-86). 
Still, her treatment of individual agents provides valuable 
additional information that helps to evaluate the careers 
of various agents.
Nye, a retired military man, bases his work on army 
records and diaries and on interviews with some key Indian 
informants. Carbine and Lance is primarily concerned with 
the role played by Fort Sill in reservation history. His 
work is clearly pro-military but valuable, none the less, 
for its frequently sympathetic treatment of the Indians and 
its criticism of various agents. Nye also devotes much 
space to the problem of white trespass, stock theft, and 
whiskey trade.
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Reservation Period Statistical Tables and Charts 
The following tables and charts should prove useful 
in helping keep individual years and agency regimes in per­
spective. They are presented in advance of the text related 
to them and are intended as a reference source. Table 1 
covers 1867-1885 and Table 2 covers 1886-1904. These tables 
present corrected raw figures for each category listed. 
Initially they were drawn from the ARCIA but were revised in 
light of further evaluation. It should be noted that they 
are based partly on yearly estimates by agents and partly 
on actual counts or measurements. Their general con- 
sitency with corroborating material makes them credible as 
estimates.
Table 3 covers the same material but the figures 
have been converted into percent of maximum year figures.
In addition, the KCA/W acreage farmed ratios are presented, 
and the droughts and changes of agents are indicated. Of 
special note in this table is the frequency of drought 
years and the fluctuation of bushel yield per acre. Atten­
tion also should be given to the slow and sporadic develop­
ment of oats and wheat as Indian crops. The several peak 
years for Indian cattle herds are due to large scale purchase 
and distribution of breeding stock. At maximum, Indian cattle
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numbered only 25,000 or six head per person, and this number 
was not sustained for any length of time. The maximum num­
ber of acres farmed by Indians is 19,525 and represents 
slightly less than 5 acres per person.
In Charts 1-12, it is much easier to note the gradual 
developmental growth. The charts are plotted on percent of 
maximum year figures. The relatively slow but reasonably 
steady growth in acres farmed and number of cattle should be 
noted. The year 1900 is the year of maximum for yield per 
acre, com, wheat, and oats. Its significance, however, is 
tempered by the fact that rainfall and other climatic fac­
tors were especially favorable (as reported by Randlett in 
ARCIA 1900) and the acreage farmed that year was only 41 
percent of maximum.
Final Years of the Quaker Agents, 1875-1877 
In 1875, significant progress in farming was made 
for the first time by the Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache. 
Agent Haworth reported that following a meeting with the 
tribes, the KCA plowed, planted, and cultivated several 
large fields. With the assistance of two farm instructors, 
cooperating groups of Indian men carried out the work and a 
yield above 25 bushels of corn per acre was expected. The
106
Table 1
Census Figures for Combined KCA/W (1867-1885)
Agent and Year Pop.
No.
Horses
No.
Cattle
No.
Hay
Tons
Swine
No.
Leavenwor th-KCA 1867 5905I
Shanklin-W 1868 5980l —  —  — 134 —  —  — ---
1869 5770} 17464 109 20
Tatum-KCA 1870 62581 —  —  — —  —  — —  —  — —  —  —
Boone/Richards-W 1871 65881 11190 597 20 650
1872 5OI5I 17700 —  —  — —  —  — —  —  —
1873 6500l 23096 1524 »  » 1700
Haworth-KCA 1874 6343I 20189 1925 210 —  —  —
Richards/Williams-W 1875 32821 9360 1650 —  —  — —  —  —
1876 4205 11028 1942 —  —  — 1974
1877 —  —  — 8144 3123 250 2000
1878 4274 8144 2598 120 2000
1879 4117 8910 3168 4000 2800
1880 4123 9250 3600 50 3000
Hunt-KCA/W 1881 4157 9850 6600 —  —  — 3000
1882 4214 9550 6900 —  —  — 3000
1883 4181 9200 7800 150 2500
1884 4127 9725 7200 20 3500
1885 4057 9200 7500 120 4000
Prior to 1875 the population for the Wichita 
reservation included temporarily many members of other 
tribes. The figure for 1875 is low due to the dead, 
absent, and prisoners at Fort Marion that resulted from 
the previous year's military activities.
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Table 1 (continued)
Agent and Year Worked
Acreage
No.
Corn
Bu.
No.
Bu./
Acre
No.
Oats
Bu.
No.
Wheat
Bu.
No.
Leavenworth-KCA 1867 57 1140 20 _ _ _ _ _ _
Shanklin-W 1868 —  —  — —  —  — —  -  — -  -  - —  “  —
1869 292 8065 28 wm ^  mm a  M
Tatum-KCA 1870 —  —  — —  —  — —  —  — —  —  — —  —  —
Boone/Richards-W 1871 825 12900 16* —  —  — —  —  —
1872 —  —  — —  —  — — -  — —  —  - —  —  —
1873 1111 18525 17* ## *»
Haworth-KCA 1874 1778 1778 1* 1120 —  —  —
Richards/Williams-W 1875 1915 54875 29 —  —  — —  —  —
1876 2203 51200 24 688 500
1877 2520 40000 16 400 —  —  —
1878 2563 69500 28 3000 400
1879 2535 17800 8* 500 1000
1880 3360 40800 12 —  —  — —  —  —
Hunt-KCA/W 1881 3400 3400 1* —  —  —
1882 3500 38500 11 —  —  — "  —  —
1883 3900 47000 12 —  —  — —  —  —
1884 3500 12000 3* —  —  — —  —  —
1885 3500 52500 15 —  —  — —  —  —
^Drought by year as reported by agent.
The figures above reflect Indian production alone. 
Where no entry is given, "None Reported (NR)" was entered 
in the ARCIA for the year. For 1868, 1870, and 1872, 
clearly no statistical information was provided by the 
agent. In the columns for oats and wheat, no entry 
indicates none harvested.
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Table 2
Census Figures for Combined KCA/W (1886-1904)
Agent and Year Pop.
No.
Horses
No.
Cattle
No.
Hay
Tons
Swine
No.
Hall 1886
1887
4182
4219
8012
8660
5491
6668
280
1900
1278
3643
White 1888 4015 10734 9601 3300 4011
Miles or Myers 1889 4088 10750 18000 150 500
Adams 1890
1891
4121
4166
10505
11660
19983
21000
300
450
911
1200
Day 1892 3782 10300 25000 500 3000
3 Army Men 1893 3722 10303 10000 500 5000
Able 1894 — -  — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Baldwin
1895
1896
1897
3721
3786
9737
23194
8991
10000
25000
5000
120
2679
2380
Walker 1898 3833 — — — — — — “ “ — — — —
Randlett
1899
1900
1901
3696
3733
12410
23236
15403
10000
18599
17144
1000
3228
732
500
1843
1931
1902
1903
1904
3661
3696
3676
16439
9240
6303
12234
8552
12052
885
1350
1040
822
1090
760
109
Table 2 (continued)
Agent and Year Worked
Acreage
No.
C o m
Bu.
No.
Bu./
Acre
No.
Oats
Bu.
No.
Wheat
Bu.
No.
Hall 1886 3094 8500 3*
1887 5101 55000 11* —  —  — 3500
White 1888 7985 76850 10 200 2625
Miles or Myers 1889 4445 45000 10 -  — - —  ——
Adams 1890 4445 17500 6* 8500 a M
1891 4715 38000 10 8000 — — —
Day 1892 5000 50000 11 5500 1500
3 Army Men 1893 5000 10000 4* 7300 2000
Able 1894 — -  — —  — — —  — — —  — —
1895 5000 100000 20* 2300
Baldwin 1896 — — — — — — * — — — — — -
1897 13421 — — — - — - - — -
Walker 1898 15000 — — — -  “ “ 1100
1899 15800 60000 4* 2800 3000
Randlett 1900 8065 243000 35 11145 25000
1901 5955 15485 3* — — — 962
1902 5598 69925 15 1150 12612
1903 13390 120300 10* 4100 13600
1904 19525 48350 3* 650 4840
^Drought year as reported by agent,
Table 3
Percent of Maximum Figures for Combined KCA/W
Year Pop. Horses Cattle Swine Acres KCA:W
Acres
]om Bushel
Yield/
Acre
Drought New
Agent
Wheat Hay Oats & 
Barley
1867 90 0 0:1 0 57 * 0 0
1868 91 — — — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — “ — — — 0
1869
1 Q7A
88 
Q ce
75 0 0 1 - - — 3 80 * 0 0 0
lo/U
1871 100 48 2 13 4 1:10 5 46 * * 0 0 0
1872 76 76 — — — — — — — — — — —— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
1873 99 99 6 34 6 — — — 8 49 * * 0 0 0
1874 96 87 8 — — — 9 1:8 1 3 * 0 4 10
1875 50 40 7 — — — 10 1:4 23 83 0 0 0
1876 64 47 8 39 11 1:3 21 69 2 0 6
1877 — — — 35 12 40 13 1:3 16 46 0 5 4
1878 65 35 10 40 13 1:3 29 80 * 2 2 27
1879 63 38 13 56 13 1:2 7 23 * 4 80 5
1880 63 40 14 60 17 1:2 17 34 0 1 0
1881 63 42 26 60 17 — — — 1 3 * 0 — — — 0
1882 64 41 28 60 18 — —— 16 31 — — — — — — — — —
1883 63 40 31 50 20 — — — 19 34 0 3 0
1884 63 42 29 70 18 — — — 5 9 * 0 0 0
1885 62 40 30 80 18 — — — 22 43 0 2 0
1886 63 34 22 26 16 1:1 3 9 * * 0 6 0
1887 64 37 27 73 26 1:1 23 31 * 14 38 0
o
Table 3 (continued)
Year Pop. Horses Cattle Swine Acres KCA:W
Acres
Corn Bushel
Yield/
Acre
Drought New
Agent
Wheat Hay Oats & 
Barley
1888 61 46 38 80 41 1:1 32 29 * 11 66 2
1889 62 46 72 10 23 — — — 19 29 * 0 3 — — —
1890 63 45 80 18 23 — — — 7 17 * * 0 6 76
1891 63 50 84 24 24 — — — 16 29 0 9 72
1892 57 44 100 60 26 — — — 21 31 * 6 10 49
1893
1 Q Q / t
56 44 40 100 26 — — — 4 11 •k *
•k
8 10 66
1895 56 42 36 54 26 w « 41 57 * * 0 100 21
1896 — — — 100 40 48 — — — — — — — — — — — — * — — — — — — — — —
1897 57 — — “ 100 — —— 69 — — — — — — — — — — — — 2 — — —
1898 58 — — — — — — — — — 77 — — — — — — — — — •k 4 — — — — — —
1899 56 53 40 10 81 — — — 25 11 * * 12 20 25
1900 57 100 74 37 41 — — — 100 100 100 65 100
1901 — — — 66 69 39 30 — — — 6 9 * 4 15 0
1902 56 71 49 16 29 — —— 29 43 50 18 10
1903 56 40 34 22 69 — — — 50 29 * 54 27 37
1904 56 27 48 15 100 — — — 20 9 * 19 21 6
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Kiowa fanned 175 acres, the Comanche (excluding the Penateka) 
had 80 acres, and the Kiowa Apache used 35 acres (ARCIA 1875: 
273-274). There were also numerous vegetable gardens. This 
initial success led to a further extension of farming efforts 
in the following year.
Despite the encouraging season, the agent included
an estimation of the reservation's suitability to agriculture
in his report.
Of the 3,549,440 acres of this reservation, but a 
small part is adapted to agricultural purposes, 
and a large part unfit even for grazing purposes, 
on account of its alkaline soil and waters. The 
east part of the reservation is the best portion 
of it . . . (ARCIA 1875:274).
The KCA were exempted from the government regulation 
requiring all reservation Indians to work for their rations; 
however, their rations continued to be woefully inadequate 
in any case. The agent blamed the situation on the problem 
of transportation from the distant railhead depot.
At this time, Haworth maintained an Indian roll call 
and count every three days. Indians going off the reserva­
tion to hunt were required to get a pass from the agent and 
a military escort (Buntin 1931:45).
In the agent's estimation, since peace had returned 
to the reservation and his "red children" were farming, the
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most serious problem was that of white horse thieves from 
Texas. During the outbreak in 1874, they had taken over 
2,000 Indian horses from the reservation (ARCIA 1875:274).
On the Wichita reservation, agent Richards reported 
renewed farming activity among the Wichita and affiliated 
tribes as well as among the Penateka Comanche. He also re­
ported an ongoing serious problem with inadequate rations 
and noted that only successful bison hunts off reservation 
kept the tribes from starving (ARCIA 1875:288).
In 1876, Haworth reported that:
Last year was the first for most of them (KCA) to 
put their hands to the plow. It was very season­
able; the rain seemed to come just as it was 
needed, and gave them a bountiful yield for their 
labor. . . . this year more of them engaged in the 
work than last (ARCIA 1876:52).
However, though there was more acreage, the yield was in­
ferior to that of the previous year due to damaging rains 
in mid-season.
Rations were issued by family and not by band, as 
before, and continued to be no more than a supplement to the 
bison hunted off reservation. The agent felt that the 
Congressional failure to furnish agencies with badly needed 
supplies and rations would surely result in the failure of 
the Indian farming program (ARCIA 1876:53).
126
Houses were built for ten prominent KCA but were 
not lived in by their owners. The houses represented 
prestigious gifts at this time rather than desirable housing 
(Nye 1969:250). The KCA continued to live in group camps 
along the creeks near the agency.
The new agent for the Wichita reservation, agent 
Williams, reported the same mid-season problems with weather, 
as did Haworth. The c o m  planted later in the season, how­
ever, promised to make a good crop (ARCIA 1876:66). His 
estimates of Indian progress in farming differed from those 
of his predecessor. He felt that the Wichita were "more 
interested in raising horses than cattle or crops" (ARCIA 
1876:64). He noted that the enthusiastic progress of the 
Penateka made them more exemplary Indian farmers than several 
of the traditional farming groups on the reservation.
Williams also had much to say concerning difficulties 
with agency supplies, annuity goods, and rations. A number 
of problems plagued the area agencies in this connection.
The goods and rations were insufficient due to stinting 
appropriations. At best, favored contractors furnished goods 
that were useless or frivolous, and, at worst, they simply 
defrauded the government and the Indians in quality and 
quantity. The governmental red tape involved greatly delayed
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most shipments, and the various transportation problems 
caused additional delay. These several delays resulted in 
the spoilage even of that food and seed which was initially 
unspoiled.
Climate conditions for farming during 1877 were 
worse than either of the two previous years, and the harvest 
figures illustrate this condition. At the culmination of 
his five years of experience, Haworth reflected on the 
prospects for Indian farming : "This is not a good agri­
cultural district and cannot be relied upon for farming 
purposes . . . "  (ARCIA 1877:87). He advocated a stock 
raising program instead. His scheme involved increasing 
cattle issues over a five year period until the Indians 
would be able to subsist on the yearly natural increase of 
their herds. He noted that the KCA took reasonably good 
care of their stock, though they still preferred to eat 
bison. The bison rapidly were disappearing, however, and 
off reservation hunting was increasingly restricted (Buntin 
1931:50).
The Wichita and Penateka Comanche continued to en­
large their acreage and cattle herds. It should be noted 
that their land on the Washita River was more conducive to 
farming than was the area farmed by the KCA.
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With agent Haworth's resignation, the years of
Quaker administration came to a close. In a letter to
Secretary of Interior Schurz, clerk Oden R, Smith found the
Quaker Indian farming program among the KCA a dismal failure:
I reach the conclusion that the so-called Quaker 
years of peace policy has been a failure here.
In a pronounced progressive sense, a failure.
It has been to grant everything and exact nothing 
in return, the result of which has been to create 
an army of dependents, content to live off the 
beef and flour of the Government, in short without 
any purpose in life except nomadic vagabondism, 
and very certainly without any desire to work for 
any portion of the "daily bread" which they receive 
(quoted in Pennington 1972:59).
However dependent the KCA were upon the government. Smith's 
estimation of farming progress during these years is faulty. 
Though the subsistence import of Indian farming was slight, 
it is evident that cultural resistance to farming was break­
ing down and farming skills were being acquired. By 1877, 
the Indians were breaking some land, plowing, planting, 
cultivating, and harvesting most of their acreage and fencing 
all of their fields. In the past three years 605 acres and 
1599 cattle had been added to the KCA/W totals. The KCA 
from meager beginnings had advanced to farming roughly 25% 
of the total KCA/W acreage— clearly a start. Considering 
the poor quality of their short rations and the small amount 
of instruction, seed, and implements furnished, the KCA made
129
significant progress. The weather was favorable to farming 
only once and the Indians were forced by short rations to 
spend considerable time hunting bison off reservation. In 
light of these handicaps, progress in farming was consider­
able.
The P. B. Hunt Administration. 1878-1885
On April 1, 1878, P. B. Hunt was appointed agent to 
the KCA. Commissioner Hayt told Hunt at the outset that the 
Indians soon would be forced to rely upon their own re­
sources for subsistence and that they should be prepared for 
that eventuality while time remained to do so (Pennington 
1972:61).
Hunt reported that the Indian ponies had a hard time 
drawing plows and that there were not enough implements for 
those who wished to use them. The KCA had a total of 19 
plows and 39 wagons (Pennington 1972:73). Lack of rain 
early in the growing season required that the corn be re­
planted. Overall, however. Hunt was pleased with the prog­
ress he saw and reported that the KCA would need only one 
more year to become self-sufficient (ARCIA 1878:60). Of 
course, this report was absurdly optimistic.
Though the KCA were still exempted from the "work- 
for-ration" provision, the agent was allowed to withhold
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sugar, coffee, and tobacco from non-working Indians. These 
commodities were the ones most desired by the KCA. Per­
mission was granted once more to go off reservation to hunt 
bison with a military escort and the trip was a success.
Even in his first year as agent. Hunt became aware 
of the uncertainties of farming in the area and began urging 
his superiors to adopt a stock raising emphasis with the 
Indians.
In 1879, the Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache 
reservation was consolidated with that of the Wichita under 
one agency. This was one of 11 such agency reductions made 
by the government at the time. The presidential order for 
the move was signed in August, 1878, but due to official 
red tape the move took over a year to complete. The new 
agency was located on the Washita River between the two 
former reservations and required the KCA to move north with 
the agent. It was thought that the KCA would profit by 
access to better farm land and the example of the Wichita.
At the same time, the Commissioner was pressing 
Hunt to double the acreage farmed by the KCA/W. Chronically 
short funds made the goal impossible to attain. With a 
restricted personnel budget, Hunt had only enough funds to 
hire one farm instructor and one assistant for the entire
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reservation. The distance from the agency to the Indian 
camps and the distance between camps, as well as the number 
of reports and agency duties required of the farm instruc­
tors, gave little opportunity for actual farming instruction. 
Lack of funds also limited the number of acres broken for 
new fields. Throughout the 1870s and 1880s, the number of 
acres broken severely limited the amount of Indian farming 
possible.
The drought of 1879 reduced the yield of the Indian 
fields well below that of the previous year. The KCA had 
860 acres in c o m  and the Wichita had 1,675 in corn, 75 in 
wheat, and 30 in oats. The average yield was 8 bushels per 
acre (ARCIA 1879:67).
In July, 474 cattle were bought for the KCA herds, 
but the heat and drought killed many of them. The Indians 
had no alternative but to eat many of the remaining cattle 
due to meager rations and an unsuccessful bison hunt.
Hunt issued weekly rations by family in an effort 
to undermine the various bands (ARCIA 1879:66). The Indians 
spent much of their time enroute between their camps and the 
agency. Hunt issued "longer" rations to those who were farm­
ing.
The bison hunt for the year resulted in little meat 
and few hides. Formerly, the Indians had gained some income
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from hides, but the bison were rapidly disappearing as a 
source of food and income. The Indian income from hides for 
1876-1879 was:
1876 - $70,400
1877 - $64,500
1878 - $26,375
1879 - $ 5,068 
(ARCIA 1879:65)
To heighten the tragedy, while on an approved and escorted 
hunt off reservation the Kiowa were attacked by Texas State 
Troopers. Several Indians were killed and scalped (ARCIA 
1879:64).
To speed the delivery of supplies and rations to the 
agency, the Indians began being hired to haul the freight 
from the railhead. They also were hired to cut and haul 
wood.
Hunt reported that the Wichita were making good 
progress in farming and were "nearly able to support them­
selves without any assistance from the government" (ARCIA 
1879:63). Some of their leaders, in fact, had become 
prosperous farmers.
In his annual report for 1880, Hunt announced :
I have endeavored to destroy the tribal relations 
as much as possible, and also to destroy the
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influence of certain chiefs. I have allowed 
relatives to band together and would appoint 
one of the number a chief or headman and sug­
gest to him to take his people off to some 
good locality and make permanent houses. Of 
course, every band formed this way weakens the 
influence of some chief in proportion as it took 
individuals from his band. Bands that at one 
time numbered over a hundred people, have been 
reduced in this way to less than twenty. I have 
had many houses made in this way by Indians who 
never worked before. The advantage to the man 
appointed by me was that he became more prominent 
and controlled the funds derived from the sale 
of beef hides (ARCIA 1880:73).
It is apparent that Hunt was blind to any cooperative ad­
vantages to traditional band organization and saw it as an 
obstacle to his authority and to the transformation of the 
KCA into individual self-sufficient farming families. The 
advisability of some alternative to this policy of tribal 
atomization will be discussed further in the conclusions.
It is enough to note here that Hunt underestimated the diffi­
culty of making the KCA/W into self-supporting farmers 
through the use of the paternalistic manipulations recounted 
in his reports.
Following initially unfavorable weather for farming, 
sufficient rain fell to produce a fairly good corn crop.
Even so. Hunt appreciated the discouraging effect of the 
climate on Indian farming and stated that he was "satisfied 
that old, experienced farmers would have been discouraged
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at the seasons and conditions of the crops the past three 
seasons" (ARCIA 1880:73). Indian interest in fanning was 
evident from the continually greater request for farming 
equipment and instruction. Many of these requests went un­
fulfilled.
Hunt officially controlled all sales involving the 
KCA/W. He required a high price on Indian corn sold to 
local traders in an effort to keep the Indians from selling 
their harvest and being without food, feed, or seed for the 
following year (Pennington 1972:90). The KCA, however, 
preferred wheat flour to corn meal and fed what c o m  they 
couldn't sell to their stock. This situation, offering so 
little return on the effort invested, certainly did little 
to encourage rapid progress in Indian farming.
The government bought 600 more cattle for the Indian 
herds and Hunt distributed them "to those the most worthy" 
(ARCIA 1880:74). Unfortunately, short rations again re­
sulted in many of the cattle being killed by the Indians 
for food.
Hunt reported that the Indian freighters were doing 
a good job and earned a total of $14,278.87. The rate was 
$.75/100 Ibs./lOO mi. (ARCIA 1881:81).
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The Wichita were again noted as being almost com­
pletely self-supporting.
The year 1881 proved to be a very difficult one for 
the KCA/W and their agent. The reservation was hit by a 
severe drought that killed most of the Indian crops. The 
bison were gone and the rations were cut back still further 
by the government in an ill-advised effort to force the 
Indians to farm. It is to Hunt's credit that he opposed the 
reduction. The situation worsened until the military had to 
be called in to quell the threat of an outbreak due to the 
short rations (ARCIA 1881:79-80).
Weather conditions were somewhat more favorable in 
1882. The Commissioner, however, would allow the KCA/W only 
enough seed to plant 1,600 acres, though 3,500 acres were 
ready to plant. In spite of the previous year's drought, 
he felt that the Indians should have saved enough seed for 
the year's planting (Pennington 1972:115-117). Hunt re­
ceived a reprimand for pursuing his seed request but was 
able to get a loan of seed corn from Fort Sill. As fre­
quently happened, the seed from the government contractors 
was late in arriving and greatly delayed the Spring planting.
Problems with farming instruction continued and no 
new positions were budgeted. As a consequence, the KCA
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primarily learned farming techniques by trial and error or 
from each other. Corn remained virtually the only crop 
which the Indians knew how to raise. Cotton was experimented 
with at the agency with good results but nothing came of it.
Since the eradication of the bison, the rations con­
tinued to be reduced by the government and covered only 8 
months of the year (ARCIA 1882:66). In 1882, the government 
appropriation for the KCA was $100,000 and covered agency 
maintenance and personnel, farming equipment and seed, and 
annuities and rations. It is fair to estimate that the 
government was spending less than $1/person/month to feed 
the KCA. Due to the critical shortage of rations during the 
winter. Hunt made an unofficial arrangement with certain 
cattle companies in Texas. In return for short term graz­
ing privileges on the reservation, the Indians were to re­
ceive cattle to supplement their rations and to add to their 
herds (ARCIA 1882:68; Buntin 1931:71). Unfortunately, the 
cattle companies continued to graze their cattle on the 
reservation illegally after the unofficial lease had ex­
pired, and their herds became a constant problem for Hunt 
and the Indian police. Once the trespassing cattle were 
rounded up, the owner was notified and gladly paid the small 
fine. The owner took his cattle off reservation but
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immediately allowed them to disperse and wander back onto 
Indian land.
In his annual report, Hunt complained that the 
government's tight-fisted appropriations were ruining the 
chance of successful Indian farming and stock raising 
(ARCIA 1882:66). As a result of the short rations, the 
KCA were steadily eating their cattle herds. In view of the 
reservation's environment being little suited to farming. 
Hunt advanced a detailed 5-year plan. He suggested that 
part of the money obligated by the Medicine Lodge Treaty 
be advanced to purchase sizable cattle herds for the KCA, 
who then could subsist on the herd's natural increase and 
what their farming could provide (ARCIA 1882:67). His plan 
had two fatal flaws. He planned on the continued availa­
bility of the entire reservation for grazing though by then 
allotment was a foregone conclusion, and he failed to anti­
cipate the opposition of white cattlemen who wanted to lease 
large tracts within the reservation for their own herds.
Hunt noted with optimism that the KCA/W were eager 
to work but that the agency offered too few opportunities 
for wage labor. Indian freight hauling suffered due to the 
weakness of Indian horses following the drought of 1881 
(ARCIA 1882:65).
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In his annual report for 1883 Hunt stated:
The Kiowa, Comanche and Apache tribes, although 
they have been a much shorter time following the 
Whiteman's way than the affiliated bands (Wichita), 
are, I think, changing their condition more rapidly.
Their progress in opening up farms since they moved 
up to the Washita has been very marked. Their 
fields are all well fenced, and the majority of 
them are of good size. I regret that because of a 
want of funds I have not been able to have the sod 
broken for those who wished to commence farming 
this year (ARCIA 1883:70).
The year was a seasonable one for Indian corn and the 
harvest was a fair one. The lack of proper storage facilities 
and markets for the surplus, however, remained problems for 
the Indian farmers.
Though the agency operating budget was further re­
duced, Hunt succeeded in getting $30,000 to purchase cattle 
for an experimental Indian herd that was not to be divided 
among individual Indians. The money for the project came 
partly from the KCA/W clothing budget for the year to come.
In 1884, the KCA/W reservation was again struck by 
severe drought and the Indian fields yielded an average of 
only 3 bushels/acre. It mattered little that there were no 
funds available for additional farm implements and seed or 
for breaking land for new fields.
The 1,082 breeding stock that Hunt purchased for the 
"Indian herd" in 1883 were herded with 1,669 cattle for the
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beef ration onto 50,000 unfenced acres in the northeastern 
part of the reservation. When a grass fire burned much of 
the pasture in the area, the cattle were released onto the 
rest of the reservation. During the course of a year, the 
herd's number was greatly reduced by white rustlers who 
moved into the area adjacent to the reservation, apparently 
for that specific purpose (ARCIA 1884:80). The severe winter 
and hungry Indians also contributed to the herd's reduction. 
Though Hunt had been successful in getting the money to buy 
the cattle, he lacked the funds to fence their pasture or to 
hire a sufficient number of Indian herders.
The KCA/W had only a fair corn crop in 1885, yielding 
only 17 bushels per acre. In spite of the hardships of re­
cent years, those Indians who were farming continued to farm 
on the same scale. As usual, there were no funds to break 
the sod for new fields. The Indians lacked the plows and 
horses as well as the skill to break their own fields.
The grass-for-cattle arrangement that Hunt had worked 
out in 1881 continued through 1885. Though the cattle given 
in trade added to the Indian's beef ration, they did little 
to increase KCA herds. The Commissioner's attitude toward 
the unofficial grass leases was one of official detachment.
He specified only that the leases be short term (Pennington
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1972:152). In 1885, the KCA began leasing their land to 
cattlemen for $.06/acre/year.
Hunt was visited by a series of government inspectors 
throughout his career as agent to the KCA/W. He eventually 
resigned in 1885, partly as the result of an investigation by 
P. H. Folsom during the preceding year. Hunt was charged 
with permitting cattle trespass, allowing timber and hay to 
be stolen from the reservation, altering agency records, and 
antagonizing the Indians (Pennington 1972:113). Upon close 
inspection, however, it appears that Hunt was more properly 
guilty of antagonizing the cattlemen and traders by his 
attention to duty. He was also critical of his superiors and 
of departmental policy. Part of Hunt's annual report for 
1884 titled "Indian herds" was deleted from the published 
version.
Hunt originally tried to establish good relations 
with the cattlemen. In 1879, he allowed the local beef 
contractors to deliver beef in large numbers before they were 
needed to save them frequent trips to and from the agency.
He was censured by the Commissioner for doing so and was 
ordered to require weekly trips of the contractors (Buntin 
1931:65-66). Cattle trespass was a serious problem even 
before grass leasing began. The Indian police and the
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military from Fort Sill spent much of their time rounding up 
and sorting out cattle. The light fine of $l/head did little 
to discourage the cattlemen from deliberately turning their 
cattle onto the reservation (Nye 1969:257). In 1885, the 
cattlemen tried to get Hunt replaced by falsely claiming that 
he refused to allow contractors to drive cattle across the 
reservation (Buntin 1931:75).
Hunt was successful in keeping unauthorized traders 
off the reservation. Of the three licensed traders, two of 
them gave Hunt a great deal of trouble and worked to get him 
replaced. In 1885, Hunt returned cattle to the Indians that 
they had illegally sold to W. G. Williams. Williams com­
plained, and Hunt's order was countered. Hunt was informed 
that there was no such law prohibiting the Indians from sell­
ing their breeding stock. As a result, many Indians began 
selling what stock they had, and Hunt's hopes for a success­
ful Indian stock raising program were dashed (ARCIA 1885:85). 
He became so discouraged and bitter that he wrote in his 
annual report:
At this point I would throw the Indian upon his 
own resources and let him "sink or swim" as he 
himself elects (ARCIA 1885:88).
Despite the pessimism with which Hunt concluded his 
career as agent, it is clear that the KCA/W made significant
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progress in farming during his regime. In 1878, the Indian 
fields totaled 2,563 acres. When he left, seven and a half 
years later, the total was 3,500 acres. By 1885, the KCA 
were responsible for over one-third of the total Indian 
acreage. At that time, the Kiowa had 450 acres, the Comanche 
had 840 acres, and the Kiowa Apache had 135 acres, for a 
KCA total of 1,425 acres (Pennington 1972:190-191). Their 
farms included some 150 separate fields of from 1-50 acres 
each, farmed by approximately 200 Indian families (ARCIA 
1885:87; Pennington 1972:142).
Hunt's claims concerning the progress of the KCA, 
quoted earlier, are corroborated by J. B. Wicks, the 
Episcopal missionary for the reservation (ARCIA 1883:73).
From 1880 to 1885, Indian acreage remained static not from 
lack of effort by the KCA/W or Hunt, but from lack of funds 
to open any new fields. When agent Hall took over from 
Hunt, he reported that over 4,000 acres needed to be broken 
to meet the needs and requests of the Indians (Pennington 
1972:141). It is absurd that the government refused to 
appropriate the funds necessary to carry out its own policy 
of expanding Indian farming.
The corn raised on the reservation during the Hunt 
years was used primarily for feeding Indian livestock.
143
though traders bought some of the surplus for resale at 
Fort Sill (Pennington 1972:134 and 138). Due to the absence 
of an accessible and dependable market for their crops, even 
favorable growing conditions resulted in little gain for the 
Indian farmers.
Until the bison were gone, in 1879, the KCA/W got 
most of their meat, as well as hides for sale, from off 
reservation bison hunts. When the bison were gone and the 
rations continued to be reduced, the Indians turned to their 
cattle herds for food and income. Even Commissioner Price 
noted that while the government spent $1,000/year to feed 
and clothe a soldier in 1884, only $7 was expected to do the 
same for an Indian (Pennington 1972:121).
Short rations were only one of several obstacles to 
Hunt's Indian stock raising plan. The Indians were allowed, 
over his objection and in spite of official regulations to 
the contrary, to sell their cattle and hides at will to 
traders, cattlemen, and settlers, usually for much less 
than what they were worth. Also, from the mid-1870s on, 
white rustlers made off with an incredible number of Indian 
stock each year. Nevertheless, Indian herds grew from 
2,598 in 1878 to 7,500 in 1885.
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After considering the events of the Hunt years and 
the conditions which prevailed on the KCA/W reservation, it 
is surprising that any progress was made at all in Indian 
farming and stock raising. Though the Congress and the 
Commissioners continually voiced their concern with making 
the Indians self-supporting, the funds to help realize that 
goal nearly always were withheld.
The Political Agent Years, 1886-1891
Following the continuity of the Hunt regime, the 
KCA/W reservation experienced two periods of rapid agent 
turnover. The first of these periods is aptly termed the 
"Political Period" by Buntil (1931:80-106). In six years 
the agency changed hands four times. All four agents (Hall, 
White, Miles and Adams) were short-term political appointees 
who had little, if any, Indian Affairs experience.
Lee Hall succeeded Hunt as agent to the KCA/W. In 
March, 1886, he received a letter from Commissioner Hayt 
outlining what the Commissioner expected of the agency em­
ployees and the Indians. In reading the following letter, 
note that passage of the General Allotment Act is imminent, 
and though the Indians are threatened VTith the termination 
of rations, 11 years remain of Medicine Lodge Treaty obli­
gations .
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3/23/1886
Sir:
The one great object this department has now 
in view, is the civilization of the Indian, and 
to enable him to support himself by agriculture 
as soon as possible. I therefore expect and will 
require all Indian agents and agency employees 
who wish to be retained in the service, to use 
every means at their command to instruct, en­
courage and assist the Indians to this end, and 
their marked progress in successful agriculture, 
commencing with the current year, is indispensably 
necessary to prove the agent and employees of any 
agency qualified for their positions. Nothing 
less than a very great improvement over former 
years will be satisfactory, as the law requiring 
all able bodied male Indians to perform service 
on their reservations for themselves or their 
tribe, to entitle them to subsistence, (sec. 18 
stat. 176, and sec. 346, Regulations 1884), has 
not been strictly enforced at some agencies hither­
to, but it will now be applied to the fullest ex­
tent possible, that an increase in production and 
a decrease in estimates for the purchase of sub­
sistence may at once result.
That the area of land cultivated by Indians 
may be increased this year, to its utmost possible 
extent, those who have already made a beginning, in 
a small way, must be encouraged to enlarge their 
operations and those who have as yet made no effort 
toward cultivating, even a small piece of land, 
must be urged to make a commencement, and given all 
possible advice and assistance, that they may need, 
to encourage them.
The season being nearly at hand for spring farm 
work to commence, you should devote your close 
personal attention to the timely and careful prepara­
tion of your Indians for plowing, sowing, planting, 
etc., which you must follow up by watching that they 
have the necessary tools, know how to use them and 
actually do properly cultivate and care for what 
they plant, as without this and the proper prepara­
tion of the ground in the beginning, nothing but
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failure and discouragement need be expected. To do 
this, you and your farmer and any other employees, 
who can be spared from their regular duties, should 
go amongst the Indians every day and hour from the 
time farm work commences, until the crops are saved, 
working with first one, then another, showing them 
how to direct their energies so that they may not 
expend them unprofitably, and by personal example, 
that you do not consider it degrading to honestly 
labor with your own hands for independence, and also 
that you are in earnest when you tell them that they 
can support themselves and that the time has come 
when they must do so or starve.
As soon as practicable after you receive this,
I would be glad to have you write me your views, 
making such suggestions and recommendations as you 
think would further the work. What do you propose 
to do in the way of steps in advance of the old un­
satisfactory routine, so as to increase the acreage 
under cultivation by Indians and the yield per acre; 
to care for the crop after it is gathered, both grain 
and root and what market is there for the sale of 
such as will not be needed by the Indians either for 
present use or next year's planting? . . . (Farmers 
File, Indian Archives Division, Oklahoma Historical 
Society).
It is ironic that the Commissioner/agent relation­
ship in some ways parallels the agent/Indian relationship. 
In both we find bullying and threats and unrealistic ex­
pectations on the part of the superior, slow response to 
the reasonable requests of the subordinate, and the applica­
tion of rigid policies ill-suited to the immediate situa­
tions .
In 1886, Hall fared no better than his predecessor 
in getting the additional farm instructors he requested.
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He estimated at the time that it would take the agency's 
two farm instructors two months to visit all of the Indian 
farms if they spent only 1/2 hour each at each (ARCIA 1886: 
130). Since the position offered long hours and little pay, 
the agency was ordinarily unable to attract capable and en­
thusiastic men to do the job.
Hall was successful in getting a good number of 
farm implements for distribution to the KCA/W, though half 
arrived too late to be of much assistance during the current 
season. The Commissioner threatened Hall with personal 
financial liability if he did not see to the proper main­
tenance of the tools (Pennington 1972:174-175). The tools 
furnished by the contractors were of inferior quality and 
the KCA had less training in tool maintenance than they had 
in farming. Consequently, many tools were broken but never 
repaired, and others that were out of adjustment or poorly 
maintained were abandoned.
The year's seed request was only partially met due 
to the continued policy of trying to force the Indians to 
save their own seed. The allotted 1,500 bushels of winter 
wheat seed arrived a month later than the last favorable 
planting date and had to be saved for the next year 
(Pennington 1972:175).
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In 1886, the Indians began fencing their fields with 
barbed wire rather than rails as they had done previously. 
The barbed wire allowed them to complete the task more 
rapidly and enclose more acres, though from 1886 through 
1888 only 1/2 the amount needed was available to complete 
the job.
Hall was authorized to break 4,000 acres of KCA/W 
land to enlarge present farms and establish new ones. Of 
the total, 3,000 acres were to be broken in tracts of 10-25 
acres (Pennington 1972:179-180). The total Indian acreage 
farmed in 1886, however, was 400 acres less than the pre­
vious year, and the total for 1887 was only 1,600 more than 
in 1885. The answer to this puzzle may lie in the fact that 
Hall was indicted for embezzlement of agency funds in 1887, 
but more on that will be seen later.
The Indian farms suffered from the severe drought 
of 1886 and only yielded an average of 3 bushels/acre.
There was also an apparent reduction in Indian cattle herds 
of 2,000 head. The KCA grass lease was lucrative, though, 
and the tribes received $56,000 in grass money from various 
cattlemen (ARCIA 1886:130).
Hall reported that the Wichita were nearly self- 
supporting and recommended that their rations be cut off
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and the money used to buy stock for them. He felt that if 
this were done, they would then be totally independent 
(ARCIA 1886:128).
Drought once again struck the reservation in 1887, 
and the Indian fields yielded an average of only 11 bushels/ 
acre. Hall reported that com, winter wheat, and cotton 
were the only crops suited to the soil and climate condi­
tions on the reservation. Most of the winter wheat was 
planted late that year and wasn't worth harvesting. Little 
was done with cotton during the remainder of the reservation 
period.
Hall urged the government to buy the Indian's surplus 
wheat for issue as seed so that 1/3 of the KCA/W acreage 
could be planted in wheat (ARCIA 1887:82). Though winter 
wheat was relatively well suited to environmental condi­
tions on the reservation, the agency had no flouring mill, 
and there was no market within range. The KCA/W had only 
one "thrashing-machine" which was difficult to transport 
between farms and, as a result, much of the wheat crop was 
lost.
On the positive side, the agency was granted two 
additional assistant farmers for six months, and the Indian 
cattle herds were increased by 1,177 head.
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Consistent with Hall's suggestion of the preceding 
year, the Wichita rations were cut off, but the poor crop 
yield forced them to eat a good number of their stock 
(ARCIA 1887:81).
It is to Hall's credit that he opposed passage of 
the Dawes Act and its application to the KCA/W. Part of 
his annual report for 1886 was devoted to criticism of the 
allotment plan and was deleted from the annual publication 
by the Commissioner (Pennington 1972:166). In the report, 
Hall correctly assessed the true motives and impact of 
allotment. Fortunately, even the Commissioner agreed that 
the KCA/W were not yet ready to be allotted.
E. E. White investigated the Hall administration 
and served as a witness during the indictment. Hall was 
charged with neglect of duties, drunkenness, selling whiskey 
to the Indians at the agency, and embezzlement of $14,008 
grass money (ARCIA 1888:98; Buntin 1931:92; Pennington 
1972:169).
White succeeded Hall as a temporary agent in 1888. 
His reported figures for KCA/W acreage and cattle were quite 
high, and the apparent increase was unaccounted for in his 
annual report. It appears most likely that the acreage 
figure of 7,985 acres, representing close to 3,000 acres
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above the previous year's total, was in error since the 
following seven years showed a maximum of only 5,000 acres. 
The reported number of Indian cattle should also be treated 
skeptically, though it is consistent with the larger pattern 
of growth.
Though no drought as such was reported, Indian crops 
yielded only 10 bushels/acre. White corroborated Hall's 
report that the agency lacked a flouring mill and that the 
wheat crop was worthless to the Indians (ARCIA 1888:97). 
There was also a problem with the beef rations. The con­
tractors were delivering the total winter beef supply to the 
agency in early fall to save themselves the rigors of making 
winter deliveries. By mid-winter, many of the cattle had 
died, and those remaining were so thin that they were hardly 
worth eating. White also reported that all of the reserva­
tion tribes were opposed to allotment and to the building 
of railroads through their reservation.
In 1888, peyote was mentioned in White's report.
He confused peyote, which he called "woqui," with mescal
beans but clearly saw its use as unquestionably evil. He
took a very firm stand against it at first.
I issued an order, in writing, forbidding any 
Indian to use the beans or have any in his 
possession, and declared that I would punish
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any violation of the order by withholding 
rations, annuity goods, and lease money 
(ARCIA 1888:99).
However, the Comanche raised such vocal opposition that 
White conceded to the winter use of peyote.
The incident illustrates quite well a fairly common 
agent style in dealing with the Indians. Typically hasty 
conclusions were drawn from limited information and a policy 
formulated. Paternalistic authoritarian restrictions were 
used in an attempt to force conformity from the Indians, 
i.e., the agent used his custodial position to gain com­
pliance by selectively withholding the food, goods, and 
favors that the Indians were dependent upon. When the 
policy or tactics proved to be unworkable, the agents backed 
down. This pattern was found in the promotion of farming 
and in the suppression of the tribal activities.
The agent for 1889 was L. J. Miles. He estimated 
that the reservation's total acreage was 3,594,240 acres.
Of this, he noted that no more than 40% could be used for 
agriculture. Much of the remaining acreage was sandy and 
covered by upland native grasses. He warned that the soil 
beneath was fragile and would be ruined if it were plowed 
(ARCIA 1889:187).
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According to Miles, 1/2 the Indian men on the reser­
vation were "very prosperous farmers in a small way," but 
many of the KCA men were uninterested in farming. To pro­
mote farming. Miles required every male Indian, 20 years of 
age or older, to plant and cultivate 10 acres or lose his 
ration to those who did (ARCIA 1889:188). Miles was re­
placed before he could put this policy into effect.
The year's oat crop failed because the seed arrived 
late. The corn and millet crops made but the yield was again 
only 10 bushels/acre. The wheat flouring mill was completed 
in 1889, but wheat seed was not sent to the agency from 1889- 
1897, except for 40 bushels in 1891 (Pennington 1972:215).
The Kiowa asked for permission to hold a Sun Dance,
but Miles was opposed to the idea.
After making diligent inquiry about the manner in 
which the dance was celebrated, it was obvious to 
me that it was both demoralizing and degrading and 
that it should not be permitted (ARCIA 1889:190).
The Commissioner gave his approval for Miles to use force, 
if necessary, to prevent the Kiowa from holding their cere­
mony.
C. E. Adams replaced Miles as agent. In describing 
the Indian farms, he stated that the farms averaged 10-15 
acres in corn and some vegetable gardens. There were 64
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farms in excess of 20 acres and 8 farms of 50 or more acres 
(Pennington 1972:224). Among the over 300 farmers there 
were only 115 plows. Drought again hit the area and Indian 
farms yielded an average of 6 bushels/acre.
After reading an inspector's report, the Commissioner 
concluded that the grass leases were detrimental to Indian 
farming and should be stopped. He thought that by further 
impoverishing the Indians, they could be more easily forced 
to farm. Unfortunately, by terminating the grass leases 
two months early. Commissioner Morgan lost the $33,000 in 
grass money and $75,000 in land improvements due the KCA 
(Pennington 1972:239; Board of Indian Commissioners Report 
1890:31).
The Commissioner visited the KCA/W reservation in 
1891 to inform the Indians of the impending allotment and 
to urge them to prepare themselves for that eventuality 
(ARCIA 1891:350).
Adams gave little information in his reports bear­
ing directly on Indian farming. He did report in 1891 that 
the seed oats arrived too late for planting. From the 
annual statistics for the agency, it is apparent that the 
Indian c o m  crop yielded only 10 bushels/acre. For both 
years that Adams was agent, an unexplained annual increase
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of about 2,000 head of cattle is recorded for the Indian 
herds (ARCIA 1890:475; ARCIA 1891:101)
Adams was investigated and spent the last months of 
his career as agent answering charges of using his office 
to assist friends in gaining contracts and making leases 
(Buntin 1931:82, 102, 104).
During this "Political Period," the Commissioners 
clearly gave the agents less discretionary power than Hunt 
or his predecessors had enjoyed. In 1888, the Commissioner 
began demanding detailed monthly progress reports from the 
agents based upon accurate records rather than estimates 
(Pennington 1972:186). This policy not only required more 
clerical work of the agents but increased the amount of 
time the farm instructors spent keeping records, allowing 
less time for actual farm instruction. Agency farmer 
Madera’s reports for May-August, 1888, appear representative 
of the situation. In May, he assisted 25 Indian farmers; 
in June, he saw only 7 Indian farmers because 16 days were 
taken up with agency duties; in July, he visited only 2 
Indian farms and spent most of the month at the agency; 
in August he was at the agency stacking hay and was unable 
to instruct any Indians (Pennington 1972:197).
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In 1889, the Commissioner began requiring that the 
agency farm instructors live in the local areas of the res­
ervation for which they were responsible in order to cut 
their travel time to and from the agency (Pennington 1972: 
221). In the same directive, however, the Commissioner re­
emphasized the required monthly farmer reports and thereby 
helped undercut his own plan for greater efficiency.
The program of farm instruction was hampered during 
this period by too few instructors, who were expected to do 
too many things for too little pay. In 1886, the head 
farmer received $700/year for his services and his assist­
ants were hired for only 6 months out of the year for $40/ 
month. In 1887, the head farmer's salary was reduced to 
$600/year (Pennington 1972:185). With little pay, and with 
detailed reports and agency farm duties in addition to the 
rigorous travel and instructional duties, it is little 
wonder that the job attracted few farmers with much ability 
and did not fire them with enthusiasm for their assignments. 
The farm instructors also were hampered by the general lack 
of implements and seed which made instruction in wheat farm­
ing especially difficult.
Nevertheless, the yearly reports indicate that some 
progress in Indian farming was made during this period.
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Despite the discouraging effect of severe drought, occurring 
three years out of six and with a crop yield never exceeding 
11 bushels/acre, Indian acreage had increased by 1,200 acres 
at the end of the period. The maximum reached in 1891 was 
4,715 acres. Though this represents only slightly more than 
one acre farmed per Indian, it was an increase over the pre­
ceding period and during a time when any increase must have 
been miraculous.
The increase in acreage for the period must be 
attributed to the KCA. By 1887, they were responsible for 
more than half the total Indian acreage. There were still 
some cooperative group farming endeavors at this time among 
the KCA and the major crop continued to be corn which was 
mainly used as feed for their cattle. Besides their large 
corn fields, the Indian farmers commonly tended large vege­
table gardens.
The two most promising cash crops for the area, 
cotton and wheat, were given little support or encourage­
ment by the government during the "Political Period." When 
experimented with, cotton showed good results but was aban­
doned when the government gave it no support. Wheat was 
fairly well suited to the area, but was a useless crop until 
a flouring mill was installed at the agency. When the mill
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became operable, however, wheat seed was withheld by the 
Commissioner.
Without fanfare in the annual reports, the Indian 
cattle herds were significantly enlarged during this period. 
In 1886 they totaled 5,491 head and by 1891 their number had 
reached 21,000 or slightly more than 5 head per Indian. Of 
course, certain prosperous individuals, like Quanah Porker, 
acccounted for much of the total.
In 1886-1887, the KCA took half their lease payments 
in cattle and half in cash. Beginning in 1888, they took 
the total in cash (Pennington 1972:204). Freight hauling 
offered another source of cash income, though the Indians 
made less from it than they had previously (ARCIA 1888:97; 
ARCIA 1889:190).
The Final Years; From the Jerome Agreement (1892) 
to Allotment and Opening (1901)
The agency saw a rapid agent turnover in the final 
years of the reservation period. In nine years time, seven 
agents took their turns at the agency.
Upon his arrival, agent Day met with the KCA/W. He 
found that they were concerned about the length of time re­
maining in the Medicine Lodge annuity period and that they 
wanted their grass leases reestablished (ARCIA 1892:385).
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After making a trip to Washington, Day was successful in 
renewing the grass leases. Shortly afterward, back grass 
money payments were made in the lump sum of $69,000. The 
Indians used the money to buy wagons and to buy houses on 
a cost-sharing basis with the government. From this point 
on, the government pushed the housing project nearly as much 
as Indian farming. In each of the remaining reservation 
period years, additional houses were paid for by the Indians. 
The Indians paid for the lumber and assisted in construction 
and the government paid for the carpenter (ARCIA 1892:385).
The year 1892 was not a fair one for reservation 
crops which yielded only 11 bushels/acre. The total acreage 
increased over the previous year, however, and 4,000 head of 
cattle were added to the Indian herds, though apparently not 
through government cattle distributions (Pennington 1972:
236).
On October 6 , 1892, the Jerome Agreement was made 
by which the Indian signers, supposedly representing the 
KCA/W, agreed to an allogment of 160 acres for each Indian 
with title held in trust for 25 years. The remainder of the 
reservation was to be bought by the government and opened to 
white settlement. The Jerome Agreement was almost immedi­
ately denounced as a fraud, and its Congressional ratification
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was vigorously opposed by both the Indians and the cattlemen. 
It was not until 1900 that it was finally ratified and allot­
ment applied to the KCA/W.
There was no annual narrative report filed for 1893. 
During the year, two Army men (Brown and Nichols) filled in 
until the new agent arrived. A statistical report was filed 
which indicates that severe drought limited the Indian crop 
yield to 4 bushels/acre. In a letter to the Commissioner, 
Brown claimed that a great number of white sharecroppers 
were working Indian land (Pennington 1972:235). Since this 
is the only direct report on white sharecropping, it is diffi­
cult to determine the actual extent of the practice.
Agent Abie's statistical report for 1894 resubmitted 
figures from the preceding year and he provided no narrative 
report.
When agent Baldwin took charge of the agency in 
December, 1894, he found it a complete shambles. "Retained 
copy letter books were being used as toilet paper in the 
closets . . . "  (ARCIA 1895:250). Though Baldwin was new to 
the Indian Affairs department, he was an enthusiastic clerk 
and soon had the agency back in order.
Baldwin launched a major effort to improve the manner 
in which tool and seed distribution was handled. He demanded
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that all requests be validated by an agency farm instructor 
before they were filled.
In his annual report, Baldwin stated that due to 
drought, only late or replanted crops had any chance of 
making harvest. The accompanying statistical report, how­
ever, shows 100,000 bushels of c o m  were harvested (ARCIA 
1895:588). It is more likely that this figure is off by a 
factor of ten and that the corn crop yielded 10,000 bushels. 
A severe drought year yielding 20 bushels/acre is certainly 
a contradiction in terms.
Though Baldwin recognized the unsuitability of much 
of the reservation to agriculture, his solution to the 
Indian farming problem was an old one. He felt that the 
KCA could farm or starve (ARCIA 1895:251-252). On the other 
hand, he found the Wichita to be almost self-supporting.
The seed issued during 1895 consisted mainly of 
corn, millet, sorghum, and oats. Baldwin used the money for 
wheat and rye seed to buy more oat and millet seed, despite 
the suitability of winter wheat and the presence of a flour­
ing mill (Pennington 1972:249).
At a general council, the KCA decided to use the 
money from the grass leases to buy additional breeding stock 
for distribution. Baldwin used $50,000 of the grass money
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each year to purchase the cattle for the Indians, The local 
traders, however, complained that the project was unfairly 
diverting money from their businesses.
During the 1890s, the Indian farming program was 
assisted by the four government and five mission schools on 
the reservation which included farming instruction in their 
curriculums. Baldwin went a step further and advocated that 
Indian children be taken off to boarding schools at two 
years of age in order to mold them properly (ARCIA 1895: 
252).
Though Baldwin referred to his statistical report 
for 1896, no such report accompanied his annual narrative 
report. He claimed that during the year one-third more land 
was opened than ever before. The recurrence of drought 
conditions, however, led him to conclude that agriculture 
on any large scale would be impossible on the reservation 
(ARCIA 1896:253). He saw stock raising as the only real 
possibility for Indian self-sufficiency. He noted that the 
grass money was providing each Indian with one head per 
year and that the government, by buying the cattle for the 
beef ration from the Indians, could provide a good local 
market for them. Unfortunately, the circularity and
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destructiveness of this process to the stock raising effort 
eluded Baldwin.
The industriousness of the KCA was testified to by 
Baldwin when he reported that they were actively engaged 
in hauling freight and cutting and hauling wood and hay.
He noted, however, that though the desire for wage labor 
was obvious, there were only limited opportunities on the 
reservation (ARCIA 1896:254).
By 1896, the KCA/W were becoming alarmed about the 
possible ratification of the Jerome Agreement. The Indians 
protested that those who signed were forced to do so and 
that some signatures were forged. Baldwin also opposed 
immediate allotment, but his overly enthusiastic accounts 
of the progress he was making in transforming the KCA/W 
into farmers and cattlemen did little to discourage rati­
fication.
In 1897, Baldwin reported:
There has been an increased acreage under cultiva­
tion by the Indians over that of last season, 
which, with the abundant rainfall, has placed 
these people (KCA/W) beyond a chance of want or 
hunger during the coming winter, besides having 
something to put on the market (ARCIA 1897:231).
He observed that such a good crop year was to be looked for
only once every six or seven years. Though no crop yield
statistics accompanied his report, he claimed that 13,421
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acres were under Indian cultivation. Baldwin noted that 
cotton was well suited to the environment but that it re­
quired a great amount of field labor and that there was no 
market for cotton nearby (Pennington 1972:272).
The year was also a good one for Indian cattle herds 
which were estimated at between 20,000 and 30,000 head. 
Baldwin stated that the Indians were selling better quality 
beef to the government than was supplied by the beef con- 
traccors (ARCIA 1897:231). Unfortunately, due to the 
Indians' ignorance of fair stock prices, they were being 
victimized by unscrupulous local whites. Baldwin saw com­
plete governmental control of all Indian stock sales as the 
only alternative.
During 1897, KCA/W income reached its peak for the 
entire reservation period. Baldwin reported that by taking 
agency jobs, plus stock and crop sales and grass leases, 
the KCA/W income had reached $127,205 for the year (ARCIA 
1897:232). This total results in an unimpressive per 
capita figure of $32. There still were not enough job 
opportunities to satisfy the Indian requests for work. It 
should be noted also that even this modest level of income 
was entirely dependent upon the existence of lands to lease, 
an agency with jobs, and a need for supplies to be hauled.
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and a neighboring Army post with needs that could be ful­
filled by the Indians without local white competition. In 
other words, the situation even with these limited oppor­
tunities was an artificial one that was bound to change 
once allotment and white settlement came to the reservation.
The allotment and opening of the Cheyenne and 
Arapaho reservation provided an example that much worried 
the KCA/W. Baldwin supported the Indian opposition to 
allotment and agreed that the Jerome Agreement had been 
"made and completed by coercion and fraud" (ARCIA 1897:233). 
He wrote a letter to this effect to the House Committee on 
Indian Affairs.
Usually a change of agent was made in August or 
September, following the yearly report; however. Walker 
took over from Baldwin in May of 1898. According to Walker, 
various urgent agency duties made it impossible for him to 
compile and submit a statistical report for the year, though 
he did claim that 15,000 acres were being farmed by the 
KCA/W. This acreage figure appears to be fairly accurate 
since it fits between Baldwin's 1897 total of 13,421 and 
Randlett's 15,800 acres for 1899.
Walker noted in his report, as so many agents had 
done before, that the reservation was ill-suited to farming
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and that Indian stock raising should be encouraged (ARCIA 
1898:237). No further information on Indian farming was 
given for 1898, other than a report of fair weather and the 
expectation of a good crop.
Walker served as agent for 14 months and then ab­
sconded with agency Indian funds (Buntin 1931:142),
Agent Randlett replaced Walker in July, 1899. He 
remained as agent for seven and a half years. The agency 
records were in disorder when he arrived, so his annual 
report for 1899 was a bit thin. Randlett stated, however, 
that 15,800 acres were farmed by the KCA/W and that their 
cattle herds had 10,000 head. The reservation was once 
again hit by severe drought which limited Indian crop yield 
to 4 bushels/acre. Randlett was quick to report to the 
Commissioner on the area's unsuitability to agriculture 
(Kiowa Agency Letter Press Book - KALPB 1899:K-72, #s 158 
and 162).
By 1899, the reservation had been divided into five 
farming districts, each with its own farm instructor. A 
subagency also had been established at Fort Sill to better 
coordinate agency affairs in the southern part of the 
reservation.
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From Randlett's letters to the Commissioner, it is 
apparent that ration commodities of unacceptable quality 
frequently were received and distributed due to the hardship 
to the Indians if the rations were further delayed (viz.
KALPB 1899:K-72, #230). By October the agency had been 
connected to Chickasha by the Rock Island and Pacific Rail­
way, making the hauling of rations by wagon unnecessary.
In 1898 and 1899, the grass money was paid on a per 
capita basis. Many Indians made house deposits and paid 
for wagons that were to be delivered during the last months 
of Walker's administration. Walker made no records of the 
deposits and left with the Indians' money (ARCIA 1899:288; 
KALPB 1899:K-72, #s 246 and 342).
By 1899, not only the KCA/W, but the cattlemen and 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs were raising vocal opposi­
tion to the ratification of the Jerome Agreement. Randlett 
helped compose a letter to Commissioner Jones stating the 
Indians' case against allotment. The letter stressed that, 
though the KCA/W were making progress, they were not ready 
for allotment. The uncertainty of farming in the area was 
pointed out, and a request was made that if allotted they 
be given sufficient grazing land to raise cattle so that 
they could subsist upon the natural increases of their herds.
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In his annual report for 1900, Randlett again de­
scribed the environmental conditions that made farming on 
the reservation all but impossible (ARCIA 1900:331-332).
This was done not only as a report of fact but as another 
effort to forestall allotment. As luck would have it, the 
year turned out to be the best year for agriculture of the 
entire reservation period. Though only 8,065 acres were 
planted, the season yielded a bumper crop in com, oats, 
and wheat. The average yield was 35 bushels/acre.
Well before the crop was in, however, the Jerome 
Agreement was ratified, and plans for allotment were made. 
Each Indian was to receive 160 acres of his choice. Several 
large tracts totaling 480,000 acres were set aside for 
Indian cattle grazing. The rest of the reservation was to 
be sold to white settlers by lottery.
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the Board of 
Indian Commissioners, and the Secretary of Interior had done 
everything in their power to block ratification. In the 
last months prior to passage, they had even submitted 
greatly biased reports exaggerating the poor condition of 
the Indians and the inhospitable reservation environment 
(Pennington 1972:353-357), as if the real situation were 
not grim enough.
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In his annual report for 1900, Randlett anticipated 
that with the KCA/W taking most of the good farm land in 
allotment, the white settlers coming into the area would be 
eager to lease or sharecrop Indian allotments (ARCIA 1900: 
333). Randlett proved to be correct, and, as will be seen, 
the leasing of allotments completely undid any possible good 
that could have resulted from the allotment.
By all accounts, 1901 was a trying year for the 
KCA/W. Allotment and the opening of the reservation to 
white settlement had an unsettling effect on the Indians, 
and only 5,955 acres were farmed in 1901. Randlett reported, 
however, that the KCA had made good choices in their allot­
ments and that they were satisfied with the quality of their 
land. Due to the speed with which allotment was accomplished 
many Wichita had to have land selected for them though, in 
general, they too were satisfied (ARCIA 1901:320).
Once again, severe drought struck the area, and 
Indian crops yielded only 3 bushels/acre. Drought, however, 
was not the major disaster of the year. A smallpox epidemic 
broke out and took a heavy toll in Indian lives, especially 
among those still living in group camps along rivers and 
streams. The Comanche suffered the most and lost 163 people 
to the disease (ARCIA 1901:321). Vaccination reduced the
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number that would have died otherwise, but still great 
numbers of children and old people succumbed.
Indian cattle herds were down somewhat over the 
previous year's total. The year's statistical report 
records 17,144 head for the KCA/W or an average of slightly 
more than four head per person. There were many large herds, 
however, especially among the Comanche, and these herds were 
grazed in the "Big Pasture."
Following registration of applicants, the unallotted 
portion of the reservation was sold by lottery on August 6, 
1901. The KCA/W had chosen their land wisely, and there was 
relatively little good farm land left. Immediately follow­
ing the lottery, the area was flooded by land sharks and 
potential tenant farmers seeking land (Nye 1969:304). In 
his annual report, Randlett noted that Indian cattle and 
horses were stolen daily in good number by local whites and 
that Indian homes left unattended were frequently ransacked 
(ARCIA 1901:322).
The final years of the reservation period saw a 
rapid succession of agents and agency personnel that pro­
vided little continuity or efficiency. The KCA/W reserva­
tion became a focus of great political and economic pressure 
during the 1890s. Land speculators, homesteaders, merchants.
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and railroads attempted to force allotment while the Indians, 
the Department of Interior, and the cattlemen vigorously 
opposed such a move (Buntin 1931:120). In the end, of 
course, the pro-allotment forces won out.
During this period, the farm instructor's and agent's 
reports were frequently patchy and incomplete. For some 
years they were non-existent. A detailed picture of the 
condition of Indian farming is not available, though the 
pieces that remain support the following conclusions.
From 1892 up to 1899, there was a gradual increase 
in the number of acres farmed by the KCA/W; from 5,000 to 
15,800. Due to the turmoil caused by the allotment and 
opening of the reservation, the total acreage declined 
markedly during 1900 and 1901. Out of the last ten years 
(1892-1901), five years brought severe drought and only one 
clearly resulted in a good crop yield.
Though a breakdown of acreage by tribe is not possi­
ble for this period, it appears likely that the KCA were 
responsible for much of the increase in total Indian acreage 
for the period. In 1900, Randlett observed that all of the 
tribes were willing to farm when "profitable results 
appear(ed) attainable" (ARCIA 1900:463). "Profitable 
results," unfortunately, were seldom attainable and most
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Indian farms ranged from 10-70 acres, with few exceeding 100 
acres (Pennington 1972:320). Despite generally favorable 
experiments with wheat and cotton, corn remained the main 
Indian crop throughout the reservation period. Given the 
limited utility and market for c o m  and the unrelenting 
droughts, it is little wonder that the Indians felt dis­
inclined to farm on a larger scale. It is true that there 
were some exemplary, successful Indian farmers, but after 
32 years of governmental "efforts" to transform the KCA/W 
into self-sufficient farmers, this group included but a 
handful. For 1900, Randlett estimated that 22% of Indian 
subsistence came from the government and 70% came from grass 
money, wage labor, stock sales and farming (Pennington 1972: 
346).
During 1899-1901, the government curtailed seed and 
small implement distributions to the KCA/W and bought some 
large and expensive implements for them to share. This 
equipment was kept at the agency and district farm stations. 
Prior to 1895, there were two farming districts and only two 
farm instructors. In 1895, an additional district was 
formed and an instructor was added. A fourth farm district 
and instructor were added in 1897, and in 1899, the number 
of districts and instructors reached five (Pennington 1972:
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260, 262, 318). Both the farm machinery and increased farm 
instruction, however, arrived too late to have much effect 
prior to the allotment and opening.
The "final years" saw much fluctuation in the size 
of the Indian cattle herds. From a total of 25,000 head in 
1892, there was a decline to 8,991 head in 1895. After two 
years, the herds once more reached 25,000 head but immedi­
ately began to decrease again. By 1901, there were only 
17,144 head, and in the following three years the number 
dwindled still further. Both the agency and Fort Sill needed 
beef and favored Indian cattle since they were closer and 
arrived in better shape for butchering. Though the sales 
provided the Indians with badly needed cash, the demands of 
the government installations, which included the Indian's 
own beef ration, far exceeded the natural increase of the 
herds. The result was that while the government provided 
a fair market for Indian cattle, it reduced the number of 
breeding stock in the herds.
The agents for the period reported no breeding 
cattle distributions by the government. It seems most 
likely that when the Indian herds increased, they did so 
as a result of grass lease payments, horse for cattle 
trades, and natural increases.
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Though Randlett apparently was a diligent and sym­
pathetic agent, his judgment certainly can be questioned on 
the subject of leasing Indian allotments. In his annual re­
port for 1900, he correctly anticipated that white home­
steaders would be anxious to lease Indian allotments after 
the opening, and he urged that the government adopt stringent 
rules to cover the situation. It was not that he was op­
posed to leases so much as that he was concerned with the 
quality of the white tenants (ARCIA 1900:333). He advocated 
sharecropping rather than outright lease for cash arrange­
ments. In 1901, Randlett wrote the Commissioner and actually 
pleaded the case for the settlers who had lost in the lottery 
and who wanted to lease Indian allotments (Pennington 1972: 
344). In the same year he supported the leasing of parts 
of the "Big Pasture" to one man who could then sublease 
small tracts to white tenant farmers (Pennington 1972:349).
It is difficult to keep from questioning his motives. There 
were two conflicting ideas on the subject. In one view it 
seemed reasonable that land which was not tilled or grazed 
by the KCA/W should be made useful to them by leasing to 
white tenants. On the other hand, it was thought that if 
leasing were encouraged, the marginal progress that had been 
made in Indian farming would be abruptly halted, if not
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erased. As will be seen in the next chapter, leasing was 
permitted on a large scale, and Indian farming suffered.
Conclusions
Immediately following the Medicine Lodge Treaty of 
1867, the federal policy with regard to the KCA/W was con­
cerned with tribal pacification, concentration onto isolated 
reservations, and the Indians’ transformation into self- 
sufficient farmers. By 1880, new goals in the government’s 
Indian policy were emerging: tribal atomization, individual
Indian allotment and independent farming, and the opening of 
reservations to white settlement. The eradication of Indian 
culture, social organization, and bison hunting subsistence 
and their replacement with "Christian" values and family- 
farming subsistence were long term goals throughout the 
reservation period.
The various branches of government had differing 
priorities and tactics for "civilizing" the Indians. The 
Congress imagined no serious obstacles to the project. 
Grandiose plans for Indian progress happily were concocted, 
though the Congress consistently withheld adequate funding 
to accomplish its own plans. In an effort to please the 
taxpayers, the Congress usually voted to cut Indian
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appropriations while at the same time new programs were 
being endorsed. When funds were forthcoming for a specific 
project, dramatic results were expected immediately, and 
when they did not come, funds again were reduced. Much of 
the money that was appropriated did little to benefit the 
Indians, but lined the pockets of crooked government con­
tractors .
The Indian Affairs branch of the Department of 
Interior continually wrangled for larger Indian appropria­
tions, though it too was laced with corruption. The Com­
missioners expected miracles of the agents and the Indians 
and frequently enforced rigid policy directives that were 
ill-fitted to actual reservation conditions.
By 1900, there was ample evidence to show that the 
KCA/W reservation was not environmentally suited to farming 
and that the KCA/W had not attained a scale of farming that 
was adequate to compete with white settlers. Nevertheless, 
Congress bowed to the demands of homesteaders and various 
economic interests and allotted the Indians and sold the 
balance of the reservation. Despite Congressional rhetoric 
concerned with Indian improvement, the real driving force 
for allotment was avarice for Indian land. Washburn, in his 
analysis of the push for allotment, suggests that the
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railroads were a major behind-the-scenes force, and he notes 
that they gained the most from the land openings (Washburn 
1975:20-21). Though unverified, his proposition certainly 
appears likely.
Ironically, Commissioner Jones stated in his 1901 
annual report that the intent of the government concerning 
the KCA/W at the time of the reservation opening was to 
protect the rights of the Indians, to establish opportunity 
for self-support, and then to allow them to sink or swim 
(ARCIA 1901:45). Indian rights were not protected, and 
reasonable opportunity for self-support was never estab­
lished, but the KCA/W were allowed to sink or swim.
From Medicine Lodge to Allotment, significant prog­
ress in Indian farming was made despite great handicaps. 
Though the Indians did some farming during the turmoil of 
the military campaign years, farming really began for the 
KCA/W in 1875. From only 292 acres in 1869, the Indian 
acreage grew to 15,800 acres by 1899. Indian cattle herds 
also increased from 109 head in 1869 to 18,599 head in 1900. 
The increased acreage and stock are significant, though they 
were not of a scale adequate for self-support or competition 
with white settlers.
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The Wichita were clearly not the only Indian farmers. 
By 1871, the KCA accounted for 10% of the total Indian acre­
age, by 1888 over 50%, and by 1900, it can be assumed, even 
more.
Frequent drought was likely the greatest discourage­
ment to Indian farming. In the 32 years between 1869 and 
1901, severe drought struck the reservation 15 times. Fur­
ther discouragement was provided by the lack of markets or 
a valued use for Indian crops. Though the government prom­
ised much in the way of seed, tools, and instruction, what 
actually was furnished was never sufficient for the needs 
and requests of the Indians. The local agencies were always 
understaffed and, following Hunt, the agents considered their 
positions temporary and were reluctant to give the job the 
monumental effort it required.
Cattle raising really was not considered by the 
government as an alternative to farming. It would have 
taken too much money to start. It also would have required 
the KCA/W to keep large tracts of land for grazing. It also 
would not have promoted tribal break-up, private property 
or sedentariness, all of which were seen as requisite to 
"civilizing" the Indian.
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From Medicine Lodge onward, the KCA/W became in­
creasingly dependent upon the government and the local agent 
for their subsistence. The paternalistic relationship, how­
ever, went beyond the simple disbursement of rations and 
annuity goods to include the distribution of seed, tools, 
breeding stock, and agency jobs. The agent's authority ex­
tended even to control over Indian financial dealings with 
traders, as well as Indian education, religious activities, 
and socio-political organization. If an agent disapproved 
of any individual or group, he had the power to punish and 
force apparent conformity to his wishes by withholding goods 
vital to subsistence. The agent's favorites, those Indians 
discerned as most "progressive," frequently were rewarded by 
more than their fair share of goods and opportunities. From 
the preceding historical account, it is apparent that most 
agents used the paternalistic authority of their position 
to reward and punish as they saw fit. In either case, how­
ever, the Indians remained dependent upon the government 
agent. Given the constraints of the reservation situation, 
such a relationship is understandable. Unfortunately, 
paternalism served to undemine Indian self-reliance and 
replaced it with a helpless dependence upon the agent. Of 
course, the process referred to here was neither immediate
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nor complete, but characterized a pervasive attitude and 
relationship that eroded the Indians' independent spirit 
and ambition. There were notable exceptions among the 
culturally conservative Indians and among the few relatively 
successful Indian farmers.
Indian Subsistence Alternatives 
From the agents' statistical reports included in the 
ARCIA came the following figures on the percent of Indian 
subsistence gained from various sources.
Farming and Hunting and Rations 
Stock Raising Gathering and Annuities
1878 KCA 3 15 82
W 33 33 34
1885 KCA/W 20 5 75
1891 KCA/W 35 15 50
1894 KCA/W 50 0 50
No agent estimates are available for any year between 1895 
and 1901. It should be remembered that the above figures 
are but rough estimates made by various agents in their 
yearly reports to the Commissioner. It is likely that the 
farm and stock percentages were padded somewhat to help the 
agent validate his progress in transforming the Indians.
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Given that probability, the figures still retain some worth 
as approximations for an agent couldn't afford to report a 
condition that was too much at variance with that observed 
by the frequent investigators and special agents.
If the historical data presented earlier in the 
chapter are analyzed, seven alternative sources of Indian 
subsistence emerge for the reservation period. These are 
(1) hunting and gathering, (2) horse raiding and trading,
(3) rations and annuities, (4) farming, (5) stock raising,
(6) grass leases, and (7) wage labor,
(1) Though the KCA/W continued to hunt and gather 
throughout the reservation period, it was limited to a 
marginal or supplementary basis after 1879, and the virtual 
elimination of bison from the Southern Plains, Traditionally, 
hunting and gathering had been the chief source of subsist­
ence and, in the 1870s, the Indians had earned cash from the 
sale of bison hides. From 1880 onward, hunting and gather­
ing had little significance in KCA/W subsistence.
(2) The other major traditional source of Indian 
subsistence was horse raiding and trading. After their 
military pacification was complete in 1874, the KCA/W were 
restricted to the reservation and made no further horse 
raids into Texas or Mexico, In fact, the Indians themselves
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became the target of unrelenting horse thieves from Texas 
during the remaining reservation years. Even before 1874, 
the horse raid/horse trade system had been disrupted by the 
government.
(3) After the disappearance of the bison, the 
KCA/W depended most heavily upon government rations and 
annuities for their subsistence. This dependence was by 
necessity rather than choice. The level of ration support 
was determined while the bison still provided most of the 
Indian's needs and was even inadequate in those days. After 
the bison were gone and the rations had to be depended upon, 
they proved to be far from sufficient. The rations and 
annuities habitually arrived late, were of shockingly poor 
quality, and many commodities and items were useless to the 
Indians. The amount of rations provided was continually 
reduced by Congress. Indian dependence upon the rations 
gave the agents a basis from which to threaten effectively 
and to coerce the Indians into some conformity with their 
wishes. The ration situation presented the KCA/W with a 
"double-bind." Rations were frequently withheld from those 
who refused to attempt farming, thus forcing nearly every 
Indian family to plant a few acres. Yet, those who became 
proficient farmers (viz. the Wichita) had their rations cut
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off and suffered when their crops were destroyed by the 
frequent droughts.
(4) As already mentioned, farming on the reserva­
tion was limited by the lack of much suitable land and by 
the occurrence of severe drought. Other factors also con­
spired to discourage Indian farming. Even in the late 
1890s, both agents and commissioners still were thinking of 
Indian subsistence farming in unrealistically small scale. 
They believed that 15-25 acres and a few head of cattle per 
family were all that would be necessary to establish Indian 
self-sufficiency. Admittedly, a start had to be made some­
where, but the scale of farming they had in mind was clearly 
too small to be self-supporting, let alone competitive. 
Throughout the reservation period, the KCA/W were given only 
minimal seed, tools, and training. The frequent complaints 
by agents about the Indians' laziness and unwi1lingness to 
work are tempered by the equally frequent unfulfilled Indian 
requests for wage labor jobs and for the materials and in­
struction necessary for farming. The unavailability of local 
markets for their crops further limited the recognizable 
incentive to engage in the back-breaking work that was 
Indian farming during even a good year. Only a couple of 
years prior to allotment the reservation was connected by
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rail with the larger agro-economic system. Though both 
wheat and cotton were found suited to the reservation en­
vironment and commanded good prices at market, c o m  re­
mained the predominant Indian crop. Yet, even when the 
crop was "made," it was of little worth other than as feed 
for Indian stock. As a result of these factors, it is little 
wonder that there was no great Indian enthusiasm for farming. 
In fact, it is marvelous that the KCA/W farmed as much as 
they did by 1900, and likely reflects the inadequacy of 
other sources of subsistence.
(5) The reservation lands were best suited to 
cattle raising. The government, however, did not con­
sistently support Indian stock raising since it did not fit 
with the goal of small-scale family farming and allotment.
At the same time that stock raising brought the best profits 
to the Indians, its future was being undermined by heavy 
government purchase of the best cattle in their herds. The 
Indian desire for cash was exploited and their herds severely 
depleted in the years just prior to allotment.
(6) The grass leases, whereby large tracts of 
reservation land were leased to cattle companies, provided 
another source of support to the KCA. At first, payment 
was made in beef and breeding stock. Later, the Indians
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were paid in cash. Though the grass leases were periodi­
cally suspended by various Commissioners, the KCA usually 
received between $30,000 and $90,000 per year from the 
leases. These figures look like a great deal of money until 
it is remembered that when divided among over 3,000 Indians, 
the result is $10 to $30/person/year. The individual pay­
ments were further reduced since they were usually made on 
a semi-annual basis. The money was used to pay debts with 
the traders, to buy cattle, implements or houses, or to 
gamble. Needless to say, the per capita grass money didn't 
go very far, even when used prudently.
(7) Many KCA/W showed great enthusiasm for wage 
labor jobs. Unfortunately, the reservation offered few 
opportunities and little pay. Indians hauled freight for 
the agents and traders for $.75/100 Ibs./lOO miles and also 
cut and hauled lumber and hay. The Indian police made $8- 
$12/month for their arduous and invaluable services, and the 
few Indian assistant farmers made $40/month for full-time 
heavy work. The few jobs and little pay made only a slight 
contribution to Indian subsistence.
Due to the inadequacy of each of the subsistence 
alternatives, a composite with partial commitment to a 
variety of alternatives was required. Rations and annuities
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formed the base and were augmented by small scale farming 
and stock raising. Supplemental cash was brought in by 
grass money, wage labor and occasional stock sales. Light 
hunting and gathering efforts continued through the reserva­
tion period, but overall made a small contribution to Indian 
subsistence.
Reservation restriction and government policy quickly 
destroyed the basis of the traditional KCA/W ecological 
relationship and undermined tribal social organization as a 
supporting structure. The pre-reservation pattern was re­
placed by dependence upon government rations and the pater­
nalistic agency administration. The official policy of 
tribal atomization did away with a possible transitional 
structural option--cooperative "band" stock raising. As 
individual families, the Indians lacked the capital, breed­
ing stock, manpower, and, later, grazing land to make a go 
of cattle herding. As an intermediate step on the way to 
becoming self-sufficient family farmers, such a cooperative 
band unit might have provided the subsistence security 
necessary to make a gradual transition. A plan of this type 
was never tried since it conflicted with the popular goal 
of individual "civilized" self-sufficiency, would have taken 
too long, and would also have kept too much land in Indian
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ownership. As it was, the government gave the KCA/W only 
one generation to make the move from nomadic raiders and 
hunters and gatherers to independent family subsistence 
farmers. By all accounts the government attempted to ac­
complish too much, too quickly with too little support, and 
with no transitional structure other than paternalism to 
replace the traditional socio-economic structure which its 
policies largely destroyed.
CHAPTER 4
POST-ALLOTMENT AND PRE-INDIAN 
REORGANIZATION ACT PERIOD,
1901-1934
Developments in Federal Indian Policy 
In 1902, a major amendment to the General Allotment 
Act (Dawes Act) was passed. The amendment permitted mul­
tiple heirs to sell their inherited allotment and divide 
the proceeds. The framers of the bill saw it as a measure 
whereby the problems of fractionated land inheritance could 
be overcome (Officer 1971:37). The net effect, however, 
was to open the door for the premature fee patenting and sale 
of Indian allotments which originally were intended to re­
main in trust for 25 years. From this point on the tempo 
of Indian land base erosion increased rapidly until it was 
halted temporarily with the passage of the Indian Reorgani­
zation Act of 1934. During the intervening 32 years an 
incredible amount of Indian land was lost through sale.
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The Burke Act of 1906 furthered the rapid sale of 
allotments by allowing the issuing of fee patents to any 
Indian judged competent to handle his own affairs. Fee 
patents thereafter were issued automatically on all in­
herited allotments (Officer 1971:37).
Fortunately, under Commissioners Leupp and Valentine 
(1904-1913) fee patenting proceeded slowly, and the judging 
of competency was not an automatic process.
The Omnibus Bill of 1910 enlarged the Secretary of 
Interior’s discretionary authority in determining heirs, 
conferring fee patents, partitioning inherited property, 
selling inherited allotments, and establishing lease ar­
rangements (Officer 1971:38).
By 1913, the stage was set for the rapid liquidation 
of Indian allotments through the exercising of the Com­
missioner’s authority. Cato Sells was just the Commissioner 
(1913-1921) for the job. He was ”a firm believer in re­
moving the restrictions from the titles of Indian allottees 
and giving them full control of their property" (Officer 
1971:38-39). Under Sells a disastrous program of forced fee 
patenting began in 1916. By 1920, he was proud to note in 
his annual report that approximately 135,000 of the 175,000 
allotments were fee patented. Given the post-allotment
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economic difficulties which most Indians were experiencing, 
the opportunity to sell their allotments proved irresistible, 
Commissioner Charles Burke quickly abandoned the 
forced fee patent program upon taking office in 1921. There­
after, fee patents were issued only after they had been 
applied for, and there was a great decline in the number of
such patents issued (Officer 1971:40).
The tragic condition of Indian land and water rights 
was highlighted in the early 1920s by the controversies over 
the Bursum Lands Bill and the diversion of water from the 
Maricopa and Pima Reservation. Popular interest in the 
Indians' plight was once again stirred. In 1926, a govern­
ment contract was given to the Institute of Government Re­
search to conduct a study of the condition of the American
Indians. Under the direction of Lewis Meriam the report,
The Problem of Indian Administration, was issued in 1928.
Commenting on the general conditions of Indian life, 
the Meriam Report stated:
The poverty of the Indians and their lack of ad­
justment to the dominant economic and social 
systems produce the vicious circle ordinarily 
found among any people under such circumstances.
Because of interrelationships, causes cannot be 
differentiated from effects. The only course is 
to state briefly the conditions found that are 
part of this vicious circle of poverty and mal­
adjustment (Meriam 1928:3).
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Two implications flow from the above findings. First, the
Indians' condition was not the result of unique cultural
factors, but of more general social and economic forces
acting upon them. Second, the Indians' condition was the
result of a failure to adapt on their part. The first
implication is supported though the second implication is
contradicted by the bulk of the material in this study.
A little further on, the report characterized the
Indian economic situation as follows;
He generally ekes out an existence through un­
earned income from leases of his land, the sale 
of land, per capita payments from tribal funds, 
or in exceptional cases through rations given 
him by the government . . . the main occupations 
of the men are some outdoor work, mostly of an 
agricultural nature, but the number of real 
farmers is comparatively small.
In justice to the Indians it should be said that 
many of them are living on lands from which a 
trained and experienced white man could scarcely 
wrest a reasonable living. In some instances the 
land originally set apart for the Indians was of 
little value for agricultural operations other 
than grazing (Meriam 1928:5).
With little modification this description fits the allotted
KCA/W of the late 1920s perfectly.
Later in the report attention again was given to
the topic of Indian farming:
Although a few Indians were visited who could 
really be called farmers in the ordinary sense
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of that word, they were distinctly exceptional.
The agricultural activities of a great majority 
of them are very limited, and are considerably 
below any satisfactory standard for subsistence 
farming (Meriam 1928:491).
The report proceeded to correctly cite inadequate farm in­
struction and lack of working capital as chief obstacles to 
Indian farming, but it retained an inappropriate subsistence 
farming focus consistent with the emphasis of the Dawes Act. 
By way of a solution, the report proposed a vague "Five year 
Agricultural Program" which would transform not only the 
Indian farmers but their families and local communities as 
well (Meriam 1928:497).
On the subject of Indian stock raising, the report
stated:
Ample evidence demonstrates that stock raising 
is the most promising form of agricultural and, 
in fact, the most promising of all pursuits for 
a large number of Indians. Not only does the 
average Indian show considerable aptitude for 
this work, but enormous areas of Indian land, 
tribal and individual, are of little value ex­
cept for grazing (Meriam 1928:504).
A general Indian stock raising plan was suggested which was 
to commence with tribal herds started with government back­
ing and later proceed to stock raising on an individual 
basis. Clearly, this plan was not a new one.
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In general, the Meriam Report offered a thoughtful 
and sympathetic analysis of the 1928 conditions of Indian 
life and roundly criticized the Department of Interior and 
Bureau of Indian Affairs for their negligence. With the 
appointment of John Collier as Commissioner in 1933 and the 
passage of the Wheeler-Howard Indian Reorganization Act in 
1934, many of the findings and suggestions of the Meriam 
Report were brought before Congress for action.
Agricultural Developments Prior to 1900
The period following the Civil War was one of eco­
nomic distress for the American farmer. From 1867 to 1898, 
though prices were favorable, the situation was dampened by 
rising transportation and production costs and a labor 
shortage. The balance gradually was tipped in favor of the 
farmer as technological improvements were made and new farm­
lands were opened to production. From 1898 to 1914, the 
farmers enjoyed a rare period of prosperity.
Prior to 1898, complex marketing problems plagued 
the farmer. Schlebecker claims that "Even with free 
transport of products, some commodities would still not have 
paid their cost of production" (1975:162). By the 1890s, 
however, marketing conditions were becoming more favorable.
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and better and cheaper transportation was available. Also 
by the 1890s, grain harvesting technology, including the 
combining of wheat, had greatly improved production.
Until the 1890s, Indian Territory (Oklahoma) was 
marginal to the national farm economy. Homesteaders were 
avid for land in Indian Territory in the 1890s and early 
1900s because of the emerging conditions favorable to farm­
ing. However, in retrospect, we can see that the tide 
already had turned against small scale farming by the 1890s. 
To that extent, then, the terms of Indian allotment and 
white homesteading in Indian Territory were out of step with 
the larger developing trends.
It is worth noting the circumstances of white farmers 
in North Central Indian Territory during the 1890s. The 
average farm consisted of 160 acres with 40 acres under 
cultivation and the remainder in pasture. All implements 
were horse drawn and rudimentary. Capital was limited.
Corn was clearly the preferred crop, followed by cotton, 
wheat, sorghum, and oats (Dale and Wardell 1948:406). At 
the same time, white farmers in Western Indian Territory 
were devoted to ranching on a small scale since the distance 
to the nearest market precluded anything other than sub­
sistence and feed crops. By 1900, however, and the arrival
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of the railroads, small scale diversified cash crop farming 
had become widespread. C o m  and cotton dominated the scene, 
but wheat was becoming more popular and was gradually taking 
over (Dale and Wardell 1948:408). The foregoing conditions 
would seem to indicate that the KCA/W, limited farmers as 
they were in the 1890s, were not outclassed completely by 
local white farmers.
Sources for 1901-1977 
The Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs offer coverage of varying depth and completeness 
for the KCA/W from 1901 to 1920. For 1901-1904, both the 
local agent's reports and annual statistics are presented. 
For 1905-1907, only the agent's reports are to be found, 
and for 1911-1920, only statistical information is offered. 
The same problems exist with this source of data as were 
reported in the last chapter.
The Indian Archives of the Oklahoma Historical 
Society contain little information on the KCA/W past the 
immediate allotment period. The two notable exceptions 
are the partial surveys of Indian farmers for 1915 and 
1925. The first survey appears to cover only Kiowa farmers, 
and the second survey seems to focus chiefly on Comanche
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farmers. Neither survey is complete nor are tribal affilia­
tions noted. Yet, though the surveys are incomplete, they 
offer an informative sample profile of some of the Indian 
farmers at the time. The agency records for the post­
allotment period are in a federal repository in Dallas and 
are to be found in a maze of unindexed storage crates 
(Jordan 1973: private correspondence).
The quest for current information collected by the 
Anadarko Agency's Soil and Moisture Committee is foiled by 
the fact that their records include no tribal designations 
and focus solely upon recent information directly related 
to their soil conservation programs.
The Doris Duke Oral History Project (DDOHP) col­
lected interviews in the late 1960s from many KCA/W on a 
variety of topics, including farming. The interview tran­
scripts are housed at the University of Oklahoma Library in 
the Western History Collection. The interviews usually are 
spotty in their references to farming. However, a few 
interviews offer some in-depth information, though even in 
these, chronological referents are quite vague.
The author conducted interviews with KCA/W farmers 
during the summers of 1973 and 1974. These interviews are 
relied upon heavily in the present chapter and even more
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heavily in the following chapter and are the source for the 
Indian farmer profiles offered prior to the conclusion of 
Chapter 5.
Finally, the Biennial Reports of the Oklahoma State 
Board of Agriculture (BROSBA) offer some important county 
farming statistics which help keep the Indian farming picture 
in perspective.
Allotment Selection and Settlement Patterns
At the outset it should be noted that the KCA/W 
agent's pessimistic opinions of the agricultural potential 
of the reservation lands prior to allotment were conditioned 
by the agricultural technology available at the time. By 
allotment, improvements in farm machinery and seed were 
making it more possible to farm many parts of Western Indian 
Territory. Frequent drought conditions, however, continued 
to plague the farmers.
In choosing their allotments, the KCA/W were en­
couraged to select quarter sections that offered water, 
grass, and wood. This mixture, while providing the in­
gredients for survival, limited the tillable land to 80-100 
acres per allotment. While at first this limitation was of 
little significance, it later was to further reduce the
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chances of Indian farmers successfully competing in the 
emerging agribusiness complex.
In general, members of the four tribes chose allot­
ments in the same area as their fellow tribesmen, Kiowa 
allotments centered around what is now Carnegie, Oklahoma 
and ranged somewhat to the west and south. The Kiowa Apache 
chose allotments in the area between what is now Fort Cobb 
and Apache, Oklahoma. The Comanche allotments spread to the 
south and west of Apache, extending to Walters, Oklahoma.
The Wichita and affiliated tribes took allotments to the 
north of Anadarko, north of the Washita River near con­
temporary Gracemont, Oklahoma.
Within each general tribal area, family members 
usually took allotments adjacent to each other, sometimes 
at the expense of overall land quality. Several informants 
reported that their parents had selected virtually worthless 
allotments for them solely because the land was near their 
own. It appears that band divisions and tribal factions 
also were reflected in the areas selected for allotments.
This is clearly the case for the Comanche and the Kiowa 
Apache.
The government assumed that allotment would magically 
transform the Indians into self-sufficient farming families.
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though from the start this assumption was obviously in error. 
Nevertheless, the policy of "allotment, sink or swim" re­
mained in force until the passage of the Indian Reorganiza­
tion Act. Though some KCA/W immediately moved onto their 
allotments and made an attempt to farm and raise cattle on 
a small scale, many more lived in group camps of tipis dur­
ing the first decade or more following allotment. Though 
the camp dwelling groups did some gardening and had some 
horses and cattle, their primary sources of income were per 
capita payments, allotment and tribal leases, and occasional 
land sales. Group camps were clearly not limited to one 
tribe but were found among all four tribes (Evgenia Mausape, 
DDOHP, T-138:3; Ray Blackbear, DDOHP, T-332:18; Joseph 
Wheeler, DDOHP, T-288:2). The existence of many such group 
camps among the Wichita is especially noteworthy given their 
farming origins and reservation period farming success. It 
seems likely then that the 1890s and early 1900s farming 
statistics do not represent simply the success of the 
Wichita with only minimal participation in farming from the 
other three tribes, but rather that by allotment times all 
four tribes were on much the same footing.
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1901-1910
Nationally, farm acreage expanded until 1914 under 
the thrust provided by a ready world for domestic surplus.
The development of the gas powered tractor had much to do 
with the general Increase In farmed acres. While there were 
only five tractors In use In 1900, there were over 17,000 
In use by 1914 (Schlebecker 1975:174). Though tractors were 
expensive, they required no fodder, and the acres that would 
have been devoted to feed were planted In cash crops.
Improvements In transportation, handling, and storage 
made national marketing possible and, while the farmers cer­
tainly were not the biggest gainers In the developing com­
modity economy, they made sufficient profits to justify 
calling the period from 1898 to 1914 the "Golden Age" of 
American Agriculture.
Oklahoma only partly shared In this period of agri­
cultural prosperity due to the recency of the areas' open­
ing to farming and the homesteading subsistence basis of 
Oklahoma farming.
The following national figures for farmers as a 
percentage of the work force Is an Indication of the emerg­
ing agribusiness complex In which fewer farmers were farming 
more acres with greater mechanical assistance.
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1870 - 53.0%
1880 - 49.4%
1890 - 42.6%
1900 - 37.5%
1910 - 31.0%
Homesteading and subsistence farming clearly were losing out 
to large scale cash-crop operations nationally by 1910. To 
that extent, not just KCA/W farmers but much of Oklahoma 
agriculture was developmentslly behind the times during the 
first decade of the 20th Century.
During 1900-1910, Oklahoma achieved statehood, be­
came linked by railroad to the national commodity economy, 
and initiated various state agencies and programs aimed at 
bringing Oklahoma agriculture up to date. The farm insti­
tutes and the State Board of Agriculture paid scant atten­
tion to the KCA/W except as a source of land that could be 
leased inexpensively by local white farmers.
Statewide figures for 1906-1907 show that corn still 
was the major crop by acreage and was followed by cotton and 
wheat, though cotton yielded the greatest income (Dale and 
Wardell 1948:411; Biennial Report of the Oklahoma State 
Board of Agriculture, BROSBA 1908:105). This picture 
corresponds quite well with the 1907 crop acreage and price
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figures for the three counties containing the majority of 
the KCA/W allotments— Caddo, Comanche, and Kiowa counties 
(BROSBA 1908:113, 121, 141).
In 1908, the state average profit per harvested 
acres was $9.55 (BROSBA 1908:14). The 1908 average wage per 
day for field labor ranged between $1.09 and $1.17, depend­
ing upon the type of work done, and a man with a working 
team of horses or mules could earn between $1.76 and $2.12 
per day (BROSBA 1908:12). This information will become 
more pertinent as we turn to the level of Indian income from 
various sources in 1911-1920.
From the Biennial Reports it is apparent that 1908- 
1909 was a pivotal period in the shift from homesteading to 
sharecropping in the KCA/W allotment area. In 1908, Caddo, 
Comanche, and Kiowa counties had roughly half as many farm 
tenants as farm owners, while by 1909 the same counties re­
ported farm tenants and farm owners in nearly equal numbers 
(BROSBA 1910:212-213). Many of the new tenants were farming 
land leased from individual KCA/W allottees.
After allotment and before the KCA reservation was 
opened to white settlement, 480,000 acres were set aside 
for common tribal pasture. The several large pastures, 
including the "Big Pasture," were located in the southeastern
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part of the former reservations and were not liquidated 
until 1906 and a second allotment and land opening.
In his annual report for 1901, Agent Randlett noted 
that the Indians did little farming due to the excitement 
of the opening and the disruption caused by selecting allot­
ments (ARCIA 1901:321). It mattered little, however, since 
severe drought again visited the area. Further turmoil 
among the KCA/W was caused by an outbreak of smallpox and 
the widespread white theft of Indian cattle and horses.
In 1902, Randlett was unable to report much farming 
progress and blamed it on the shortage of farm instructors. 
Those instructors that he did have had their time monopolized 
by agency bookkeeping duties and had little time for Indian 
farmers. Randlett reported that white burglary of un­
attended Indian houses and theft of Indian stock was pro­
ceeding on a routine wholesale basis. He noted also that 
since the KCA/W had become citizens they had been harassed 
repeatedly by their white neighbors and the one-sided 
application of property laws (ARCIA 1902:288).
In 1902, much of the common pasture land was leased 
for $132,369.90 per year. This money was distributed among 
the KCA in semiannual per capita payments (ARCIA 1902:290).
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By Congressional Act on May 27, 1902, the sale of 
inherited Indian allotments was approved. Randlett mis­
takenly anticipated few sales among the KCA/W. Previously 
(1900 and 1901), Randlett predicted that the policy of 
allowing widows, children, and the infirm to lease their 
allotments would result in few leases and would have an 
overall beneficial effect. Yet, in less than a year 
(October 1, 1901-September 1, 1902), 443 leases had been 
filed (ARCIA 1902:290). As we proceed with the treatment 
of the post-allotment years prior to 1934, we will have 
ample opportunity to see just how wrong he was on both the 
popularity and effects of KCA/W land sales and leases.
Randlett's report for 1902 also included an im­
passioned plea for custodial power over the funds of "non- 
competent" Indians. His plea was answered, and the judgment 
of competency was left up to the agent. Under this arrange­
ment the Indians were protected in their financial dealings 
with the predatory elements of the local white communities 
but remained financially dependent upon the agent's judg­
ment as to what was best for them. This particular paternal 
relationship still exists today between the KCA/W and the 
B.I.A. Area Office at Anadarko.
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Randlett wrote in his 1903 report:
Almost all the able-bodied married male adults 
of the tribes have done something in the way of 
personal labor on their allotments for improve­
ment of land and obtaining products for self- 
support, some of whom have been quite successful 
in producing small grain and vegetables (ARCIA 
1903:262).
In light of the growing number of leased allotments and the 
presence of many group encampments, it is apparent that 
Randlett’s portrayal was an overstatement of the prevailing 
conditions. In any event, flood and drought again severely 
limited the Indian farmer's crop yield. Randlett went on 
to note that the shortage of implements and farm instruction 
seriously hampered the development of Indian farming (ARCIA 
1903:261).
The enthusiasm with which Randlett discussed the 
leasing policies and the presence of 1,200 leased allot­
ments is alarming.
Results of leasing individual allotments. Regula­
tion of the Department disallowing the leasing of 
the entire allotments of able-bodied male Indians 
is observed. The larger number of the 1,200 leases 
that have been made are in favor of incapables, the 
old and infirm, and women and children. Leases 
covering allotments of women are all made in the 
name of the women, whether married or single, the 
money received being paid to the women. Moneys 
received in payment of leases of allotments of 
minor children that are orphans is deposited in 
the United States Treasury to their credit, to be 
held until they become of age. All leases provide
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that the land shall be fenced with three wires, 
posts 1 rod apart; that a two or three room frame 
house shall be constructed on the land, a well 
dug, and at least 100 acres of land be broken up 
and put in cultivation, besides money rent ranging 
from $40 to $80 per annum. Leases run for three 
or five years, except in cases of minor children 
who are to reach their majority in less time. The 
design of the system is to bring the allotment 
into condition so that when the leases expire the 
able-bodied males will be able to handle them 
personally and profitably. It insures a living 
to the cripples and men too old and infirm to 
work; also to the widows and orphans, and makes 
promising provisions for orphan boys who, when 
becoming of age, will find their lands improved, 
and with the money saved from rents can provide 
themselves with teams and implements for farming 
and have hopeful chances of establishing homes for 
themselves. It is reasonable to anticipate that 
the plan for leasing allotments, which has been 
so carefully guarded by departmental regulations, 
if faithfully observed by agents entrusted with 
the execution of its provisions, will incite 
courage, ambition, and hope among the enlightened 
Indians, and that they will accept and maintain 
with profit the great ultimate advantages designed 
by the system and thus attest the wisdom of its 
having been adopted (ARCIA 1903:263).
Apparently he had become oblivious to the danger to Indian
farming progress that the leases presented--the danger
which he had correctly foreseen in his report for 1900. A
further note of alarm should have been sounded, but was not,
when he reported the sale of 22 inherited allotments (ARCIA
1903:263).
Randlett, however, had troubles of his own in 1903 
as local grafters joined with the dissident Lone Wolf faction
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(upset over allotment) in seeking his removal. Francis 
Leupp's investigation and report on the situation resulted 
in Randlett's complete exoneration and the handing down of 
several indictments to some of his antagonists for fraud 
and perjury (ARCIA 1903:449-497).
In 1904, Randlett reported that "a large number" of 
Indians had been trying to farm their allotments while others 
hired out as cotton-pickers. The chief Indian crops con­
tinued to be com, Kaffir corn, and some cotton. Indian 
farming again, however, was devastated by severe drought.
Indian stock theft continued unabated. Randlett 
was more concerned with the activities of local money 
lenders. He reported that not only pawnbrokers but even 
national bank officers routinely charged the Indians usuri­
ous interest rates of 25-200%. It was not uncommon for loans 
to be seductively offered to Indians who could not afford 
to meet the loan deadlines. The Indians' collateral in 
implements and stock subsequently was seized and sold to 
local white buyers.
By 1904, Randlett began feeling significant pressure 
to advocate the breakup and sale of the remaining KCA tribal 
pasture land. He loudly opposed the bill which he clearly
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demonstrated was not in the economic best interests of the 
tribes (ARCIA 1904:294).
Indian cattle numbered 18,599 in 1900 (see Table 4) 
and then rapidly declined after the opening of the reserva­
tion. This decline was due largely to white theft. A 
similar and simultaneous decline in the number of Indian 
horses can be seen. However, in 1904, while the horses con­
tinued to dwindle, the cattle took a sudden upturn. Randlett 
reported no government cattle distribution to the Indians.
Did such a distribution go unnoted in his report? Were 
horses suddenly being traded for cattle in great numbers?
Were a great number of Indians using available funds to 
purchase cattle? The answer is not readily apparent.
From 1899 to 1902, the Indians' worked acreage fell, 
but rose sharply in 1903 and 1904 until it surpassed the 
reservation period high of 15,800 acres in 1899. By 1912, 
only 20,000 acres were cultivated by the KCA/W. If these 
figures are reliable, then it would seem that Indian farming 
reached its pre-World War I plateau by about 1904.
Further examination of the tables indicates that 
between 1899 and 1904, drought struck four years out of six, 
and oat and wheat farming fluctuated crazily.
Table 4
KCA/W Farm Statistics, 1899-1904
Year Worked
Acres
Corn
Bu,
Avg. Yield 
Bu./Acre
Drought
Years
Oat
Bu.
Wheat KCA/W 
Bu. Pop.
Horses Cattle Hay
Tons
Swine
1899 15800 60000 4 * 2800 3000 3696 12410 10000 1000 500
1900 8065 243000 35 11145 25000 3733 23236 18599 3228 1843
1901 5955 15485 3 * — — — 962 15403 17144 732 1931
1902 5598 69925 15 1150 12612 3661 16439 12234 885 822
1903 13390 120300 10 * 4100 13600 3696 9240 8552 1350 1090
1904 19525 48350 3 * 650 4840 3676 6303 12052 1040 760
N >
o
v£>
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It is sad to read the pessimism and despair written
between the lines of Randlett's final report as he summed up
the general condition of the KCA/W in 1905:
Since my last annual report these Indians as a 
whole have made as much progress in the matter 
of civilized living and ways of self-support as 
could reasonably be expected by those conversant 
with the influences calculated to serve as im­
pediments. Very many of them have worked upon 
their lands and made fair crops of cotton, corn, 
and small grains to which their allotments are 
generally well adapted. They have experienced 
drawbacks in various forms, the chief originating 
from inherent disposition to depend upon pro­
visions made by the Government for their support.
The matter of dissipating this disposition has 
been much retarded by the unfavorable influences 
that were brought among them with the opening of 
this country, to settlement by the whites. Very 
many of them who were well supplied with animals 
with which to work their lands have found them­
selves stripped of this indispensable advantage 
by the horse thieves, who took the occasion of 
the influx of actual settlers to locate them­
selves in the vicinities where their vocations 
could most conveniently be practiced. The civil 
authorities for a long time were unable to meet 
all the demands for service in ridding the new 
country of the horse thieves and other criminals 
with which it was infested. Much success has 
resulted from the efficient efforts of officers 
of the law, and it is now possible for the Indians 
to trust their work horses out of sight. Under 
such conditions it is unreasonable to expect mature 
Indians who have passed their lives in habitual 
idleness, unable to receive instructions except 
through an interpreter seldom at hand, to make 
their living by farming with two or three seasons 
of experience. With few exceptions none have been 
able to do it, and but for the annuity funds they 
receive these tribes would have to be chiefly 
supported by the Government or by the communities 
that have come among them to live.
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The older ones of the Indians generally are im­
provident and utterly wanting in anxiety to provide 
for the future, and are most easily led into ex­
travagances of all sorts and become victimized by 
the sharpers and sharks that lay in wait for trade 
with them; therefore, always in debt, either to 
legitimate vendors of the necessities of life or 
its luxuries, or to the money lenders, who gamble 
in loans to them usually at the rate of from 150 
to 3,000 percent. This practice in usurious rates 
of interest from them is not confined to the despised 
professional gamblers, but is most generally found 
to be a habit of senior officials of national as 
well as State banks (ARCIA 1905:300).
It should be noted that the "habitual idleness" of many of
the Indians to which he referred was hardly an epidemic of
lazy welfare sponging. Remember that hunting as a means of
support had been eliminated by the white hide hunters'
destruction of the bison; that the environment was ill-
suited to farming, and farming was further limited by the
absence of markets for produce and by the government's
reluctance to properly fund its own programs; and that in
the absence of employment opportunities the bulk of the
Indian population prior to allotment was left with little
alternative other than subsistence on meager government
rations.
Further, as will be seen when the results of the 
1925 Indian farming survey are presented, the great majority 
of Indians still farming in 1925 started farming in 1901
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and therefore must have learned to farm with "only two or 
three seasons of experience." Admittedly, few Indians ever 
farmed on a scale that was competitive in the area's agri­
cultural economy.
Finally, Randlett failed to see the danger that 
allotment lease and sale posed to the possible future of 
Indian farming. By 1905, 1,701 of the 3,716 KCA/W allot­
ments were being leased to white tenant farmers. Of the 
leased allotments, 519 belonged to women, 741 to children, 
and 441 to men (ARCIA 1905:301). It is apparent that by 
1905 the lease policy was being abused. It is even more 
tragic to note that according to Randlett, lease revenue 
was the main source of support for the Wichita and affiliated 
tribes who during reservation times had been nearly self- 
sufficient by farming (ARCIA 1905:301).
Randlett went on to report that he was pleased with 
the new regulation giving the agent control over Indian 
money gained from land sales (ARCIA 1905:301). The agent 
was thereby authorized to dispense the money in the form of 
a monthly allowance as he saw fit. This arrangement was not 
the only paternalistic relationship with which the Indians 
were involved. The credit system of the nine licensed 
traders had much the same effect. Many Indians lived on
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credit much of the time and were, in fact, quite dependent 
upon the traders for their survival (ARCIA 1905:301).
Randlett's clerk, Blackmon, replaced him as agent. 
Blackmon’s first report viewed the Indian farming situation 
of 1906 in largely optimistic terms. According to Blackmon, 
the KCA/W had enlarged the number of tilled acres and were 
favored by good weather conditions during the season. He 
noted that 2,000 of the 3,716 allotments were leased by the 
time he filed his report (ARCIA 1906:309). These figures 
indicate that during the previous year 300 additional leases 
were arranged.
By March, 1906, it was established that the tribal 
pasture lands were to be sold to white bidders after all of 
the KCA children born since June 6, 1900, were allotted 
(ARCIA 1906:309). On December 6, 1906, bidding was opened 
with $5/acre as the minimum bid and 160 acres as the largest 
tract. Most 160 acre tracts went for between $1,200 and 
$1,800 (ARCIA 1907:686).
Little other information is available on the closing 
years of this decade other than that between August 15,
1908, and June 30, 1909, there were 598 additional allot­
ments leased (ARCIA 1909:95).
214
Though the available information is far from com­
plete, it appears that following the trauma of allotment and 
opening, the major obstacles to Indian farmers were drought, 
lack of farm instruction, inadequate farm tools, and a 
general shortage of capital. Given the reported scale of 
farming (20-40 acres) and the 1904 figure of close to 20,000 
worked acres, it would appear that over half of the adult 
male KCA/W were farming. Initially, the Indian scale of 
farming was not greatly different from that of the first 
homesteaders and it appears that leasing did not drastically 
reduce the Indian's farmed acreage, though it did curtail 
growth. In the following decade, however, as Oklahoma 
agriculture shifted to a larger scale cash crop basis, the 
Indians' small acreages proved to be a handicap to those 
who were inclined to farm.
For 1901-1910, then, the following picture emerges. 
The KCA/W farming effort continued to be plagued by many of 
the same obstacles that were present during the reservation 
period. New hazards took the form of white stock theft and 
loan sharking. Nevertheless, it appears that a number of 
Indians were growing feed crops for their stock, gardening, 
and attempting cotton as a cash crop only on a limited 
basis. Most families continued to maintain a few horses
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and cattle. Indian income was supplemented by per capita 
payments of approximately $100/year (ARCIA 1909:91), by 
allotment leases, and by some field labor. Until 1906, the 
KCA received approximately $35/year/person from the leasing 
of part of their tribal pasture land.
1911-1920
American farmers continued to experience rare 
prosperity until 1915, when commodity prices started to 
fall. This decline, however, was only temporary, for in 
1916 and the advent of U.S. involvement in World War I, 
prices again rose. On August 10, 1917, government controls 
were imposed on farming through the Food Production Act 
and the Food and Fuel Control Act. The effect of this 
legislation was to encourage farming, to establish minimum 
wheat prices, and to control the distribution of food, fuel, 
feed, fertilizer, and farm machinery (Schlebecker 1975:210). 
Additional controls were added by the creation of the Food 
Administration, the Railroad Administration, and the Shipping 
Board. Through one government agency or another virtually 
every aspect of farming was controlled during the War. 
Clearly, production was stimulated and farm prices were held 
at a relatively high level. However, there is some dispute
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over the net results of such thorough government control. 
Would farmers have fared better if foreign and domestic 
buyers had had to compete for their produce? One obvious 
side effect of government stimulation of farming during the 
war years was that following the war with the reduction of 
the foreign market, American farmers were overextended, pro­
ducing too much for the domestic market to absorb and com­
modity prices fell steadily.
During the war when farm labor was in even shorter 
supply than usual, machines were required as substitutes 
for human laborers. Great advances in farm technology were 
made during this time. The tractor became commonplace, and 
major improvements in implements and seed varieties were 
introduced. Improved wheat varieties based on Russian and 
Turkish wheat strains allowed the wheatlands to increase by 
27 million acres between 1914-1919. With the spread of 
Spring Wheat on the Northern Plains and Winter Wheat on the 
Southern Plains, the well known Plains wheat harvest cycle 
came into being (Schlebecker 1975:265). During the war, 
wheat farmers made enormous profits. With the spread of 
dependable feed crops (viz. sorghum, milo, Kaffir, and broom 
com) areas ill-suited to food crops could be utilized to 
support the cattle industry (Schlebecker 1975:267).
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Following the war, however, with the loss of their lucrative 
foreign market, American farmers entered a period of eco­
nomic distress that was not alleviated until 1941 and the 
Second World War.
In the 1911-1920 period Oklahoma shared in much of 
the farming prosperity but still was faced with several 
problems: the poor quality of farm to market roads, the
slow construction of railroad networks, inadequate farm 
machinery, and the deterioration of land caused by the poor 
farming methods of the droves of tenant farmers.
The available information on Indian farming for this 
period is limited to the statistics found in the Annual 
Reports to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and to a 1915 
Kiowa farmers survey. The statistical data is presented in 
Tables 5 through 9.
From the Population Table it appears that KCA/W 
population grew steadily between 1911 and 1920, and that 
houses gradually were replacing tents as family living 
quarters.
Table 6 shows the various sources of Indian income 
for the period.
Just as 1915 was a depressed year for American 
farmers, it was a meager year for the KCA/W. Prior to 1915,
Table 5
KCA/W Statistics - ARCIA 1911 - 1920^ 
Population^
Year Pop. Births Deaths Families Houses Tents
1911 4,081 234 93 1,300 700 600
1912 4,174 —  —  — —  —  — — —— — —— —  —  —
1913 —» —• — —  — —  —  — —  —  — —  —  —
1914 4,369 183 151 1,612 1,062 550
1915 4,410 222 163 1,518 1,214 304
1916 4,514 190 114 1,654 1,323 331
1917 4,554 189 140 1,162 1,012 150
1918 4,583 210 178 1,200 1,100 100
1919 4,574 186 202 1,200 1,100 100
1920 4,631 — — — —  —  — —  —  — — —  —
Ipor fiscal years ending on June 30 of the year cited.
^All figures are for the combined KCA/W listed under Oklahoma and the 
Kiowa Superintendency.
w
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Table 6 
Income ($)
Year Crops
Value
Average 
Per Capita 
Income!
Wages Land
Leases
Land
Sales
1911 67,000 374.03 18,704 329,525 599,642
1912 41,000 271.21 20,083 186,380 338,841
1913 —  —  — —  — —  —  — —  —  — —  —  —
1914 35,500 207.46 21,150 369,276 85,736
1915 15,170 107.15 24,246 365,000 61,749
1916 23,600 111.21 21,449 402,500 46,513
1917 305,240 203.69 22,773 507,098 80,577
1918 293,600 211.90 26,128 567,096 72,187
1919 204,850 230.52 24,320 610,000 205,041
1920 208,871 267.93 17,420 610,000 396,967
^Calculated from ARCIA statistics (Tot. Income 
Per Capita Income).
- Trust Interest f Pop. =
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Table 6 (continued)
Year Misc. Per Capita 
Payments
Rations and 
Issues
Trust
Interest
Total
1911 17 509,276 2,235 168,792 1,695,191
1912 84 545,568 81 171,092 1,303,129
1913 —  —  — —  —  — —  —  — —  —  — —  —  —
1914 7,329 387,394 166,018 1,072,403
1915 6,351 157,827 630,343
1916 7,952 150,978 652,992
1917 11,931 140,056 1,067,675
1918 12,126 126,160 1,097,297
1919 10,175 110,810 1,165,196
1920 7,452 109,665 1,350,465
ro
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Employment-*
Year Regular Irregular Total
No.
Total
Wages
1911 40 19 59 18,704
1912 20,083
1913
1914 75 11 86 21,150
1915 85 58 143 24,246
1916 21,449
1917 46 135 181 22,773
1918 53 16 69 26,128
1919 50 25 75 24,320
1920 37 25 62 17,420
^No Indians employed by anyone other than the 
government.
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Table 8 
KCA/W Land Sales
Year No, of 
Tracts
Acres Price $/Acre Avg.
March
June,
, 1907- 
1909 40 5,386 118,619 22.02
1911 73 8,113 189,934 22.17
1912 43 3,968 96,283 24.26
1913
1914
1915 1 155 3,255 21.00
1916 4 188 7,396 39.34
1917 60 7,181 165,241 23.01
1918 36 3,924 108,216 27.58
1919 35 5,021 141,044 28.09
1920 65 7,586 278,586 36.72
Table 9
Farming and Stockraising
Year Allotted
Indian
Land
Acres Indian Acres 
Cultivated Farmers Grazed by 
By Indians Indian Stock
Indian
Stockmen
No. of 
Leases
No. of 
Leased 
Allot­
ments
Leased
Acres
Annual
Rent
1911 700,520 16,000 821(823)2 82,000 187 3,641 3,641 598,280 329,535
1912 642,421 20,000 1,000(852)2 82,000 185 3,343 3,343 528,000 186,380
1913 20,350 1,003
1914 641,901 20,480 1,003(857)2 82,000 185 369,276
1915 641,746} 20,480 1,003(1,024)2 4,000 3,800 621,901 365,000
1916 641,558} 20,000 1,000(1,017)2 525 4,000 3,800 621,901 402,500
1917 634,377} 40,822 1,002(1,002)2 6,711 428 3,990 3,600 594,368 507,098
1918 630,453} 40,822 1,200(982)2 567,096
1919 625,432} 40,822 1,200(951)2 6,?11 500 4,047 3,600 594,368 610,000
1920 617,846^ 9,600 925(1,061)2 37,933 756 4,047 3,600 594,368 610,000
^Estimates calculated from ARCIA statistics (Previous Year's Allotted Land - 
Current Year's Land Sales = Current Year's Allotted Land).
^Able bodied adult males as reported in ARCIA,
N5
to
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the chief sources of income were per capita payments, land 
sales, and leases. From 1917 through 1920, farm produce 
made a significant contribution to Indian income, though 
even during this period of agricultural prosperity land 
leases and sales accounted for two-thirds of the total 
KCA/W income. Note that per capita payments stopped in 
1914.
Wage labor was of little import throughout the 
period. According to official statistics (ARCIA 1911-1920), 
the government was the sole Indian employer. Even a quick 
glance at Table 7 is enough to see that wages earned per 
year per regular employee never amounted to more than $500 
in the best of years.
Approximately 83,000 acres of allotted land were 
sold by the Indians between 1911 and 1920. As can be seen 
from Table 8, the average price per acre fluctuated between 
$21.00 and $39.34. The agency policy was to solicit bids 
on all land up for sale. Usually a minimum bid price per 
acre was established. One can imagine that rather low bids 
frequently were accepted.
It would appear from Table 9 that prior to 1917, 
about 20 acres per farmer was the average. During the war 
years the total acres cultivated were 40,822 or roughly 40
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acres per farmer. Then in 1920, the KCA/W tilled only 
9,600 acres for an average of about 10 acres per farmer.
The overall contours of these figures are correct, though 
the figures themselves are misleading. When the number of 
Indian farmers is compared with the number of able-bodied 
adult males and then compared with the number of families 
for each year (Table 5), certain logical improbabilities 
present themselves. It seems most likely that gardeners 
(some of them women) and large gardens (of several acres) 
were being included in the tallies. Probably no more than 
a third of the farms contained 20 or more worked acres and 
only half of this number had more than 40 worked acres. 
Correspondingly, the number of farmers likely could be cut 
to a third of the reported figure. The 1915 Kiowa Farmers 
Survey supports this interpretation and scaling down of the 
reported figures.
The number of Indian farmers during the war years 
did, in fact, increase, as did the scale of farming. With 
the collapse of the foreign market in 1920, commodity 
prices fell and Indian farming declined once more. Through­
out this period not a single KCA/W farmer had a tractor.
The reported figures for Indian grazing land and 
stockmen (Table 9) fluctuate greatly and at times make
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little sense. In 1915, for example, there were no stockmen, 
though the following year they numbered 525. In 1919, 500 
Indian stockmen grazed their herds on 6,711 acres, or 13 
acres per stockman. In 1911-1914, Indian stockmen numbered 
only 185-187 and used 82,000 acres, while in 1917-1919, 
Indian stockmen numbered 428-500 and used only 6,711 acres. 
In the absence of further information, an accurate inter­
pretation of this data is not possible.
It would also appear from Table 9 that at least 
during the 1911-1920 period most of the KCA/W allotments 
were leased whole or in part. Consistent with our picture 
of increased Indian farming during the prosperous war years, 
some 200 fewer allotments were leased between 1917 and 1920.
The Kiowa farmers file of the Indian Archives Di­
vision at the Oklahoma Historical Society contains the 1915 
Kiowa Farmers' Survey covering the 1914 season. From this 
survey comes the following information (Table 10). Of the 
64 Kiowa farmers included, all had a few horses or mules 
though only half had cattle. Of those with cattle, only 
six had more than ten head. About half the farms had 
swine and, in general, swine outnumbered cattle. Commonly, 
fowl were present in good numbers with some farms having 
more than 100. Almost all farmers reported having gardens.
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Farmer No. 8 also had 20 acres in cotton yielding 9 bales.
O
Farmer No. 14 also had 32 acres in cotton yielding 16 bales.
ro
w
o
231
The farm implement situation appears to have been quite 
limited with most farmers having only a couple of imple­
ments. Several farmers were forced to borrow plows and 
other tools from their neighbors. The acres in c o m  ranged 
from 1 to 116 among the 45 farms reporting corn, with the 
average at 28 acres. Only 11 farms had oat acreage, with 
their average at 14 acres. Fewer still had wheat acreage. 
Only 8 of the 64 farms reported wheat, and their average was 
21 acres. Unfortunately, the survey did not directly in­
quire as to acres in cotton. Only 16 of the farmers had 
any savings, and their average was $427.
In general, it appears that of the 64 Kiowa farmers 
covered in the survey, only between one-third and one-half 
had enough stock or were farming enough acres that they 
could be considered successful subsistence farmers. The 
shortage of implements and working capital as well as the 
limited number of acres devoted to crops other than corn 
are indications of the underdeveloped status of Indian farm- 
ing during this period. Though c o m  was a dependable crop 
in the area, the market value was minimal.
The survey covers only the Kiowa farmers and the 
1914 season; however, the results are indicative of the 
overall KCA/W farming situation before World War I. Clearly,
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the wartime conditions and prices gave some incentives to 
farming and there was in fact an increase in both farmed 
acres and farmers and a corresponding decline in leased 
allotment acreage. These conditions, however, lasted only 
as long as the wartime market did. In 1902, as soon as the 
farm economy became depressed, Indian farming rapidly lost 
ground and fell far below the pre-war level. By 1920, the 
old obstacles of limited capital, implements, and know-how 
caught up with most of the KCA/W farmers. After the war, 
cash crop farming required a sizable acreage in wheat or 
cotton and expensive farm machinery. Without access to 
working capital, the majority of Indian farmers were doomed.
1921-1934
In the 1920s and 1930s, American farmers paid for 
the prosperity of the "Golden Age" and the war years. The 
deadly crossfire between rising production costs, production 
scale, and production efficiency and falling commodity prices 
and a shrinking market had several effects. First, the aver­
age farm acreage continued to rise from 148 acres in 1920 to 
174 acres by 1940 (Schlebecker 1975:207). Second, the per­
cent of farmers in the national work force fell from 27% in 
1920 to 17.6% by 1940 (Schlebecker 1975:224). And thirdly.
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mechanization of farm work proceeded rapidly. There were 
158,000 tractors in operation in 1919, while their number 
reached 1,445,000 by 1939 (Schlebecker 1975:223). Self- 
defeating overproduction was furthered by improved seed 
varieties. In 1926, for example, hybrid corn had more than 
doubled the previous yield in those areas where it was used 
(Schlebecker 1975:264).
The government removed all of its controls on agri­
culture after the war, and it was hoped that prices even­
tually would stabilize at a favorable level. When this 
manifestly did not happen, the government intervened. In 
1928, the Agricultural Marketing Act was passed creating 
the Federal Farm Board. The plan was to stimulate voluntary 
cooperation among the farmers by making loans to assist the 
establishment of farm co-ops and stabilization corporations 
(Schlebecker 1975:236-237). This effort at market control 
failed, and the Federal Farm Board was dissolved in 1933 
with losses of $184,000,000. In the same year, the first 
Agricultural Adjustment Act was passed. It sought a solu­
tion by reducing production. The problems of this program 
and its effect upon the Indian farmers will be treated in 
the next chapter. It is enough to note here that the farm
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depression was not sifnificantly alleviated until 1941 and 
the return to wartime commodity market conditions.
For the 1920s, the only source of information on 
KCA/W farming is the 1925 U.S. Agricultural Census found in 
the Indian Archives Division of the Oklahoma Historical 
Society. Only 178 Indians are contained in the survey, and 
most of the entries are from Comanche County. The survey 
certainly is incomplete, and most entries probably are 
Comanche, though tribal designations are lacking.
The great majority of the farmers reporting began 
farming in 1901. Only four Indian farmers who had started 
prior to allotment were still farming by 1925. Most of the 
farmers owned exactly 160 acres, though a good number owned 
between 50 and 100 acres. Few farmers owned less than 50 
acres, and fewer still owned more than 160 acres. Of the 
farmers in the survey, only eight rented farm land, and all 
of these rented 160 acres or less. But a fraction of the 
land owned or rented was under cultivation. The average 
farmed acreage, excluding pasture, was less than 40 acres 
(23 farmers used 1-20 acres; 27 used 21-40 acres; 41 used 
41-80 acres). Only nine farmers had more than 80 acres 
under cultivation, and only one of these used more than 
120 acres.
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Not one farmer owned or had access to a tractor.
It can well be imagined that horse drawn machinery, even in 
its most sophisticated form, would limit the number of acres 
that could be farmed by a single family. Only eight of 178 
farmers reported any farm debts (one owed $600; one owed 
$200; one owed $150; five owed $100 or less). The first 
response to this information is likely to be congratulatory. 
Though the Indian farmers were operating on a painfully 
small scale, at least they were not deeply in debt. Upon 
further consideration, however, another thought arises. 
Indian farmers were limited by the small number of tillable 
acres they owned, by lack of modern mechanized implements 
(tractors, etc.), and by lack of capital. The smallness of 
their farm debt indicates their inability to get much needed
loans rather than their ability to remain solvent. Several
of the farmers interviewed bore out this conclusion.
The following list of Indian crops and the total 
number of acres for each is compiled from the 1925 survey;
Sorghum 1,066 acres
Oats 889
Cotton 790
Wheat 650
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Corn 331
Barley and rye 25
Indian farmers usually cultivated a combination of feed and 
cash crops. The feed crops went to maintain their draft
animals and the small number of cattle, milk cows, swine,
and chickens that they raised for their own consumption.
All farmers had several horses or mules, and half had a 
few cattle or milk cows, A third had swine and three- 
quarters had chickens and/or turkeys,
A typical pattern for successful small scale Indian 
subsistence farming can be pieced together from the survey. 
This pattern includes 40-80 cultivated acres, part in cash 
crops (wheat or cotton), part in feed crops (sorghum, al­
falfa, milo, and Kaffir) and/or part in corn or oats which 
can be sold or used as feed; 6-10 horses or mules for trac­
tion; a few cattle and dairy cows ; and 20-30 chickens. The 
number of acres in cash crops in a few cases were traded 
off for additional cattle and acres in feed crops. Only 43 
of the 178 Indian farmers covered in the survey roughly 
conform to this pattern. None were farming or ranching on 
a scale that would allow expansion or real participation 
in the commodity market economy.
237
From the figures reported in A Socioeconomic Atlas 
of Oklahoma (Burril 1936) for Caddo, Comanche, Cotton, and 
Kiowa Counties (1929-1935), the following conclusions can 
be drawn. The four county area, which includes virtually 
all KCA/W allotments, experienced a general decline in the 
number of farms of 5-10%. The average farm size increased 
in the five years between 1930 and 1935 as follows: Caddo
County, from 130 to 143 acres; Comanche County, From 195 to 
198 acres; Cotton County, from 186 to 194 acres; and Kiowa 
County, from 171 to 205 acres. Cotton was clearly the 
dominant crop and was followed by wheat. C o m  was third by 
acreage and during this period it was reduced by half.
Cotton also lost acreage though it remained very much in the 
lead. Wheat acreage showed the greatest stability during 
1930-1935. The number of farm owners increased, and the 
number of tenant farmers greatly declined, though by 1935 
tenants still outnumbered owners two to one.
The Burril Atlas also offers a county by county 
breakdown by race for 1935 which is summarized in Tables 11 
and 12. The category of "Colored Farm Owners" for Caddo, 
Comanche, Cotton, and Kiowa Counties undoubtedly includes 
some black farm owners. Of the total of 313 "Colored Farm 
Owners," however, it seems likely that one-half to
Table 11
1935 "Colored" Farm Owner Statistics for 
Caddo, Comanche, Cotton, 
and Kiowa Counties
Caddo Comanche Cotton Kiowa
"Colored
Farmers" 193 77 30 13
Acres Owned 12,091 
Avg. 63
7,994 
Avg. 104
4,326 
Avg. 144
1,347 
Avg. 104
Acres
Harvested 3,616 
Avg. 19
1,753 
Avg. 23
1,358 
Avg. 45
282 
Avg. 22
Value of 
Farm 524,590 
Avg. 2,718
197,350 
Avg. 2,563
139,500 
Avg. 4,650
42,600 
Avg. 3,277
N5w00
Table 12
1934 Farm/Farmer Averages for Caddo, Comanche, 
Cotton, and Kiowa Counties
No. of 
Farms^
Average No. 
of Acres!
Average No. of 
Harvested Acres
"Colored Owners" 313 82.29 22.39
"Colored Tenants" 227 100.27 37.58
"White Owners" 3,482 160.97 66.11
"White Tenants" 8,215 152.02 68.54
^The figures for number of operators and number of acres used are 
for 1935.
2
The figures for number of harvested acres are for the 1934 harvest,
to
w
VO
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two-thirds were KCA/W farmers. In any event, the figures 
are enlightening as to the condition of Indian farming in 
1935. The average number of acres owned was 82.29, and the 
average number of acres harvested was 22.39. It is clear 
that Indian farmers suffered a major setback in the 1930s 
consistent with the plight of all small scale farmers during 
the farm depression and "dust bowl" period.
It is interesting to compare averages for "Colored 
Owners" with those for "Colored Tenant Farmers," "White 
Owners," and "White Tenant Farmers" for the same counties 
and the same year (Table 12). That Indian farming had 
declined well below its 1925 level is not surprising, nor 
is it surprising that in 1935 the neighboring white farm 
owners owned twice the acreage and harvested three times the 
number of acres. What is startling and appalling is that 
black tenant farmers also were farming and harvesting on a 
scale that averaged well above the Indian farm owners.
Here it is assumed that the "Colored Tenant Farmers" were 
nearly all blacks. There is certainly no reason to believe 
that Indian farmers suddenly began renting land to farm 
after the 1925 survey.
It is quite clear that Indian farming had been re­
duced to a pitiful scale, largely due to the inaccessibility
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of working capital. After 1919, banks were loath to loan 
Indian farmers money unless they put their land up as 
collateral. The KCA/W had suffered terribly at the hands 
of loan sharks and bank officials during the early post­
allotment years, and farming was too uncertain to risk los­
ing the means of even the marginal subsistence that their 
land afforded them.
The result was that the KCA/W farmers were forced 
to operate within a deteriorating marginal farming system. 
Indian farmers were limited by the number of acres they 
had been allotted or had inherited. As mentioned previously, 
nearly all allotments contained a certain amount of agri­
culturally useless land. The scale of Indian farming was 
further limited by the horse or mule drawn machinery and 
the requirements of feed for the stock. Without sizable 
acreage in cash crops, there was no way to accumulate work­
ing capital to keep up with the technological innovations 
and the demand for even larger cash crop acreages.
In other words, the KCA/W farmers, and any other 
small scale subsistence farmers for that matter, were locked 
into a simple struggle for subsistence survival. Without 
working capital, there was no way to expand, mechanize, 
and compete in the commodity market economy.
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Gradually, as subsistence became more and more un­
certain, many Indian farmers began leasing most of their 
land, keeping just enough for a house, a garden, and a few 
acres of feed for their horses and a handful of cattle and 
swine. With the income they could gain by doing wage labor 
on neighboring white farms, as well as the lease money and 
what they raised themselves, many former Indian farmers were 
able to put together a better existence than they had ex­
perienced previously.
Conclusions
: From 1887-1934, concern with allotment and Indian 
assimilation dominated federal policy in Indian Affairs. 
Following allotment, individual families were to be allowed 
to "sink or swim" according to the effort they invested in 
supporting themselves. The federal government was little 
concerned with whether the Indians had adequate training, 
land, or implements to realize this goal. Emphasis was 
placed on right effort rather than realistic opportunity.
The General Allotment Act was amended in 1902 to 
permit the sale of inherited allotment land and the allot­
ments of the non-competent. With this measure, the sales 
of allotted lands increased rapidly. The amendment made a 
mockery of the 25-year trust status of all allotted lands
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which was originally provided for in the General Allotment 
Act. Land sales were much accelerated ruing 1913-1920 by 
the ill-advised policy of Commissioner Cato Sells who urged 
fee patents upon the Indians and for several years actually 
forced fee patents upon them.
After Commissioner Sells was replaced, fee patenting 
declined until 1934, when Indian land policies were revised.
Public concern over the plight of the Indians was 
once again stirred in the 1920s and resulted in the Meriam 
investigation of 1926-1928. With the appointment of John 
Collier as Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1933, a major 
attempt was made to implement many of the findings and 
suggestions of the Meriam Report and to reverse the course 
of Indian policy since passage of the Dawes Act. Though 
the innovative and progressive Indian Reorganization Act 
was passed in 1934, its implementation met with great op­
position in Congress and was further undercut by the eco­
nomic effects of the Depression and the Second World War.
The national farm economy enjoyed rare prosperity 
between 1898 and 1914 and again during the war years, 1916- 
1919. By 1920, however, many of the conditions and develop­
ments which had contributed to this prosperity, when 
combined with the shrinking foreign market for commodities
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after the war, helped produce the farmer's depression which 
lasted until 1941 and the outbreak of another world war. 
Throughout the period, 1901-1934, American agriculture 
shifted away from subsistence farming toward efficient agri­
business. Production efficiency was greatly improved by 
better varieties of seed, by mechanization, and by enlarged 
farm scale. Capital investment was key, and with the stress­
ful conditions of the Depression, small scale farmers were 
forced out of existence by their own limitations.
Since Oklahoma (Indian Territory) was not opened for 
white settlement and economic development until 1889-1906, 
it lagged somewhat behind the national trends in agriculture 
during the early part of the 20th Century. Initially, the 
state was hampered by the slow expansion of the railroad and 
the farm-to-market road system. Since homesteading had oc­
curred so recently, the scale of farming was limited at first, 
as was the level of technology employed on most farms. From 
the start farm tenancy posed a great; problem for the growth 
of Oklahoma agriculture.
In the early years prior to the war small scale sub­
sistence farming and stock raising dominated the scene in 
Western Oklahoma. At this time the major crops were c o m  
and feed crops with some wheat and cotton cash crops. As
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Western Oklahoma agriculture developed, the scale was 
gradually increased, farms became more mechanized, and 
cotton and wheat became dominant. C o m  rapidly lost ground. 
The number of tenant farmers in the 1920s and 1930s rapidly 
declined, though by 1935 the KCA/W area still had twice as 
many tenants as owners farming.
The KCA/W were initially traumatized by the opening 
of their reservation to white settlement and Indian farming 
suffered. In the early years following allotment many 
Indians lived in group camps along the creeks. Between 1901 
and 1910 many Indians appear to have been engaged in farming 
on a limited basis. As the number of leases and land sales 
increased, the number of KCA/W farmers decreased, though the 
number of acres farmed increased slightly.
Over three-fourths of the allotted land was leased 
to white farmers by 1911-1920. Indian interest in farming 
was stimulated by the wartime commodity prices, but with 
1920 and the onset of the farm depression, the total acre­
age farmed by Indians fell to one-half of the pre-war total. 
During 1911-1920, though Indian farmers were handicapped by 
limited working capital, their farm size and horsedrawn 
implements probably put them on a par with half of their 
white neighbors.
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The Indians' land base continued to be eroded by 
allotment sale and fractional inheritance between 1921 and 
1934. During the farm depression, the Indian farmers lacked 
the working capital necessary to purchase additional land 
and more efficient farm machinery. They probably numbered 
no more than 150 to 200 by 1934 and no more than 50 of those 
were economically surviving as subsistence farmers.
Not just Indians but all small scale subsistence 
farmers suffered after the war due to the mechanization/land 
scale take off and their own inability to generate working 
capital with the limited means available to them. In the 
KCA/W area in 1934, however, Indian farmers operated at a 
level averaging even below that of the neighboring black 
sharecroppers. As subsistence farming became more and more 
uncertain, Indian farmers quit farming in favor of leasing 
their land and doing wage labor on nearby farms.
Land leasing began among the KCA/W in 1890 when white 
farmers were allowed on the reservation to work 160 acres on 
a sharecropping basis for some aged or handicapped Indians 
(Pennington 1972:233). By 1894, the policy only required 
"inability" of Indians. In 1897, even the word "inability" 
was dropped, though it was replaced in 1900 (ARCIA 1900:13; 
Pennington 1972:340). From 1901 onward, any Indian could
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lease his allotment, though initially able bodied men could 
lease only three-fourths of their allotment in return for 
one-third of the crop.
Leasing involved the Indians in paternalistic re­
lationships with both their white "lease men" and the local 
agent. Most Indians were dependent upon their "lease men" 
for small advances on the next year's lease money to scrape 
by through especially hard times or occasional emergencies.
In so doing, however, they committed themselves to a largely 
unnegotiable lease renewal. The Indians also were dependent 
upon the area office of the B.I.A. The local agent ap­
praised the land, set the conditions of the contract, col­
lected the lease money, and distributed it. Throughout the 
process, the Indian land owner remained a dependent spectator 
and gained no practical experience in handling his own fi­
nancial affairs. The Indian land owners were in both cases 
locked into dependent relationships which severely limited 
the options open to them.
In view of the uncertainties of subsistence farming 
in Western Oklahoma, allotment leasing certainly can be 
understood. It reached epidemic proportions rapidly, how­
ever, and by 1911, over thre-fourths of the allotments were 
leased. Leases yielded an important source of survival
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income to a population with few alteimatives, but that was 
all that they offered. If Indian farmers had had adequate 
instruction, implements, and seed shortly after allotment, 
individual families with multiple adjacent allotments would 
have been in a position to capitalize on the period of war­
time farm prosperity and possibly could have launched them­
selves into the competitive cash crop agribusiness system. 
Without adequate training and capital, Indian farmers were 
forced to lease their land or struggle for existence as small 
scale subsistence farmers.
The major alternative sources of subsistence for the 
1901-1934 period were;
(1) allotment leases;
(2) land sales;
(3) per capita payments, up to 1914;
(4) wages from farm labor or government jobs;
(5) subsistence farming;
(6) a combination of the above.
This last alternative, a combination of selective 
partial leasing, sale of inherited land, wage labor, and 
limited farming, was in fact the option that offered the 
greatest rewards during this period. Those who lived off 
their lease money and meager wages found it worthwhile to
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put in large gardens and raise chickens and, if they could 
afford them, a few cattle. Most of those who attempted to 
farm gradually discovered that by leasing most of their land, 
doing farm labor, and continuing to grow enough feed for their 
stock and garden produce for their family, they could improve 
their condition somewhat.
CHAPTER 5
INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT AND AFTER, 1934-1974
Federal Indian Policy 
The Wheeler-Howard Indian Reorganization Act was 
passed in 1934 and was largely a response to the findings 
of the Meriam Report. Under provisions of the Act, allot­
ment was halted, "surplus" reservation lands were restored 
to tribes, and additional land was purchased for tribal 
use. The Act also called for the formation of tribal or­
ganizations and corporations and the establishment of a 
revolving loan fund to stimulate tribal business enter­
prises (Officer 1971:43).
Under John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
between 1933 and 1946, the attempt was made to implement the 
Indian Reorganization Act and to initiate a "New Deal" for 
the Indians. Due to the economic problems of the Depression 
and the Second World War, however. Collier found money in 
short supply, and there was little Congressional or
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departmental enthusiasm for his programs. Even the Indians 
were divided on many of his proposals. As a result, the 
Indian Reorganization Act accomplished little in the way of 
changing the living conditions of most Indians.
The Indian Claims Commission Act, which allowed 
tribes to bring suit against the federal government for 
treaty violations and loss of tribal lands, was passed in 
1946. In many cases the cash settlements were large, though 
legal fees reduced the usable portion of the settlements.
Two other important events closely followed the 
Indian Claims Commission Act. These were the introduction 
of a bill calling for termination of the "special status" 
of Indians and the commencement of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs' Indian Relocation Program. Under termination, the 
legal assimilation of the Indians would have been complete, 
and the reservations and the B.I.A. would have been scrapped. 
Predictably, this proposal met with vocal opposition from 
most Indians. The pilot relocation program involved the 
vocational training and job placement of Hopi and Navajo off- 
reservation in major cities. Because the introduction of 
termination and relocation were simultaneous, many Indians 
perceived them as connected, though they were not, and there­
fore they rejected both programs (Officer 1971:47).
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The push for termination peaked in 1953 but failed to 
pass in Congress and thereafter lost support. It eventually 
resulted in a voluntary termination policy that was adopted 
in 1958. The B.I.A. continued to push vocational training 
and relocation during the 1950s and 1960s, though the pro­
gram met with limited success. In the 1960s, the B.I.A. 
began decentralizing its programs, and the government began 
subcontracting programs and encouraging state and local 
agencies to accept more responsibility for the Indians.
There is some justification in calling this "decentralized 
reorganization" simply another guise for gradual termination.
Besides vocational training and relocation, housing 
and tribal business programs were pushed in the 1960s and 
1970s. Since the 1940s, however, the government made no 
attempt to develop Indian farming.
Developments in Agriculture, 1933-1974
The Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) was first 
passed in 1933. It called for the voluntary reduction of 
certain key crops because overproduction was resulting in 
extremely low prices. The key crops included wheat, cotton, 
and corn, among others. Under the AAA program, the govern­
ment rented farmland that had been in these crops and, in
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effect, paid the farmers not to produce. Rye, barley, grain 
sorghum, and peanuts were added to the list of restricted 
crops in 1934 and 1935 (Schlebecker 1975:238).
A program of "non-recourse loans" under the Commodity 
Credit Corporation (CCC) was initiated in the fall of 1933 
to accomplish the same goal as the AAA. Under the CCC, the 
government loaned the farmers 60-70% of parity on their 
crops. If the commodity price rose above parity at harvest 
time, the farmers repaid the loan and sold their crops. If 
the price fell below parity, the farmer kept the amount 
loaned and the government confiscated the harvest and in 
effect bought it for the amount loaned. Parity was the 
established unit price for the various crops based upon their 
average market value in 1910-1914 (Schlebecker 1975:239).
The AAA and CCC programs did serve to reduce produc­
tion and stabilize prices somewhat, and it did put some money 
into the farmers' hands which enabled them to survive mar­
ginally during the economic hard times of the 1930s. The 
programs, however, fell far short of their intended goals. 
Though the farmers initially cooperated with the AAA, the 
drought of 1934 helped raise commodity prices, and there was 
widespread cheating on the program. Some farmers began grow­
ing and selling crops that they had been paid not to produce.
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Though the AAA and CCC helped the farm situation, even the 
1929 price level was not regained until 1941 and the out­
break of war, and 1929 had been a depression year for 
farmers (Schlebecker 1975:239-240).
The AAA and CCC were declared unconstitutional in 
1936, and a hasty stopgap measure called the Soil Conserva­
tion and Domestic Allotment Act was passed to replace them. 
The new Act was simply a rewording of its predecessors with 
additional money offered for soil conservation projects.
A new Agricultural Adjustment Act was passed in 1938. 
Under this program, the government estimated the crop acre­
age needed to meet the market demand. This acreage was then 
distributed to states, counties, and individual farmers on 
the basis of past production. Farmers were paid to keep 
within their crop allotments.
From 1933 through 1940, the AAA succeeded in reduc­
ing crop acreage but production continued to increase due 
to the rise in bushel per acre yields from technological 
improvements, especially mechanization. As a result, com­
modity prices continued to decline and fell 25% between 1938 
and 1940 (Schlebecker 1975:243). The AAA simply kept the 
farmers' situation from deteriorating even further than it 
did. The major failure of the AAA was that it contributed
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to the process whereby the small scale farmers were eco­
nomically forced out of existence as farm scale and mechani­
zation continued to increase. The larger the farm size and 
cash crop acreage, the more support that was received from 
the government. Yet it was the size of the harvested cash 
crop acreage that really counted. Without government sup­
port, all farmers would have suffered grievously. As it 
was, the small farmers were left to feel the real weight of 
the hard times. By the mid-1930s they could afford to plant 
only a few acres. This acreage was then greatly reduced by 
the government and they were only partially compensated. 
Expensive technological innovations gave the large scale 
farmers even greater bushel per acre yields. The small 
scale farmers, with their horse drawn implements and small 
cash crop acreages, were forced out of business.
With World War II, commodity prices rose, and the 
foreign and domestic markets increased so that once again 
American farmers experienced prosperity. Wartime govern­
mental controls were re-established in 1940 under the Office 
of Agricultural Defense Relations in the Department of 
Agriculture, Prices were controlled, parity was guaranteed, 
and maximum production was encouraged (Schlebecker 1975 : 
213). After the U.S. declared war on December 7, 1941, the
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armed forces began buying farm commodities in vast quan­
tities. During the war, the farmers couldn't produce 
enough to keep up with the market demands, even though 50% 
more food was being produced per year than during the First 
World War. With less land under cultivation and 10% fewer 
workers, American farmers were able to compensate through 
the increased efficiency provided by costly technological 
improvements. Those farmers not wiped out by the depression 
of the 1930s and who could afford advanced farm technology 
were able to recover and make substantial gains during the 
war years. With the wartime stimuli to farm production, 
land scale and mechanization also made significant advances.
Tractors_________ Farm Size________Farms________
1940 1,567,000 173.99 acres 6,350,000
1945 2,354,000 199.96 acres 5,967,000
The above figures from Schlebecker (1975:207 and 251) 
illustrate this trend. The areas producing corn and wheat, 
including Oklahoma, led in mechanization and farm scale.
It was the large scale farmers who suffered least 
and were best able to survive during the 1930s. It was 
again the large scale farmers who could produce the most and 
profit the most during the war and thus gain the capital
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needed to keep pace with the expensive advances in farm 
technology. The small scale farmers who survived the 
depression enjoyed a brief respite during the war, but few 
were able to afford additional acres and mechanized farm 
equipment. After the war they continued to lose ground and 
to founder economically.
After the Second World War, American farmers again 
were producing more than the market demanded and commodity 
food prices fell. The problems of the farm economy since 
the war, however, have been more than the result of simple 
overproduction. The situation presents an admittedly com­
plex and confusing picture.
Following the war, farm production gradually de­
clined and market demands shifted away from wheat and dairy 
products toward meat and potatoes (Schlebecker 1975:279 and 
289). The Marshall Plan, the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration, and federal price supports 
all served to cushion the post-war letdown for the farmers 
and put surplus commodities to use. Nevertheless, in 1949- 
1950, the farmers experienced a brief recession. The 
Korean War (1950-1953), however, once again restored a fa­
vorable commodity market situation.
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The farmers suffered as prices fell after the 
Korean War. The "flexible" price supports of 1954 and 
the Soil Bank programs of 1956-1958 had little effect upon 
the failing farm economy. In the late 1950s, export sales 
increased, and an overall export boom was experienced in 
the 1960s (Schlebecker 1975:287).
After the Second World War farm mechanization and 
farm scale continued to increase, while the number of farms 
and farmers declined and the elimination of small scale 
farmers was accelerated. In 1945, there were 2,354,000 
tractors in use on American farms. By 1965, the number 
reached 4,625,000 (Schlebecker 1975:279). After 1946 most 
wheat was harvested by combine.
Some wheat farmers owned their own combines, but 
most hired combines and crews. Since most wheat in a given 
area was ready for harvest at much the same time, those with 
the biggest wheat acreages had their crops combined first, 
while those with smaller wheat acreages waited their turn.
On the Southern Plains, with its notorious thunderstorms 
accompanied by damaging wind, rain, and hail, the timing of 
the wheat harvest was frequently quite critical. A matter 
of a day or two could make a great difference in yield. In 
fact, it could make the difference between a successful crop
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and a failure. It seems reasonable that those with the 
most to lose should be the first to harvest. They also 
offered the most employment to the free lance harvest crews. 
The small scale farmer, however, not infrequently lost part 
or all of his crop to the weather while waiting his turn.
Mechanization was not the only expensive techno­
logical innovation to become a necessity after World War II. 
Fertilizer in the form of anhydrous ammonia offered a great 
boost to crop yield and, though it was expensive, it became 
a necessity for the wheat farmers.
Oklahoma farmers followed the national trends in 
agriculture; mechanization, production, and farm scale 
rapidly increased while the number of farms and farmers 
decreased. In 1940, there were 179,687 farms in Oklahoma, 
and in 1967, there were only 93,000. The average farm size 
was 193.7 acres in 1940, and it had jumped to 401 acres by 
1967 (Dale & Warde11 1948:422).
When American agriculture prospered in the 20th 
century, it did so by virtue of its tremendous scale and 
efficiency of production that was made possible through 
technological innovations and supported by temporarily ex­
panded world and domestic markets. When it failed, it did 
so as a result of market shrinkage. During these times.
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the ability to produce in such abundance was turned against 
the farmers and resulted in even lower commodity prices than 
might have been expected otherwise. With the turn of the 
century, the age of subsistence farming was passed, and 
those farmers who did not change with the requirements of 
the American farm economy gradually were forced out of busi­
ness .
The KCA/W and Farming, 1934-1974 
This period in Indian farming is somewhat anti- 
climactic by comparison with preceding periods. The eco­
nomic promise of the Indian Reorganization Act clearly was 
never realized among the KCA/W tribes which continued to 
operate on the same footing as they had previously. Land 
sales did slow after 1934, but sales never ceased. The 
Anadarko Area Office continued to arrange the sales and to 
determine how the sellers would receive their money. During 
the 1930s, most of the Indian subsistence farmers quit farm­
ing and turned to leasing their land and doing farm labor.
Indian farming was undermined also by the continual 
fractioning of inherited Indian land. By the time a 160 
acre allotment was divided even once among several heirs, 
there was not enough land left in one piece to farm. After
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several generations of inheritance, even leasing became a 
joke. In one case, the 35 heirs to one tract each received 
an annual lease payment of $.97 (DDOHP Roberta Tohay T-606: 
11).
The Agricultural Adjustment Acts, though initially 
voluntary, had a county option clause where with the consent 
of two-thirds of the farmers crop reduction became mandatory 
and enforced. The large scale farmers were reduced by the 
same percentage as the small scale farmers, but they tended 
to compensate by more efficient production— i.e., they could 
afford the farm machinery and fertilizer. The Indian farm­
ers had little acreage in cash crops prior to the AAA. What 
they did have was reduced to one-half and later reduced 
again. They were not allowed to enlarge their cash crop 
acreage or add new cash crops under the county option since 
virtually all cash crops came under the AAA restrictions. 
Earlier they had squeezed by on what subsistence crops they 
grew and on the meager cash income from the few acres of 
wheat or cotton that they could afford to plant. With crop 
reduction, their cash income was further reduced, and sur­
vival became even more problematic. The problem of getting 
small acreages of wheat harvested by combine crews already
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has been mentioned. After crop reduction, many Indian 
farmers could not afford the combine crews in any event.
It is little wonder that by the 1940s, probably 
there were no more than one or two dozen KCA/W still farm­
ing. Unfortunately, there are no statistics available on 
Indian farming for this period, though the above estimate 
is borne out by numerous interviews with Indian farmers.
The Second World War and the accompanying commodity 
market expansion and price increase allowed some Indian 
farmers to hang on for a few more years. The respite, how­
ever, was brief. Following the war, it became even more 
obvious that 160 acres and a team of mules were not adequate 
for survival in farming. Nevertheless, the Washita Valley 
Loan Association was founded after the war to offer loans 
to capable and deserving young Indian veterans who wanted to 
make a start in farming. The association functioned in 
conjunction with both the KCA Intertribal Council and the 
Anadarko Area Office. There was only enough money, however, 
to fund the best three proposals and the loans had to be 
paid back in five years. Tragically, three of those years 
held widespread crop failures. Two of the three men were 
unable to pay their loans back, and they and their loan 
co-signers had to repay the loans from their lease money
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over several years. The third veteran used his loan to 
buy earth-moving equipment and went into business for him­
self. He was able to make his loan payments and support 
his family by hiring out his services.
Pervasive job discrimination and failing small town 
economies in Southwestern Oklahoma have kept the KCA/W from 
gaining full employment and equal economic opportunity in 
the area. The only jobs routinely open to Indians are farm 
labor or menial in-town jobs such as gas station attendant 
or cafe help (Bittle 1971:29).
Though educational, vocational-technical training, 
and relocation-job placement programs have been in opera­
tion in the area for several decades, they are only now 
beginning to have any effect and only upon some of the young 
adult KCA/W.
The primary sources of support for the bulk of the 
KCA/W continue to be land leases, farm labor, and public 
assistance (for those who qualify). Land sales and an 
Indian Claims Commission settlement have provided only short 
periods of relief from the ordinary conditions of poverty. 
The Indians have continued to maintain their relations of 
mutual assistance whereby relatives and in-laws freely 
share during times of individual abundance/individual need.
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This form of windfall reciprocity serves to level economi­
cally the traditional rural Indian population. This con­
temporary system of reciprocity, including its traditional 
public form, the "give-away," is worthy of detailed study 
and presentation.
Though its central importance has diminished over 
the years, the B.I.A. still maintains a strong paternalistic 
relationship with many KCA/W through its control of land 
leases and sales and other areas of finance.
Three Successful Indian Farmers 
The following sketches are offered as a way of 
illustrating the plight of 20th century KCA/W farmers. The 
period from allotment to 1968 is covered by the farming ex­
periences of the two Kiowa farmers and one Kiowa Apache 
farmer introduced here. Though all three men were among the 
small number of periodically successful Indian farmers, 
their stories are not atypical and illustrate the way in 
which most KCA/W farmers were forced out of farming by the 
prevailing farm economy.
Hicks Boyiddle, a Kiowa farmer 
Hicks was born in 1894, and he farmed on his own 
from 1921 to 1936. His first memories of farming go back
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to 1898-1899 when he was five years old. At that time his 
cousin was farming southwest of Mountain View on Rainy 
Mountain Creek. Using simple implements issued by the 
government, 5 acres of com, 8 or 9 acres of milo maize, 
and a few acres of millet and squaw corn were cultivated 
as a family effort.
Hicks and his parents took allotments near his cous­
in's place in 1900. He recalls that "living was good there" 
on the adjacent family allotments. They had 20-25 horses, 
30-40 beef cattle, milk cows, a dozen hogs, and many chick­
ens. The family went to town infrequently for lard, sugar, 
coffee, and bacon. Hicks remembers that a white family was 
"living with them" at the time and presumably was share- 
cropping some allotted acreage. He says that in the early 
1900s farming and living conditions were essentially the 
same both for Indians and for whites in the area.
In the early 1900s, the family moved several miles 
away to a brother's allotment that afforded easier access 
to water. After the move, Hicks and his parents leased 
their allotments. It was on his brother's place that he 
learned to farm. They had cotton, wheat, Kaffir corn, and 
a large garden and fruit orchard.
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In 1919, the family had 120 acres in wheat. The 
wartime wheat prices of $2.60-$2.65/bushel had led them 
to turn cotton acreage into wheat acreage. The grain was 
hauled by wagon many miles to the elevator at Mountain View.
In 1921, Hicks and his wife and two children moved 
onto his wife's allotment southwest of Carnegie. After 
buying basic horse drawn implements on time (1 or 2 years) 
at a store in Gotebo, Hicks began farming on his own. At 
first, he had only 20 acres of c o m  and a garden with the 
rest of the land in pasture. The next year he worked 40 
acres and leased 101 acres to a white farmer.
In 1926, Hicks took over the entire 160 acres. He 
put 80 acres in cotton, 22 acres in wheat, 20 acres in 
Kaffir com, one acre in garden and the rest in pasture for 
his horses, mules, and cows. He also kept hogs and chick­
ens. During the depression, he recalls that cotton prices 
got as low as $.05/pound and that $1.30/bushel of wheat was 
not uncommon.
Hicks continued to farm his wife's allotment and to 
lease his own until 1936, when he quite farming for him­
self. At that time, his wife leased her allotment except 
for a few acres for the house, garden, and stock. Hicks 
did farm labor and drove tractors for neighboring white
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farmers. He and his wife discovered that they could make 
a better and surer living by leasing their allotments and 
working than if they farmed for themselves.
In general, Hicks recalls that his farm supported 
only his immediate family. They did all of the farm work 
themselves except chopping cotton, for which they hired 
Indian boys. Seed was saved from year to year, and fer­
tilizer was never used. Without a tractor, Hicks used 
simple horse drawn implements and hauled his grain to the 
elevator at Carnegie by wagon. Most of the meat that the 
family ate was purchased because there was not enough water 
or pasture to raise beef cattle. All debts accumulated dur­
ing the year were paid at harvest time. Hicks says that he 
was never visited by anyone from the Department of Agri­
culture or the B.I.A. in connection with his farm, and he 
never joined the farmers co-op cr any farmers associations. 
He clearly recalls that the best years were the war years.
James Silverhom, a Kiowa farmer 
James is now in his late 70s and farmed for himself 
between 1924 and 1947. He remembers that his father farmed 
an allotment located between Apache and Stacker from 1906 
to 1918 when he got a government job at Fort Sill as a 
painter. James married in 1919 and learned to farm while
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living with his brother-in-law. With the exception of a 
Mr. Cook, whom he knew from 1918 to 1920, he recalls no 
farming assistance being given by the Anadarko Area Office.
After getting a loan for implements from the Apache 
Bank, he began farming his 80 acre allotment. He had been 
allotted in 1906, and his father had chosen a tract for him 
near his own. Unfortunately, it was too sandy to be of 
much use for farming. James inherited his mother's 160 
acres in 1924 and was able to expand his farming operation. 
He had acreage in cotton, com, and various feed crops. He 
pastured 4 horses, 4 mules, and 28 beef cattle and milk cows. 
He also kept hogs and chickens.
In 1926, James inherited 135 acres from an uncle and 
further enlarged his scale of farming. At that time, he had 
the use of 375 acres, though at times he leased some land 
to get money for farm implements.
At first, he relied upon credit at the general store 
in Apache for seed, groceries, and other supplies. In time, 
he became more independent and self-sufficient and only 
bought coffee, flour, and sugar. All accumulated debts at 
the store were paid at harvest time.
The good farming years for James were 1924 through 
1929. From 1932 onward he says that farming became
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increasingly difficult. James never used a tractor and 
preferred simple 1 or 2 row implements. He sometimes hired 
out with his team for $4 or $5 a day to supplement his 
farming income. James and his wife had 10 children and 8 
or 9 nephews and cousins living with them. Everyone helped 
with the farm work, and James only hired help chopping cotton.
James usually saved his own seed for the next year 
and never used fertilizers or insecticides. The family had 
a garden of several acres each year and a fruit orchard as 
well. James was never a member of a farmer's co-op or 
association. He recalls that a few of his contemporaries 
farmed, and those who did had only 20-30 acres of com.
When he was doing well, friends and relatives would come by 
and ask for money, food, or meat, and he didn't refuse them.
"A man gets a good reputation by being generous and a bad 
reputation by being tight." James has an exceptionally good 
reputation, and his generosity is recognized by the whole 
tribe.
In the early 1930s, James had 80 acres in cotton, 
his main cash crop. During the AAA crop reduction program 
his cotton acreage allowance was cut and then cut again 
until he was allowed to plant only 12 acres of cotton. He
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says that the county agricultural agents checked crops 
closely.
James quit farming in 1947 because he "couldn't 
make any money at it," and because it was "too expensive 
to farm." He kept 140 acres and sold the rest. He did 
farm labor for a number of years and leased what land he had 
left after allowing for his house, garden, and stock. He 
knows of no Kiowa still farming today.
Alfred Chalepah, a Kiowa Apache farmer
Alfred was b o m  in 1910 and missed the last allot­
ment by several years. He farmed on his own from 1949 to 
1959.
It was in the late 1920s that he learned to farm 
from the local white farmers he worked for. In 1931, Alfred 
inherited his grandfather's 160 acre allotment. For the 
next 18 years, however, he rented his land, sharecropped, 
and did farm labor simultaneously. In 1949, he began farm­
ing for himself. He had enough money in an account at the 
Anadarko Area Office to purchase fairly sophisticated 
implements, including a tractor. At first he had only 75 
acres under cultivation, but he gradually enlarged it until 
he had 105 tilled acres. Of the total, 37 acres were in 
wheat, 7 acres in cotton, 15 acres in com, and the rest was
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in feed crops. He kept 4 beef cattle, a milk cow, hogs, 
and chickens.
Alfred recalls that he was the only Indian farmer 
in the Boone area. He did one form or another of farm work 
from 1927 to 1968. Even when farming on his own, he supple­
mented his farming income by hiring out with his tractor or 
by repairing farm machinery. He learned different farming 
techniques by working for others but was unable to apply 
what he learned to his own farm because he couldn't afford 
the cost of the innovations.
Alfred bought or saved seed on alternating years, 
and he did not use fertilizer. He had a half acre garden, 
and his corn crop was kept for home use and for feed. He 
took his grain and cotton to market at Apache and remembers 
that $1.25/bushel of wheat was not uncommon. He was a 
member of the farmers' co-op at Apache, and he "felt it was 
an honor." He clearly recalls, however, having trouble 
getting his wheat combined at the right time. He also re­
calls wanting to trade his 7 acre cotton allowance for wheat 
acres and being refused. A few years later he lost his 
cotton allowance entirely when he failed to plant one season.
Alfred quit farming in 1959 because he was "just 
breaking even." He felt that without more land and a combine
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his farming effort was pointless. After quitting, he sold 
most of his implements for $1500 and did farm work until 
1968. He leased 105 acres of crop land but kept the rest 
for his house, garden, and stock.
Alfred has pondered the problems of Indian farming 
for quite some time and believes that limited land scale, 
fractional inheritance, and the lack of financial backing 
or capital are the main obstacles to success.
The farming experiences of Hicks, Jome<;, and Alfred 
overlap chronologically and represent a variety of approaches 
to farming. All three men, however, learned by doing farm 
work for relatives or neighbors and came up with the money 
and land to start farming without government support. All 
three men fall into the category of "successful Indian 
farmers," yet all three quit farming for the same reason 
and adopted the alternative combination of leasing land, 
doing farm labor, gardening, and limited stock raising.
Hicks successfully farmed his wife’s 160 acre allot­
ment for 15 years and was backed up by the lease money from 
his allotment which was located too far away to farm simul­
taneously. Supported and assisted by just his immediate 
family and limited by his simple horse drawn implements, 
he quit in 1936 in the middle of the depression.
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James was able to put together 375 acres and farmed 
on a larger scale than Hicks or Alfred. Though he was 
limited to horse drawn technology, James had many children 
and relatives helping him farm. Though he farmed on a 
larger scale, he was supporting an extended family and many 
friends and relatives. James successfully farmed for 23 
years but was greatly hampered when his cotton allowance 
was cut from 80 acres to 12 acres. He survived the de­
pression but quit farming during the post-war depression in 
1947 because he could no longer continue to live on his 
meager cash crop allowance.
Alfred's experience was slightly different. He in­
herited 160 acres from his grandfather but did not farm it 
for 18 years. During this time, he leased his land, share- 
cropped, and did farm labor. By 1949, when he began farming 
on his own, he had been able to buy modern farm implements, 
including a tractor. Between 1949 and 1959, he successfully 
farmed 105 acres but was limited to 37 acres of wheat and 7 
acres of cotton. After 10 years of trying to farm too small 
an acreage, he quit, leased his crop land, and hired out to 
neighboring farms with his tractor.
All three of these men had a better experience than 
most of their farming Indian contemporaries. All three were
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industrious and knowledgable farmers, yet all three quit 
because they could make a better living with a lease-labor- 
garden-stock combination. Though they were uncommonly 
successful Indian farmers, their eventual choice of an 
alternative was typical of most Indian farmers.
It is interesting to note that today many white 
farmers in the area have opted for a similar combination of 
rural income sources. On the basis of casual observation 
and cafe conversations, it appears that many white farmers 
own and/or lease several hundred acres on which they raise 
cattle and grow cash crops such as wheat, cotton, or peanuts 
At the same time, they hold down semi-skilled jobs in town 
or hire out with their tractors to supplement their farming 
income. It appears that few farmers in the area can afford 
to operate on the scale needed to survive in today's agri­
cultural commodity economy without alternative sources of 
income.
Conclusions
The Indian Reorganization Act was passed in 1934, 
and the Indians' "New Deal" commenced. Though many of the 
problems were better understood, the solutions were blocked 
in Congress as funding priority was given to the depression
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and the Second World War programs. The promise of the 
Indian Reorganization Act was never realized, and an un­
declared policy of gradual termination and assimilation 
emerged. From the 1950s on, the main push in federal Indian 
programs was in the direction of vocational-technical train­
ing and relocation in urban centers. Unfortunately, the 
programs met with little success. The government has given 
no support to Indian farming since the 1940s.
The government initiated various farm relief pro­
grams in the 1930s including the AAA and the CGC. The 
farmers* condition did not improve, however, until the U.S. 
went to war in 1941. The high wartime commodity prices gave 
at least temporary relief. At the same time, however, 
government controls were increased and the upward spiral of 
land scale and mechanization continued to drive small farmers 
out of business. Another farm depression followed the war 
and lasted until the beginning of the Korean Conflict.
Again after peace was negotiated, the farmers were stung by 
the sudden market shrinkage. There has been a gradual ad­
justment to market conditions in the 1960s and 1970s, 
though the commodity situation is unstable and prices vary 
from year to year. The scale and cost of farm production 
has increased consistently throughout the 20th century.
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One major result has been the virtual extinction of the 
small scale subsistence farmer.
During the depression of the 1930s, most KCA/W 
farmers quit and turned to leasing their land and doing 
farm labor. Since they had been only marginal subsistence 
farmers beforehand, the depression and crop reductions 
simply pushed them over the edge and out of business as 
independent farmers. Those few who survived the depression 
experienced a brief respite during the war years, but were 
operating on too limited a scale to do more than just hold 
on a little while longer. After the war, many more Indian 
farmers quit, and by 1950, there were no more than a dozen 
left. Of the Indian farmers interviewed in the mid-1970s, 
only one still farmed and none of them knew of any other 
KCA/W still farming. From the testimony of two Wichita 
farmers, Frank Miller (DDOHP T 64:13-14) and Arthur Punley, 
it is clear that Wichita farmers suffered the same fate as 
the other Indian farmers in the area.
In sum, the 1934-1974 period was anticlimactic and 
simply saw the completed deterioration of the small scale 
subsistence farmers' position. The plight of the KCA/W 
farmers was not a unique cultural experience, but was one 
shared by most small scale farmers in the area. The Indians'
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sources of capital and supplementary job opportunities were 
more limited than those of the white farmers, but the major 
forces at work operated similarly on both Indians and non- 
Indians. Given the emerging conditions of the commodity 
economy, it is hardly surprising that Indian farmers opted 
for the security and better income afforded by a lease-labor- 
garden-stock combination.
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS
The Plains environment, with its intractable sod, 
meager and unreliable rainfall, and threatening weather, 
limited aboriginal farming to the shelter of river drainage 
systems. Even the hearty Indian strains of corn and squash 
could not survive the rigors of the open Plains climate.
Where practicable, however, farming offered an attractive 
and reasonably secure way of life, and it supported the 
relatively dense populations found in the sedentary farming 
villages.
Well before the arrival of the horse on the Plains, 
nomadic groups certainly were aware of the advantages that 
farming offered. The major obstacles that stood in the way 
of their adopting agriculture and incorporating it into their 
life-way were the limits imposed by the environment and the 
mobility required of them as bison hunters. It is signifi­
cant that even though farm produce was prized and commodities
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traded for, farming was so ill-suited to their situation 
that it appears not to have been even temporarily or par­
tially adopted.
Many peripheral groups were attracted to the Plains 
following the introduction of the horse. The subsequent 
cultural convergence and synthesis was strongly affected 
by the requirements of bison hunting, horse acquisition, 
and trade. Various tribes gained or lost power, though in 
general it can be said that the sedentary farming villages 
lost their former prosperous position, and the advantage 
went to the nomadic tribes. In the course of events, some 
tribes abandoned farming to become mounted nomadic hunters.
The Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache were formerly 
pedestrian hunters and gatherers, but they quickly adapted 
to the equestrian revolution and became wealthy horse 
traders and capable mounted bison hunters. The Wichita 
easily integrated the horse complex into their village farm­
ing way of life and became more active as bison hunters and 
raiders.
By the 1850s, however, the Southern Plains tribes, 
including the Kiowa, Comanche, Kiowa Apache, and Wichita, 
were in a stressful position. White hide hunters were re­
ducing the bison herds, and conflict with displaced eastern
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tribes was becoming more frequent and more desperate, A 
major drought cycle hit the southern Plains and adversely 
affected the movements of the bison and the farming villages' 
crops. The trade network deteriorated, while epidemics of 
European diseases became more frequent and the U.S. military 
presence became more threatening, especially after the Civil 
War.
The U.S. government saw the Indians as an obstacle 
to be overcome. Indian raids disrupted westward migration, 
commerce, and the settlement of surrounding areas. Since 
the tribes were originally viewed as sovereign nations with 
certain rights, the government attempted to solve the prob­
lem by treaty. This attempted solution resulted as much 
from the government's initial inability to subjugate the 
Plains tribes as it did from any recognition of aboriginal 
rights.
At any rate, there was a series of peace treaties 
with each one calling for stricter terms of tribal confine­
ment and greater territorial cessions to the whites. The 
treaties, however, were nothing more than negotiated inter­
ruptions in the hostilities and were agreed to for mutual 
convenience or were at times coerced from the tribes. It
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is hard to believe that the treaties were ever actually in­
tended to be permanent agreements.
The treaty cycle commonly consisted of Indian raids, 
military reprisals, general war, settlement bribes or 
threats, treaty, renewed Indian raids, military reprisals, 
etc. Both the government and the Indians were inconsistent, 
uncoordinated, and mutually unaccountable. Treaty violations 
on both sides generated the cycle of periodic military esca­
lation and renewed treaty making. With each new treaty, the 
southern Plains tribes saw their territory pared down and 
their subsistence further threatened. It is little wonder 
that they continued to resist. They found themselves in a 
deteriorating position, however, as the bison were rapidly 
exterminated and their military capability in terms of 
horses, guns, and warriors was steadily eroded.
The Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa Apache were restricted 
to a reservation in 1869 and effectively were pacified by 
1875 after a series of outbreaks. By this time, they no 
longer had the means to resist or subsist and were forced to 
rely upon government rations for survival. While the U.S. 
government failed to pacify them with treaty bribes and 
promises or with military threats, eventually it succeeded 
in reducing them to a position of nutritional dependence.
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The government, however, found that the price of peace and 
reservation confinement was higher than it wished to pay 
and immediately sought means to alleviate this burden.
During the reservation period, the government 
attempted to "civilize" and "Christianize" the Indians as 
well as to transform them into self-supporting subsistence 
farmers. With the passage of the Dawes Act, further steps 
were taken to detribalize, allot, and assimilate the Indian 
population. The government held to its plan of making 
farmers of the Indians throughout the period, though Congress 
continually refused to allocate the funds needed to achieve 
this goal.
The Kiowa, Comanche, Kiowa Apache, and Wichita 
adapted to the reservation situation by utilizing a com­
bination of subsistence sources (rations, hunting, farming, 
stock raising, wage labor, and grazing leases). No single 
source was adequate to insure survival in the reservation 
context. The bison were gone by 1880, and other game was 
too scarce to support the Indian population. Farming was 
drastically hampered by environmental conditions and in­
adequate instruction, seed, and implements, as well as other 
factors. Stock raising, though environmentally suited, was 
handicapped by the lack of government support for the project.
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by the meagerness of rations which forced the Indians to 
eat their breeding stock to keep from starving, and by 
white theft of Indian cattle. Wage labor opportunities 
were few and the wages appallingly low. Understandably and 
tragically, the Indians were forced to depend upon govern­
ment rations for 33 years. They could not support them­
selves, and yet the government rations were always short 
and undependable. Their reservation experience installed 
the KCA/W in a cycle of economic marginality in which most 
of them are still entrapped.
It is important to keep in mind that the KCA/W did 
farm, at least to the extent that farming was possible under 
reservation conditions. By 1900, it appears that the major­
ity of families in all four tribes had some acreage in feed, 
corn, and/or gardens, though they had little or no cash 
crops. They had made a beginning, but the reservation open­
ing found them ill-equipped to hold their own as the area 
was developed. If the KCA/W had received little support in 
making the transformation into self-sufficient farmers be­
fore allotment, they received even less support after allot­
ment. Without even the support of meager government rations, 
subsistence farming proved difficult at best.
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Though those KCA/W who farmed shared in the periods 
of American farming prosperity (1898-1914 and WWI 1916-1919), 
they also shared the hardships of the post-war farm de­
pression.
By the turn of the century there was a clear national 
trend away from small scale subsistence farming toward larger 
cash crop enterprises. The bulk of the Oklahoma homesteaders, 
as well as the allotted Indians, soon found that being lim­
ited to 160 acres was a severe handicap.
Though the First World War brought four years of 
quite favorable commodity prices, it also accelerated the 
pace of farm mechanization and enlarged the scale of cash 
crop production. The farm depression was the result of 
overproduction and the shrinkage of the commodity market.
All farmers suffered during the depression, but the small 
subsistence farmers were the first to be driven under.
Immediately following the allotment and opening, 
many KCA/W farmers were interrupted by having to move and 
open new fields and became the victims of cattle rustlers 
and loan sharks. Many KCA/W quickly were lured into leasing 
their allotments and trying to live off the rent. Approxi­
mately three-fourths of all KCA/W allotments were leased by 
1911. Nevertheless, several hundred Indians farmed before
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the First World War, and their number was enlarged sig­
nificantly during the war as a result of the high prices 
paid for commodities. By 1920 and the beginning of the 
farm depression, the number of Indian farmers had dropped 
well below the pre-war level, and it continued to decline 
from that point on. Even the most capable and well estab­
lished Indian farmers were marginal to the larger farm 
economy. Many Indians quit farming independently during 
this period. They typically turned to farm labor and to 
leasing most of their land, keeping just enough acreage for 
a house, a garden, and feed for a few horses and cattle.
In most cases, this combination offered a better income and 
greater security than if they had continued to farm.
The Wheeler-Howard Indian Reorganization Act was 
passed in 1934, and the government's Indian policy was 
revised. Despite the best efforts of Commissioner John 
Collier, the promise of the Indians' "New Deal" went largely 
unrealized. National depression and a world war eclipsed 
the momentarily renewed concern for the Indians' plight. 
Collier resigned in 1946 after having accomplished but a 
fraction of what he had envisioned. Rural Indians largely 
were ignored until the 1960s and 1970s, and then they
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received little direct assistance. After the 1940s, the 
government gave no further support to Indian farming.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act was passed in 1933, 
and sought to improve and stabilize commodity prices by 
cutting farm production. Though crop acreages were reduced, 
expensive but effective technological improvements helped to 
maintain the condition of overproduction. The AAA was de­
signed to provide farm relief; however, it gave little aid 
to the small scale farmer who was crippled by the reduction 
of his already small cash crop acreage. As a result, many 
small scale farmers were forced to quit during the late 
1930s.
The Second World War brought favorable commodity 
prices. The big mechanized farms prospered while the few 
remaining small scale farmers merely were given a respite 
in their struggle for survival. Following the war, there 
was a return to farm depression conditions, though the 
Korean Conflict temporarily alleviated the situation. From 
1950 on, the farm economy experienced a complex series of 
fluctuations. It is clear, however, that from 1934 to 1974, 
there was a rapid increase in farm size, mechanization, and 
production cost and an equally rapid decline in the number 
of small-scale farms.
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Those few Indian farmers not wiped out by 1933 
suffered from the AAA cash crop reductions. Most of them 
quit farming in favor of the labor, lease, and garden com­
bination. Fractional inheritance and land sales steadily 
reduced the land holdings of many Indians to the point that 
lease income became negligible. As a result, another com­
bination became prevalent: that of wage labor, help from
relatives, and/or public assistance.
Those Indians still farming by the close of the 
Second World War were unable to keep up with their large 
scale mechanized neighbors, and soon they too quit farming. 
With one exception, none of the former Indian farmers inter­
viewed knew of any KCA/W still farming.
In sum, it can be seen that government policy affect­
ing Indian farming was continually in flux. The funding re­
quired to realize the goal of self-sufficient Indian farming 
never was made available by Congress. Stinting appropria­
tions and reduction of Indian land holdings were the only 
two consistent elements in federal Indian policy.
The Indian adaptation to the Southern Plains environ­
ment appears (with one brief but spectacular exception) 
typically to have been one in which a broad combination of 
sources was tapped to provide subsistence. Such an approach
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is necessary where the environment is highly variable and 
where no single subsistence alternative can guarantee sur­
vival.
Prior to the introduction of the horse, it can be 
seen that both the nomadic hunters and gatherers and the 
village farmers utilized a broad spectrum of food resources 
on the Plains. The 1750-1850 period provides the exception. 
The effectiveness of hunting bison from horseback allowed 
the Plains tribes to specialize to a great extent. It drew 
many tribes with markedly different cultures from adjacent 
areas onto the Plains and into a largely uniform pattern of 
adaptation. With their restriction to a reservation and the 
extermination of the bison, the KCA/W turned to a combination 
of variable sources of subsistence (rations, annuities, crops, 
stock, game, wage labor, and grass money). Though the gov­
ernment tried to force them to adopt the farming specializa­
tion, the environment continually demonstrated how imprac­
ticable such a move was. The one viable specialization, 
cattle raising, was never supported since it required that 
the Indians retain too much reservation land.
The subsistence farming option was tried by many 
KCA/W families after allotment, but with the onset of the 
farm depression there was a fairly rapid shift toward a new
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combination of income sources (lease, farm labor, garden, 
and stock). With the passage of time and the fractioning 
and sale of allotments, still another combination of income 
sources came to be relied upon by many KCA/W (casual labor, 
help from relatives, and public assistance).
Recently, many young men have at least temporarily 
left the area when they joined the armed forces and were 
stationed elsewhere. There also has been a growing number 
of young people who have received technical training and who 
have taken jobs in major cities in the region.
Though no claim is made here that paternalism is the 
key factor in the failure of Indian farming, it has clearly 
exercised a pervasive influence upon the KCA/W and served to 
help perpetuate their condition of chronic dependence and 
economic marginality. From the first treaty onward, the 
government's relationship with the Indians was one in which 
minimal bribes were offered in exchange for cooperation and 
acquiescence to new territorial reductions. With the des­
truction of the bison, the Indians were not only pacified, 
but they were reduced to a fundamental dependence upon 
congressional appropriations. The government immediately 
sought to eliminate this fiscal drain and at the same time 
meet the godlike demands of the "white man's burden."
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The piecemeal manner of issuing individual rations, 
annuities, per capita payments, and grass money kept the 
Indians continually dependent upon a "nickel and dime" dole 
system and lined the pockets of government contractors and 
local merchants. It should be noted that the Indians them­
selves appear to have been in favor of such periodic in­
dividual disbursements rather than the use of available funds 
to accomplish grander long-range goals. Various agents ad­
vanced proposals and designs for achieving the goal of Indian 
self-support but were ignored since their schemes required 
either too much money at one timm or called for too much land 
to be retained in Indian ownership.
Conditions changed little in the 20th century. The 
KCA/W remained dependent upon the Anadarko Area Office in 
the handling of most financial matters. An enormous bu­
reaucracy, rather than government contractors, received the 
lion's share of the Indian appropriations. Though much 
money has been spent annually on "the Indians," the amount 
of actual direct assistance has been minimal. In fairness, 
it should be recognized that program design, agency co­
ordination, Indian cooperation, and adequate funding are all 
monumental problems in themselves and unless they can be 
overcome simultaneously little can be accomplished.
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A few points appear obvious:
(1) The KCA/W reservation environment was ill- 
suited to farming prior to the application df 20th century 
agricultural technology.
(2) The government singlemindedly was committed to 
the idea of making the Indians self-supporting farmers, yet 
the funds needed to realize this goal never were forth­
coming .
(3) Between allotment and the onset of the farm 
depression, significant numbers of KCA/W were engaged in 
subsistence farming. As farm conditions worsened, however, 
most quit farming and adopted a land lease, farm labor, 
gardening, and stock raising subsistence.
(4) The demise of the KCA/W farmers in the 20th 
century was less a product of their cultural background and 
more directly linked to the economic conditions that worked 
against all small scale farmers.
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